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ABSTRACT
The methodology evaluation and recommendations presented in this
document are part of an overall effort initiated by the Army to improve its
Hardware versus Manpower (HARDMAN) methodology for projecting manpower,
personnel, and training (MPT) to support new acquisitions. Several different
validity tests were employed to evaluate the methodology. These tests
included (1) a general examination of the basic reasonableness of the
technique; (2) a reliability measure of how well other trained individuals,
given the same data inputs, can derive the same answers as an already-
completed test case; (3) a qualitative accuracy check based on talking to
individuals who have already applied the same, or similar, methodology; and
(4) a simple measure of how accurately the methodology must predict the real
world. The net outcome of the study revealed that the methodology conformed
fairly well with both the Army's MPT user needs and other accepted manpower
modeling techniques. Additionally, audits of three completed HARDMAN
applications revealed only a small number of potential problem areas compared
to the total number of issues investigated. The reliability study results
conformed well with the problem areas uncovered through the audits. The major
problems discovered basically revolved around (1) a need to tighten up select
judgmental portions of the methodology, and (2) a requirement to improve those
aspects of the technique used for making MPT support and budget decisions.
The results of the accuracy studies suggested, respectively, that although no
firm accuracy judgment could be made at this time, the manpower life-cycle
cost component was only marginally sensitive to changes in other related cost
variables. Therefore, even with some minor problems, the methodology seemed
to be sound and to have good near-term utility to the Army. Recommendations
were provided to firm up the problem areas revealed through the evaluation.
FOREWORD
This document provides the results of the first phase of an evaluation
effort designed to examine and improve the Army's HARDMAN manpower projection
methodology. The work was performed by JPL and was sponsored by the Army
Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) through a
reimbursable agreement (ARI Nos. 13ARI19 Change 1 and 13ARI83-35, respectively
dated February 15 and March 9, 1983) with the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (Task RD-182, Amendment 256). Dr. John Whittenburg, Team
Leader for the Systems Manning Technical Area, is the task officer.
In a literal sense, this document is the product of a team effort.
Wayne Zimmerman, the Task Manager and prime author, was assisted by several
colleagues. Valerie Gray was responsible for the user requirements portion of
the study and assisted in performing the reliability study. Leigh Rosenberg
organized and conducted the reliability study. As an adjunct to the
reliability study, Robert Butler, of the Assessment Group consulting firm,
performed the event-series validity evaluation. Mark Franklin and Steven
Parks participated and provided assistance, respectively, in the SINCGARS
replication and technical audit efforts, which were part of the validity
studies. Shirley Stroup was responsible for typing the document.
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SECTION I
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
A. OBJECTIVES
The Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), sponsored by the Army Research
Institute (ARI), was asked to provide the Army with an objective, independent
assessment of the validity and reliability of the HARDMAN (Hardware vs.
Manpower) Comparability Methodology (HCM) for projecting manpower, personnel,
and training. JPL was also asked to make recommendations for needed improve-
ments in the methodology that would ultimately help the Army implement an
accurate manpower, personnel, and training (MPT) system that could be applied
early in the acquisition process of new systems.
The following paragraphs discuss the major assumptions and constraints
that established the framework of the study, the background behind the Army
manpower and training issue, the evaluation approach and summary of results,
and the overall structure of the document.
B. BACKGROUND
Having stated the overall objectives of the study, it is appropriate at
this time to provide a brief summary of the background of the task.
Over the past several years, the Army has recognized a critical manpower
situation revolving around the widening gap between increasing weapon com-
plexity and declining manpower availability. The problem of declining
manpower availability has been further aggravated by the apparent decay of
entrant skill levels. An effort was initiated by ARI in 1980, as part of an
Army-wide interest to improve the manpower problem, to determine whether a
Navy methodology called HARDMAN (HARDware vs. MANpower) could be applied to
Army systems. The Army was interested in determining whether an existing
manpower, personnel, and training projection technique could be modified to
provide early, accurate inputs to the acquisition process. The Army chose to
examine the HCM (one of several methodologies developed under the auspices of
the Navy HARDMAN Office) because it was an integrated MPT technique and had
already been used in several Navy acquisition programs. The other Navy
methodologies appeared to be too narrow in scope or required input data not
available under the Army's existing data collection systems. Although these
systems have not been ruled out for Army use, it seemed that for the near
term, the greatest payoff rested on the HCM. The HCM contains the following
six major steps:
(1) Establish a consolidated data base composed of functional descrip-
tions of the proposed and similar predecessor systems; and
associated inputs such as hardware reliability, personnel informa-
tion, costs, and training data. This information is used to
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support succeeding steps in the analysis. This step is essential
because the Army does not usually organize and store data in
effective structure to conduct human resource analysis.
.(2) Determine the manpower requirements and skills necessary to
operate and maintain the system.
(3) Determine training requirements likely to be imposed by the
proposed system.
(4) Determine personnel requirements (i.e., personnel flows that will
be necessary to support the manpower requirements).
(5) Conduct an impact analysis to establish likely manpower and
training shortages and identify parts of the system that represent
high-cost drivers.
(6) Perform a tradeoff analysis to alter features of the system (e.g.,
reliability or required skill levels) to reduce or eliminate
unreas onable demands.
Each of these steps involves several judgments pertaining to the
selection of comparable predecessor systems, the identification and assembly
of associated data on the predecessor systems, expected performance of the
proposed system as compared to predecessor systems, and required skills.
Additionally, gaps in the supporting data often exist at the conceptual design
stage. At these junctions, expert judgment is exercised to merge the various
pieces of information into a comprehensive, consistent picture to be used to
generate the personnel projections. The Army's concern is that these judgment
areas could act as major error sources in the manpower projection.
Consequently, JPL was asked to perform an objective evaluation of the
methodology to identify both strengths and weaknesses of the technique and
make recommendations, as appropriate.
C. ASSUMPTIONS AND CONSTRAINTS
One of the methodology validity tests involved a comparison of the user
needs against the proposed outcomes of the projection scheme. To establish
the user requirements, a detailed interview process was designed to use the
bank of experience already existing in the Army. The major assumption
involved with the user requirements effort centered on the user contacts.
Because the user contacts in the various Army commands were established via
the sponsor and recommendations from the users themselves, it was assumed that
the suggested sources were sufficiently experienced and knowledgeable in the
MPT arena so that their answers were representative of the respective commands
in general. Even though the sample size was small, the consistency of the
responses suggested that the answers were a good representation of the Army as
a whole.
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Several limitations were imposed on the study. The size of the sample
user population was limited primarily by the available time to complete the
evaluation. Some of the users contacted were more informed or aware than
others about MPT processes or projection models such as the HCM. Therefore,
it was understood that some of their responses could reflect an already
established preference, depending on their knowledge of the various elements
present in the HCM or other MPT models. To circumvent this bias, the
questionnaire and interview technique employed in this evaluation focused on
getting the user to provide requirements for a "generic" MPT projection system
for the Army.
It should be noted that the user requirements determined by this study
reflect the needs of a present or near-future MPT system. Any changes to this
environment could result in additional or different requirements (e.g.,
implementation of Integrated System Support (ISS)). Therefore, it is
important that the Army consider periodic reevaluation of its MPT requirements
to ensure that any in-place MPT system remains responsive to the needs of the
various MPT players.
Although it was originally planned to do a thorough validity and
reliability evaluation of the methodology, internal time and budget limita-
tions resulted in the sponsor opting to defer (1) the accuracy check on the
MPT methodology, (2) the life-cycle cost (LCC) and methodology sensitivity
analysis, and (3) the quantitative accuracy check on the methodology input
data (e.g., reliability and maintainability data). Finally, other duty
commitments required that the internal validity experiment be simplified so
that the Army participants could finish the replication within a maximum
three-week time frame.
D. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION APPROACH AND RESULTS OF ANALYSIS
The preceding discussion outlined the various steps and judgments
necessary to exercise the HCM. Because of the breadth and complexity of MPT
issues covered by the technique, a multifaceted evaluation was structured to
examine potential validity aspects. The validity aspects, evaluation
approach, and study results are summarized in the following paragraphs.
1. Evaluation Approach
As stated earlier in this section, time and budget constraints
limited the original scope of the study. Validity measures related to testing
model accuracy were deferred to the next study phase. However, within the
imposed constraints several other validity tests were conducted. Face
validity, a measure of whether the model appears logical and reasonable, was
the first aspect investigated. Although not a rigorous credibility test, a
face-validity study does afford some insights into the general utility of the
model, potential error sources, data availability problems, logic foundation,
and possible ambiguities in logic structure or results. The approach for
performing the face-validity examination was fourfold. First, a user
requirements study was performed to establish the Army's needs within the MPT
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community. A total of nine distinct user groups (thirteen individuals) were
interviewed in person to establish user MPT needs in areas, ranging from the
basic design of the MPT projection system to the kinds of information desired
from the system outputs. A basic utility test was then performed by comparing
each user requirement against the same respective element in the HCM. Second,
existing DOD and Army directives were examined to see whether there were any
established, accepted MPT techniques presently in use that could be used to
confirm the general logic structure and data foundation. Third, a larger
literature search was conducted, encompassing other government agencies and
the private sector. Again, the object was to develop a firm basis for
evaluating the logic and data support structures of the HCM, as well as
examining potential sources for error. Last, detailed audits were conducted
on three applications of the methodology. Independent analysts attempted to
replicate major empirical and judgmental steps in each application with the
intent of examining overall logic, potential sources of errors, data
manipulation or availability problems, and ambiguities in how the projections
were derived and interpreted.
Another test, internal reliability, was employed to get an understanding
of the ability of others to successfully apply the technique and obtain
consistent answers. An internal validity test is essentially a measure of the
variance in model outputs when a group of independent analysts replicate an
already completed application given the same inputs. Ultimately, the
objective is to establish the clarity and succinctness of the model, as well
as the ability to have any reasonably trained individual perform the process
reliably. An actual Army system was selected for the internal validity test.
A group of seven individuals (four civilians and three Army officers) were
initially trained in the execution of the HCM and then provided with data
packages that allowed them to conduct a "limited" manpower and personnel
assessment on the proposed system (i.e., because of other duty commitments and
resultant time restrictions, only four major components of the system were
studied).
It was decided that an attempt should be made to examine model accuracy
from at least a qualitative standpoint. To this end, several individuals in
both the Air Force and Navy, who had experience with applications of the same
(or similar) MPT model, were contacted for information pertaining to any tests
or actual comparative field data that might indicate the relative accuracy of
the methodology.
Finally, the last validity aspect examined was an event-series test.
Event-series validity is basically a measure of how accurately a simulation
must reproduce a real-world event. A top-level, life-cycle, cost-sensitivity
analysis, keying on the manpower variable, was employed as the tool to achieve
this measure. The required accuracy of the manpower variable was determined
by performing iterations of the life-cycle cost projection (using an example
acquisition) until all other dependent variables, manning, and total
life-cycle cost fell within prescribed error bounds. This measure was
particularly important for obtaining a further understanding of the model
usefulness as a decision making tool.
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Throughout all of these validity exercises several strengths and parallel
problem areas surfaced. The complete results of the evaluation are summarized
in the following discussion.
2. Summary of Results
Table 1-1 provides an overall summary of the study results. Each
of the above evaluation areas is discussed briefly in the following paragraphs.
Table 1-1. Net Results of HARDMAN Evaluation
Evaluation Areas Net Results
User Requirements
Operational Analysis
Comparison with
other MPT methods
Audits
Reliability Analysis
Internal reliability
Qualitative
Accuracy Check
Event Series Validity
Technique complied with majority of mandatory
user requirements
Methodology conformed with other known, accepted
MPT modeling schemes, and data foundations
Methodology demonstrated sound logic and
reasonable results for 85% of test issues
examined (remaining issues considered reparable
in near term)
Test group correctly replicated half of selected
test points (two of the four remaining test
points found to be repeatable after clarification)
Two of nine individuals having experience with
HARDMAN applications indicated a rough accuracy
of 80-90% with actual manning requirements;
remaining individuals had insufficient experience
to comment
Manpower variable found to be least sensitive of
all life-cycle cost variables, demonstrating good
utility of existing methodology even without
suggested near-term improvements
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a. User Requirements Analysis. The user requirements analysis
generated a total of twenty-two mandatory MPT system requirements. Thirteen
of the mandatory requirements applied to system outputs, and the remaining
nine requirements were related to system design. An additional four require-
ments were given lower priority by the users and were therefore listed as
"desirable." The major thrust of the user needs revolved around the key design
drivers of affordability, supportability, and sustainability. By comparison,
it was found that the HCM complied with seventeen of the twenty-two mandatory
requirements. The areas of noncompliance were as follows:
(1) Not indicating the accuracy of the MPT projection system to aid
budget control and program—level decisions.
(2) Not including demographic data such as age, sex, size, etc., as
part of the man-machine matching and support process.
(3) Not considering the demands of other acquisitions on the available
manpower pool (i.e., the HCM still focuses primarily on the
individual equipment system).
(4) Not performing a complete life-cycle cost tradeoff analysis (i.e.,
the HCM focuses only on MPT costs).
(5) Not indicating weaknesses in the MPT analysis along with
respective resolution actions.
Overall, it seems that the HCM is reasonably responsive to the Army's
needs.
b. Operational Analysis. The literature search and audit
aspects of the face validity study were jointly conducted under the
operational analysis portion of the evaluation. This portion of the overall
study was broadly termed "operational analysis" because the ensuing
investigation required a rigorous exercising of the HCM. The review and
comparison of related DOD and Army directives provided three major findings:
(1) DOD system acquisition guidelines stated a requirement to consider MPT in
the design process but did not appear to afford a means of projecting MPT
requirements; (2) the Army Manpower Authorization, Criteria (MACRIT) guide did
provide a simple manpower projection algorithm; and (3) the HCM appeared to be
designed around the MACRIT manpower algorithm, with its outputs generally
organized to conform with broader DOD acquisition directives. These insights,
although serving as good initial data points, only addressed a fraction of the
total methodology. The follow-up government and private-sector literature
searches were far more intensive. Nineteen other MPT models and papers,
encompassing all aspects of the HCM, were studied. Generally, it was
discovered that the other modeling approaches were reasonably equivalent in
their assumptions, algorithms, and data inputs. In one area, the personnel
pipeline projection, the HCM approach was found to be stronger because it
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employed a modeling technique that reduced the need for difficult-to-obtain
data such as present and future manpower availabilities. On the negative side,
it seemed that there were four distinct areas where potential inaccuracies
could be interjected: (1) The use of the MACRIT manpower algorithm could
result in early or late life-cycle manpower projection errors unless system
deployment and phase-out rates are considered; (2) non-consideration of major
socio-economic factors such as the draft, economy, change in federal govern-
ment administrations, or massive military reorganizations could influence the
attrition and retention characteristics of personnel career paths; (3) the
non-use of some type of long-term manpower availability projection to indicate
shortages at the time of system deployment could result in sizeable personnel
errors; and (4) the lack of a complete life-cycle cost model could prevent the
full range of potential cost and system design tradeoffs from being provided
to the decision makers.
The last aspect of the face-validity analysis, the audits, revealed that
the model successfully passed eighty-five percent of the test issues examined.
The remaining potential problem areas discovered were (1) the lack of a
structured process of selecting, adjusting, and manipulating the source data
could sizeably affect the accuracy and credibility of the projections; (2) the
use of a single reference system (composed of similar predecessor components)
to model several widely varying proposed designs could also affect the
accuracy and credibility of the results; (3) the absence of an adjustment to
the complete predecessor historical data to consider the design improvements
of the proposed system means that it would not be feasible to make a valid
comparison between real world performance and the often overly-optimistic
projection of the contractor; (4) the lack of a structured process for
approximating the value of peculiar design changes or induced human error as
related to component failure rates presents a means of interjecting computa-
tional mistakes as well as reducing both the audit and usability capacities of
the method; (5) the absence of indicators for data quality and projection
accuracy could affect the credibility and usefulness of the results; and (6)
the complexity of the technique requires the use of a well-seasoned, multi-
disciplinary team which, in turn, could impact the ability of others to apply
the method.
c. Reliability Analysis. The last parts of evaluation, the
internal and event-series validity tests and qualitative accuracy check, were
performed under the reliabiity analysis. This was done because all of these
validity aspects related to both the internal and external reliability of the
process. The results of the internal validity check were closely aligned with
the audit findings. As a whole, the test group discovered that, given the
same inputs, it could not replicate the original SINCGARS results. Although
all of the study group seemed to understand roughly half of the early steps in
the process reasonably well, they had problems with (1) developing a reference
system that jointly met the functional requirements and was representative of
the two widely varying contractor designs; (2) not understanding the thought
process for determining impacts of design differences, and how and when to
perturb historical predecessor data to model components of the proposed
system; and (3) not comprehending the exact process of matching or selecting
skills. After items (1) and (3) were clarified, the study group had a fairly
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good grasp of the majority of the early steps in the process. The test
subjects uniformly agreed that none of them singularly had enough training or
educational background to exercise the complete methodology with any
confidence.
The major finding in the event-series validity study was that the MPT
projections could easily vary by plus or minus fifteen percent without causing
major problems at the upper DOD budget and cost control management levels.
Component usage rate was found to have the greatest influence on causing
unacceptable errors in manpower projections. Although it was jointly dis-
covered that there is still not sufficient historical experience to make a
firm qualitative accuracy judgment on the process, the low sensitivity finding
on the manpower variable was a promising indicator of the utility of the model
even with its minor drawbacks.
d. Conclusions and Recommendations. In conclusion, it was felt
that, overall, the HCM appeared to be reasonably sound. The flaws discovered
did not appear to be irreparable. The major near-term recommendations
suggested to tighten up the problem areas were as follows: (1) Establish
subjective criteria for rating the quality of various data sources; (2)
provide an indication of the credibility of the projections; (3) establish a
top-level method for comparing the technology of the reference and proposed
systems on an equal basis; (4) establish solid guidelines and information
sources for building reference systems and consider the use of two reference
systems to model two widely varying contractor-proposed designs; (5) firm up
guidelines for the functional requirements level of indenture; (6) provide a
better structure for MOS and skill selection; (7) periodically update manpower
projections (every two to four years) over a system's life cycle to offset
possible end-point errors; (8) provide a more structured tradeoff process; and
(9) standardize the assessment of study weaknesses and resolution actions.
The intermediate term (two years from the present) priorities were
(1) project manpower availability out to the actual system deployment date;
(2) incorporate a more complete life cycle cost tradeoff analysis; (3) firm up
ranges for perturbation values, induced failures, and indirect productivity
factors.
Far-term recommendations (for the three- to five-year time frame
following the present) included (1) consideration of other emerging system
manpower demands; (2) development of a quantitative means to differentiate
between critical and non-critical tasks; (3) expansion of the demographic data
base; and (4) consideration of major socioeconomic fluctuations. Potential
solutions for all of the preceding recommendations were also provided.
In addition to these recommendations, it was also suggested that, based
on the audit and reliability findings, future HARDMAN training programs solicit
a multidisciplinary team of individuals with backgrounds in the military,
engineering, information systems and data management, and personnel. Further,
combinations of two of more of these disciplines in each individual as part of
the overall multidisciplinary team seem to form the best foundation for accu-
rately exercising the methodology.
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E. STRUCTURE OF DOCUMENT
This document is structured so that a brief history of both the HARDMAN
effort and Army involvement in HARDMAN is provided first in Section II as a
basis for the study. Section III discusses the overall design of the analysis
and broadly explains the purpose and content of the various validity studies.
Sections IV through VI provide the detailed results of the methodology evalua-
tion in the major areas of user requirements, face validity (operational
analysis), and reliability (internal and event-series validity). Finally,
Section VII discusses the implications of the results and provides the overall
assessment of the technique with recommendations.
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SECTION II
HARDMAN BACKGROUND
A. OVERVIEW
The previous section provided a brief summary of the evaluation approach
and results. As stated earlier in Section I, the Army has been concerned
about the widening gap between growing technology and decreasing availability
of needed skills. Manpower guidelines already exist through DOD documents
such as the 5000 series and Military Standard (MIL-STD) 1388. These documents,
which establish acquisition and support procedures for new systems, address
the requirement to have a proper man-machine balance but do not specify
techniques to accomplish the balance. Given the ever-widening technology and
skills gap, the Army has been pressed to develop clear, accurate manpower
projection techniques to fill the void in existing DOD acquisition guidelines.
The following paragraphs provide a brief summary of the history and progression
of events leading up to the Army's decision to develop an appropriate MPT pro-
jection system.
B. HARDMAN HISTORY
The weapon system acquisition process has evolved over a long period of
time. The overall system acquisition strategy suggests that the number of
competing alternatives should be narrowed by eliminating those concepts no
longer considered viable as a function of four major measures (1,2): (1) the
ability of a design to meet the proposed mission; (2) the compatibility of the
design with the anticipated threat; (3) a comparison of each concept with
operational requirements; and (4) a comparison of each design's threshold
values (i.e., cost, performance, readiness, and supportability impacts).
These measures are employed throughout the system development process. The
development process consists of four phases containing three major milestones
or acquisition decision points (2):
(1) Phase I (Milestone I) - Concept development.
(2) Phase II (Milestone II) - Concept demonstration and
validation.
(3) Phase III (Milestone III)- System development.
(4) Phase IV - System production
and deployment.
At the end of each phase or milestone, a go/no-go decision is made by
the Army System Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) and Defense System Acquisi-
tion Review Council (DSARC) as to whether to proceed to the next milestone
(1,2). A key consideration in all of the preceding measures and subsequent
decision points is the integration of manpower, personnel, and training (MPT)
2-1
into new designs. Recent studies (3, 4) by some of the services (i.e., Air
Force and Navy) indicate that operations and support costs can consume from 40
to 50% of the total life-cycle cost of a weapon system. Additionally, the
manpower component of the support portion of life-cycle cost can consume as
much as 60%. These studies underline the growing importance of MPT.
Although the Air Force was the first service to develop a major thrust
to resolve the MPT dilemma, the actual formalization of the HARDMAN concept,
as presently defined, started with the creation of Navy's HARDMAN Development
Office in 1977 (5). The Navy's HARDMAN effort was initiated partially because
of studies similar to References 3 and 4 and to the fact that present DOD
directives do not adequately define methods for projecting MPT requirements
for new acquisitions. The first Navy HARDMAN study, initiated in 1975, was
funded by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Studies and Analysis Program.
This study established that (1) systems were being designed without adequate
attention given to MPT costs and (2) logistics support planning (and in
particular MPT) for new acquisitions was inadequate. The CNO study outlined
the following solutions:
(1) Develop analytical tools and methods for MPT to influence the
weapon system acquisition process.
(2) Develop an MPT information system.
(3) Revise existing directives governing the acquisition process to be
more sensitive to MPT.
As a result of the CNO study and some aggressive management, the Navy
established the HARDMAN office and set about developing a modeling system
composed of four linked components consistent with the aforementioned CNO
guidelines and tailored to the various design phases.
The linked modeling system, which is the present HARDMAN design,
basically consisted of the following:
(1) A manpower projection model.
(2) A training resource assessment.
(3) A life-cycle cost analysis.
(4) A HARDMAN information system.
The manpower projection link of the system (HCM) was designed by
Dynamics Research Corporation (DRC) and was developed around the concept of
using information from similar predecessor technology as a basis for manpower
projections (6). Drawing on an extensive historical data base as well as the
new design inputs, the manpower for the proposed system is estimated by
altering the historical data as a function of the peculiar design improvements
and fitting these results into a simple manpower equation consisting
principally of total workload manhours and total systems to be procured. The
HCM proceeds to establish required skills, training, MP costs, and potential
personnel shortages through the remaining steps in the methodology. MPT
estimates are then refined as the input data matures through subsequent design
stages.
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The PACER Corporation developed the training resource link (HTRRDM),
designed to provide a checklist and straightforward algorithms for defining
elements such as training sites, instructors, instructional devices, course
material, and training costs (7).
The life-cycle cost link of the HARDMAN system (HLCCM) was developed by
the Assessment Group firm and designed in two levels of detail to be com-
mensurate with the different stages of design development. Drawing on standard
life-cycle cost algorithms, a skill-cost model, and designer inputs, the tech-
nique provides both the total-system, life-cycle cost and the ability to
quickly perform life-cycle cost tradeoffs between various logistic elements (8).
The last system link, the HARDMAN Information System (HIS), was designed
by Ackman Associates. Although not completed, the HIS is structured to be the
repository for all predecessor system MPT and life-cycle cost data as well as
data for new potential acquisitions.
The Navy effort has considerable value for several reasons. Most
important is the clear demonstration of the necessity to bond MPT securely
with the acquisition community. Another clear value of the Navy's effort
revolves around the many manpower models developed by DOD and the various
services over the past several years. These models generally have only
addressed select aspects of the MPT problem such as manpower flows in and out
of various skill areas or total manpower requirements. The Navy's thrust has
been to develop a total MPT system, which extends beyond these smaller
studies. Additionally, the Navy's program has produced a large bank of
experience and MPT tools.
C. ARMY INVOLVEMENT IN HARDMAN
Like the Navy, the Army has been observing similar problems with the
mismatch between advancing technology and decreasing availability of skills.
In 1980, the Army Research Institute (ARI) initiated an effort, in support of
the Army-wide interest in the system manning problem, to establish whether the
Navy HARDMAN effort could be tailored for use on new Army acquisitions.
Recognizing that approximately seventy five percent of the system acquisition
cost is committed by Phase II of the development cycle, the Army was also
interested in determining whether the technique could provide early,
reasonably accurate MPT estimates. As indicated in the preceding section,
there was considerable overlap between the comparability, training, and
costing links. Because it appeared that the HCM was the most encompassing and
mature of the MPT models, ARI decided to perform some test applications of
this technique as well as a validation of the methodology. To date, the Army
has funded four test applications: Corps Support Weapon System (CSWS),
Division Support Weapon System (DSWS), Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV), and
Single Channel Ground Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS). The study performed
in this document represents the first segment of the Army's validation effort
and draws on the results of three of the test applications. The HCM presently
represents a possible near-term solution to the Army's MPT dilemma.
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D. DESCRIPTION AND INTENDED USE OF THE ARMY HARDMAN SYSTEM
The Army HARDMAN system is presently emphasizing only the HCM. The
technique consists of six major steps as shown in Figure 2-1 (6). Step 1,
Establish Consolidated Data Base, includes the development of functional
descriptions of the alternate systems and the collection of the input data
(hardware, personnel, training, and cost) needed to support the succeeding
analyses. Step 2, Determine Manpower Requirements, refers to the process of
identifying the number and skills of soldiers necessary to operate and
maintain the system. Step 3, Determine Training Requirements, is done in
parallel with Step 4 and requires the specification of the numbers and types
of instructors, courses, media, and training devices, etc., which are
necessary to accommodate the new equipment. Step 4, Determine Personnel
Requirements, addresses the activity of identifying the peculiar occupational
speciality requirements. Step 5, Conduct Impact Analysis, focuses on the
activity of comparing assessed demands (from Steps 2-4) and available supplies
and notes unreasonable resource demands in terms of both manpower and training
costs and personnel. Step 6, Tradeoff Analysis, refers to the activity of
altering features of the system and repeating Steps 1 through 5 to reduce or
eliminate unreasonable demands.
Within each step there are several judgments required that are basically
satisfied by using experience from the new system designers or a group of
outside experts (6). For example, in Step 1, the evaluator(s) is required to
interpret documents and use personal judgment in establishing the functional
requirements for the new system and in selecting similar predecessor
components that most closely meet these requirements. In Step 2, generic
kinds of tasks must be defined and assigned to the various echelons of
maintenance (i.e., organizational level in the field and intermediate level
removed from the field). Step 2 also requires the evaluator(s) to make
educated guesses as to the split between inherent versus induced component
failures, design differences, selection and assignment of skills for the
various tasks, and probable system and component usage rates. In Step 3, the
analyzer must decide which kinds of predecessor training resources are
applicable to the proposed system and, where no training scenario exists,
generate new training resource requirements. Steps 4 and 5 involve judgments
about the movement and availability of people both within various skills and
the Army as a whole and also require the development of options to offset high
demands. Step 6 does not require any major judgments other than a selection
of different operating, reliability, or manning scenarios that represent a
modified system designed to offset high manpower demands or costs.
In reviewing the Army MPT problem outlined earlier in this section, it
appears that a technique such as the HCM could certainly contribute to
resolving most of the man-machine mismatches with new acquisitions.
Ultimately, it is the Army's primary intent to use the results of such an
approach to influence the ASARC, DSARC, and system program management
communities to be more supportive of the MPT portion of system-integrated
logistics support. At a secondary level, it is also the Army's desire to
examine techniques such as the HCM with the intent of determining the
feasibility of enhancing and managing its own MPT system. For both the ASARC
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decision and internal MPT management objectives it is important that the Army
establish a credible MPT projection scheme. It then follows that any
anticipated MPT projection techniques be validated before being approved for
Army-wide use. The following section describes the structure for the HCM
validity evaluation and sets the foundation for the final results provided
later in the report.
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SECTION III
STRUCTURE OF HARDMAN ANALYSIS
A. OVERVIEW
The previous section described how important it is for the Army to
develop a credible, comprehensive MPT system. There are several different
kinds of validity tests to consider when establishing the true credibility of
a modeling technique. For example, some kinds of mathematical models may obey
other already proven algorithmic or empirical relationships. Validating
techniques using this method is rather simple. However, the problem becomes
more difficult when a proposed simulation is projecting the future based on
experiential judgment and scant, or non-existent, historical evidence. As
shown in Section II, the proposed Array MPT methodology not only fits this
description but is further complicated by the need to draw on a considerable
amount of data and data sources. In situations such as this there are several
different kinds of validity tests that can be employed to test "first-time"
models. In this section the various kinds of validity tests are first
described, followed by a detailed discussion of the structure of each portion
of the evaluation in the context of the validity tests.
B. VALIDITY TESTING
The two important outcomes of testing the validity of a simulation or
projection are the degree of credibility of the model and results, and the
respective usefulness of the results. The credibility of a projection
methodology revolves around several operations research-type measures. Two
very important validity measures are as follows:
(1) Variable parameter validity - a measure of how well the simulation
parameters compare with their respective counterparts in the real,
or observable, world; and whether the parameters, when varied over
an expected range, effect the results in the direction of known
historical data.
(2) Hypothesis validity - a measure of how well various relationships
within the model and its outcomes correspond with the real world.
Both of these validity measures fit under generic tests of "model
accuracy." As stated earlier in Section I~B, the detailed accuracy
examination has been postponed to a later phase.
Within the constraints of this study, the following validity tests were
exercised:
(1) Face validity - a general indication of whether the model is
logical, credible, and the results reasonably based on the inputs.
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This indication can be obtained by talking to individuals
experienced with the same, or similar, models; comparing the
structure of the model to other established simulations; or
tracing and evaluating test case results for reasonableness.
(2) Internal reliability - a measure of the variance in model outputs
when replicated by a group of independent assessors given the same
inputs.
(3) Event series validity - It is understood that inherent within the
design of any model is the inability to duplicate exactly the real
world. Event series validity is a measure of how accurately the
simulation must reproduce real-world events. This test is
extremely important because it relates to both the credibility and
utility of the results as viewed by the people using the outputs
for their decision process (i.e., the ASARC and Program Managers).
In the following paragraphs, the various analytic procedures employed in
evaluating the Army MPT methodology are discussed in terms of the preceding
validity tests.
C, USER REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS
One of the more obvious tests of face validity is a straightforward,
initial comparison of the user needs against the outputs of the model. By
querying knowledgeable individuals in the Army MPT arena for problems, and
their respective needs to resolve those problems, it was possible to evaluate
whether the proposed methodology could illuminate the key personnel issues.
The effort designed to establish the relevance of the HCM MPT system to the
Army's needs was fourfold:
(1) Establish a list of experienced, interested individuals from the
Army MPT community and attempt to draw on individuals from as many
participating commands as possible to establish a broad user base.
(2) Design a comprehensive set of questions to probe both major MPT
problem areas and needed solutions and/or tools to resolve
personnel issues.
(3) Obtain answers to these questions via personal interviews with
each individual.
(4) Compare the results against the applicable portions of the
methodology to establish whether HARDMAN is reasonably responsive
to the stated issues.
Each step in the above user analysis, along with both the user require-
ments and relevance results, is discussed in greater detail in Section IV.
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D. OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS
As a continuation of the face-validity evaluation, it is also useful to
examine applications of the methodology as a means of establishing credibility.
In this study the examination encompasses both actual test cases and comparison
with other accepted or proven MPT projection techniques. The structure and
results of both of the aforementioned examinations are provided in greater
detail later in Section V. However, as a basis for the outcomes provided in
Section V, it is important to note that the results afforded insight into
several credibility issues. First, the results provided information on how
rational the model was. For example, the test-case audits were established to
examine the consistency and reasonableness of the results relative to the
inputs. Similarly, by comparing the technique against other accepted models,
it was possible to see whether the basic assumptions and logic structure
appeared sound. Second, the audit results provided useful information on the
complexity, and subsequent utility, of the model. Third, the audits provided
an understanding of whether the model logic and interpretation of the
projections were perhaps ambiguous or masked, due to model over-complexity.
Fourth, the audits indicated the presence and relative occurrence of error
sources in the methodology. Last, the use of both test cases and comparisons
with other MPT models highlighted potential problems in input data quality and
availability.
ff
E. RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
An examination of the "reliability" or accuracy of the methodology and
its projections was the original intent of this portion of the evaluation.
Although it was possible to retain part of the original reliability analysis
scope, time and funding constraints required the actual accuracy effort to be
postponed until the next evaluation phase. The portions retained for this
part of the evaluation address the issues of internal reliability, a pre-
cursory accuracy examination using the experience of individuals who have
already applied the HCM, or a similar methodology, and event-series validity.
For the internal reliability test, it was decided to use one of the Army
test cases (i.e., SINCGARS) and design a controlled experiment to establish
whether a group of individuals, initially trained to use the methodology,
could both replicate the original answers and demonstrate a low variance in
answers among themselves. A group of seven individuals (four civilians and
three career Army personnel) of varying backgrounds were selected for the
experiment. Given the small sample size (primarily due to restrictions in
available people, time, and budget) it was decided to dispense with detailed
statistical comparisons and simply establish general conclusions about the
repeatability and consistency of the results. The replication was also used
to develop a list of critical factors that have major impacts on the MPT
projections.
To round out the accuracy examination within the constraints of the
study, it was also decided to perform a qualitative accuracy check, using past
Air Force and Navy experience with the same type of methodology.
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As stated earlier, the event-series validity test is extremely important
for determining the required accuracy of a model and, subsequently, the
utility of a new simulation. To obtain an estimate for the required accuracy
of the HCM, a simple top-down cost sensitivity analysis was employed to
establish the allowable variance in the manpower projection, as constrained by
other life-cycle cost elements and an allowable error band around the total
life-cycle cost projection. This estimate of the allowable variance in the
manpower projection was performed for an example acquisition, using actual
Army weapon system data (i.e., the SINCGARS system). Once the level of
accuracy was established, it was possible to formulate corrective actions (for
the various problem areas revealed through the face-validity and internal
reliability investigations) commensurate with a greater or lesser need for
accuracy. It was for this reason that the sensitivity test was reserved for
the end of the evaluation. The complete details of the internal validity and
accuracy studies are provided in Section VI.
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SECTION IV
USER REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS
A. OVERVIEW
As a part of the approach developed to determine the face validity of
the HCM MPT projection model, an MPT user requirements study was conducted.
This analysis included a definition and documentation of Army user require-
ments for a manpower, personnel, and training (MPT) prediction model. Sub-
sequently, the user requirements were compared with the capabilities of the
HCM to determine the degree to which the technique conformed with the needs of
intermediate as well as end users of MPT information. The users included
those who currently develop the MPT information as well as those who primarily
use the information (Table 4-1). The details of the requirements analysis are
provided in the following paragraphs.
B. APPROACH
This study focused on exploring Army user requirements for a "generic"
MPT methodology that would serve as comparison against an existing MPT pro-
jection technique for the Army's Integrated Logistic Support (ILS) process.
The user requirements provided a useful measure for determining the extent to
which the HARDMAN model fulfilled the Army's stated requirements. As stated
earlier in Section III-D and III-E, detailed audits and a test case replica-
tion were also conducted to assess face validity and internal reliability.
The additional familiarization with the HCM technique achieved through these
parallel analyses augmented the comparison of the user requirements with the
methodology.
The basic approach, outlined in the preceding discussion, is explained
in greater detail in the following paragraphs:
1. Selection of Individuals
The Interim Report for Manpower and Personnel Requirements
Determination Methodologies (MANPERS) states that "the three principal
organizations responsible for the research, development, and deployment policy
of a system under development are DARCOM - the materiel developer; TRADOC -
the training and doctrine (i.e., combat) developer; and HQDA - the force
modernization planner. With the exception of the "industry" user, all of the
users interviewed in this study were from these three organizations in the
Army. These commands were also confirmed by the sponsoring agencies (Army
Research Institute (ARI) and the Soldier Support Center (SSC)), as key actors
in the Array's MPT process.
A predominance of users were from the TRADOC community. This is a
reflection of the fact that "front end analysis," such as MPT projections,
done prior to Phase I in the systems acquisition process, is largely a TRADOC
responsibility. TRADOC has the lead in ILS management prior to the appoint-
ment of a DARCOM Project Manager at Milestone I.
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Table 4-1. User Groups/Representatives Interviewed
Number of
Users Interviews
ILS Managers (DARCOM) 2
Soldier Support Center/SSC-NCR (TRADOC) 3
Logistics Center/LOGCEN (TRADOC) 1
Deputy Chief of Staff, Combat Development/DCSCO (TRADOC) 1
Deputy Chief of Staff, Training/DCST (TRADOC) 2
Special Study Group-TRADOC Systems MGR/SSG-TSM (TRADOC) 1
Logistics Evaluation Agency-DCSLOG/LEA 1
DCSPER 1
Industry (based on results of survey) 1
Total User Groups: 9 Total Respondents3: 13
aUsers listed were selected on the basis of their role/function in the MPT
process. All users contacted participated.
Inputs from the SSC-NCR-II (TRADOC) and industry users were not gathered
from actual interviews. The information needed from these users was not
obtainable within the allocated time frame for the study and was, therefore,
extracted from documents that adequately portrayed their respective user needs
for an MPT projection model. One document was a memorandum about requirements
for an MPT model (9) and the other was an industry survey conducted by the
Soldier Support Center to determine industry requirements for MPT information
in developing proposals (10).
2. Questionnaire Design
The questionnaire was designed as a discussion guide to identify
user requirements. Some questions addressed user requirements directly by
identifying the specific MPT information input they require to fulfill their
responsibilities for the Army MPT process. Other requirements directly
addressed were imbedded in questions concerning the user's interpretations of
the timing and interfaces required by the process. Through interface and
timing questions, an understanding was developed about when critical MPT
information is needed and about the relationships between principal organiza-
tional players, so that it could be determined if the design or structuring of
an MPT projection system would be sensitive to these relationships. Another
direct way of focusing on user requirements was to ask respondents for
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suggestions about the design of an MPT methodology. Suggestions included
comments on outputs, schedule, and the process of actually projecting per-
sonnel needs. Questions indirectly addressing user needs provided confirma-
tion, context, or further elaboration of the direct user data. These questions
referred to the following contextual information:
(1) The user's understanding of the present technique used for
MPT projections.
(2) Users seen as responsible for MPT projections and the nature
of their "use" of the information (intermediate or end use).
(3) MPT regulations/documents that impact the user.
(4) Users' perceptions of the strengths or weaknesses of the
current MPT process.
(5) The primary charter and responsibilities of the user.
(6) The key drivers underlying the need for MPT projections,
according to each user interviewed.
The complete questionnaire is shown in Appendix A.
3. Interview Procedure
User requirements were determined primarily through interviews
with the representative users who were identified and recommended by the
sponsor. Initial contacts made by ARI provided JPL with direct access to
appropriate individuals with whom formal follow-up requests for assistance
were made and visits scheduled.
The study received a substantial level of user cooperation in conducting
the interviews; an example was that users frequently called upon people within
their organizations having specialized knowledge of that organization's
involvement in the MPT process. Each scheduled interview was treated as a
single-user interview even if more than one person was present for the
discussion. A single-interview form consolidated the responses of all present
from that organization.
C. TABULATION OF INTERVIEWS
1. General Responses
Most of the users interviewed thought that MPT projections should
be available at the front end of the acquisition cycle. This was frequently
linked to supportability and affordability drivers for needing MPT information,
particularly because these affect the user organization's roles and responsi-
bilities for MPT projections. One user cited sustainability as a key driver
of MPT information. This was considered an important insight because it
highlights life-cycle aspects of system operation. The predominant responses
pertaining to these three major drivers are summarized in Table 4-2.
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Table 4-2. Key MPT Drivers and Associated User Rationale
Key MPT Drivers Predominant Rationale
Affordability MPT system must provide all MPT cost elements associated
with acquisitions
MPT system must reflect cost tradeoffs with force
structure/mission requirements
Supportability MPT system must support readiness goals
MPT system must fully support new acquisitions
(operations, maintenance, supply, training, etc.)
MPT system must demonstrate sensitivity to horizontal
MPT impacts (integrated System Support concept)
Sustainability MPT system must support manning/training system(s)
plans over long periods of time
MPT system must consider extended impacts of mission/
scenario changes with time
Most users expressed the idea that system design should be influenced by
various manpower constraints emerging from early MPT analysis before the
design is fixed. A related point is that most users thought that the primary
tool for getting MPT projections into the system through the Quantitative and
Qualitative Personnel Requirements Information (QQPRl), which is developed
concurrently with the Basis of Issue Plan (BOIP), was inadequate and/or
untimely. By the time QQPRI data is available (after Milestone l), most of a
system's design is fixed (Figure 4-1). Another problem mentioned was that
DARCOM and TRADOC's shared responsibility for developing the QQPRI and BOIP
requires additional clarification of lines of responsibility. This would be
particularly important if the initial development of MPT projections shifts to
an earlier point in the acquisition cycle (i.e., TRADOC would become
responsible for the initial, therefore tentative, QQPRI).
Occasionally, a user expressed a viewpoint that MPT projections made
later in the acquisition cycle were adequate, providing that sufficient lead
time was given to acquire and train the personnel. This statement assumed
that funding was already available for the personnel.
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Figure 4-1. Effect of Design Decisions on Life-cycle System Cost
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2. User Group Responses
User responses are reviewed in this section. Responses from
multiple users in DARCOM and SSC-NCR are incorporated under single headings
for these respective organizations. Individual responses, by organization,
are detailed in Appendix B. The discussion on user responses includes a
summary of the user organization background to establish the appropriate
context for the responses that follow.
a. DARCOM/Integrated Logistic Support (ILS) Managers Responses.
ILS managers in DARCOM are responsible for ensuring the planning and monitoring
of logistic support elements for systems under development from Milestone I
throughout the development process. The prime analytical tool used in ILS is
Logistic Support Analysis (LSA).
The LSA process consists of analysis efforts to completely define the
support system and its interfaces with a materiel system. The analysis
incorporates manpower/logistics analysis and tradeoff analyses associated with
maintenance concepts (repair levels, etc.). LSA Record information (LSAR)
includes all tasks required to operate and maintain a materiel system. LSA
data then becomes feeder data for the Quantitative and Qualitative Personnel
Requirements Information (QQPRI) system. As the chief means of developing
both the numbers and kinds of personnel required for operating and maintaining
systems, QQPRI development is a shared responsibility of DARCOM and TRADOC.
As a result, LSA data needs to be as accurate as possible for both the DARCOM
and the TRADOC user communities.
LSA normally includes operator/maintainer task and supply functions for
repair and test equipment as well as the system under development. In determin-
ing system supportability, ILS managers required information about the exact
tasks to operate and maintain systems. They also needed projections of reli-
able manloading requirements to help establish expected Military Occupational
Specialty (MOS) and skill demands, plus any MOS changes anticipated.
ILS managers stated a need for methods to analyze tradeoffs between
force structure, personnel constraints, hardware performance, and cost.
Essential to this analysis was information (output) about support and test
equipment ("playing field") associated with a system. The total QQPRI
associated with an expected density of these systems, when deployed, was cited
as an important element of this analysis.
Early maintenance concept information was also requested, including
maintenance manhours (MMH), reliability, availability and maintainability
(RAM) data, and maintenance-level information.
DARCOM suggestions for the design of an MPT model included providing/
displaying MPT data for alternative (proposed), as well as predecessor systems
to provide support documentation for decision-making. An MPT methodology
would need to provide credible quantitative data to the ILS process, the
source(s) of which could be documented or traced. Formats for the data should
be designed to present data efficiently to users who have limited time for
reviewing information (e.g., graphs, charts, etc). Timing for initiating the
process should be prior to Milestone I to achieve maximum benefit from
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hardware/manpower tradeoffs; however, there should also be follow-up on
existing systems in the field to verify LSAR data and system supportability
information.
b. SSC-NCR (TRADOC) Responses. SSC-NCR is responsible for
assessing the feasibility of allocating personnel and materiel to specified
organizations within the Army (i.e., the Tables of Organization and Equipment
(TOE). SSC also ensures that the user communities identify both demand and
supply MPT factors at the front end of the system acquisition process to
address supportability and affordability issues.
SSC-NCR stated that detailed data for the following general categories
of information is required:
(1) Manpower.
(2) Comprehensive task breakdown.
(3) Personnel.
(4) Training.
(5) Logistic support.
(6) Integrated System Support (ISS).
Graphic display capability was highlightd as useful to SSC for inclusion
in reports comparing demand and supply. In addition, detailed MPT analyses
comparing proposed to predecessor systems is required.
SSC also needed MPT projections prior to Milestone I to support the Army
Systems Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) decision process. An additional
need cited was timely and useful cost information for the Army's funding
process. In providing such information, the projection process should also
expose any assumptions employed so that an understanding of the limitations of
the analysis is clear.
SSC-NCR further suggested using a solid, historical data base containing
Army personnel statistical data, comprehensive task-related files, and RAM
data associated with systems. It was also indicated that the MPT system
should be compatible with existing Army reporting structures and command roles
to ensure that the model could be integrated into the Army's normal systems
acquisition process.
c. Training Developers (TRADOC) Responses. A key concern of
training developers within TRADOC Headquarters is the integration of the
Army's training function with the other critical Army functions - manning,
force structure, facilities, equipping, sustaining, mobilizing, and
deploying. Matching the Army training system to manning and the systems
acquisition process is crucial to the support of force modernization.
Supportability of force modernization requires specific information about the
availability of manpower qualified for training, as well as sustainability
(personnel flow and replacement) of the force required.
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Another driver of training developers' needs for MPT information was
system affordability, i.e., an understanding of a system's life-cycle cost.
The general categories of information needed by training developers to
determine supportability and affordability were (1) manpower and personnel
information (demand/supply); (2) training information (exact operator/
maintainer task and target audiences); (3) equipment information (capability
and man/machine tradeoffs); and (4) accurate maintenance concept information.
d. Combat Developers/Soldier Development Directorate (SDD) and
TRADOC) Responses.Combat developers in TRADOC/Soldier Development
Directorate are concerned with personnel doctrine that addresses air/land
battle mission needs. They also promote combat effectiveness through MOS and
force structure change and ensure that soldiers' physical and mental cap-
abilities are taken into account by the various elements of force moderniza-
tion. In their interface between SSC and TRADOC Headquarters, combat
developers at SDD are involved in the process of optimization of resources
between proponent schools.
The combat developer's key drivers for needing MPT information were
supportability, in a readiness sense; performance, as it relates to combat
effectiveness (e.g., through man/machine design issues); and cost (e.g., as
might be determined by impact analysis).
Combat developers' design suggestions focused on the need for an
interactive management information system having a time-line signaling
mechanism that could alert participants to needed (or missing) actions in the
current MPT process. Suggested outputs from the MPT model were a projection
of the numbers and kinds of operators and maintainers associated with a
system. A timely breakdown of task and training data was also cited to
influence system design (prior to Milestone I).
It was also suggested that some information concerning the impacts of
new systems on the existing personnel structure and resulting tradeoffs would
be useful in optimizing the selection of new systems. This requirement also
implies a need to apply MPT analysis to systems on a horizontal plane (i.e.,
to consider the drain on the projected manpower pool caused by other develop-
ing systems).
e. Tradoc System Managers (TSM) Responses. During the
gestation period of a system prior to Milestone I, TRADOC assumes the lead in
conducting mission area studies. A TRADOC Systems Manager (TSM) is concerned
with the identification, analysis, and selection of system concepts that meet
needs of combat elements of the Justification of System Major New Starts
(JSMNS) document. Other responsibilities of the TSM include preparing the
Operational and Organization (O&O) plan, as well as monitoring the preparation
of a number of different documents required for logistic support. Among these
are (1) the Integrated Logistic Support Plan (ILSP); (2) the Concept Formula-
tion Package (CFP); (3) the Outline of Individual and Collective Training Plan
(OICTP); (4) the Letter of Agreement (LOA); (5) the Cost and Operational Effec-
tive Analysis (COEA); and (6) the Preliminary Qualitative Assessment (PQA). The
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Preliminary Quantitative and Qualitative Personnel Requirements Information
(PQQPRI) could, by interpretation of the current regulation, be initiated by
the TSM although it is not normally done at this time.
The TSMs had a clear requirement for a model that would contain a com-
prehensive task file data base with task data taken from a number of task-
centered Army manuals and documents. This would assist the TSMs in ensuring
the timely completion of these documents by facilitating the identification of
specific tasks, MOS, and skills associated with hardware. Finally, the TSMs
suggested the development of both a manpower and personnel (demand/supply)
data base that would permit tradeoff analysis to determine the best fit of
people with equipment.
f. LOGCEN/LOGISTICS CENTER (TRADOC) Responses. Force
developers, training, and materiel systems managers are all MPT actors within
LOGCEN. The critical role of LOGCEN is as an executive agent for the ILS
process. Issues such as man/machine interface, system and non-system training
devices, logistic system proponency, and Manpower Authorization Criteria
(MACRIT) are included in LOGCEN1s charter. Some of the LOGCEN responsibil-
ities are (1) impact analysis of system/design characteristics; (2) support
equipment training plan and technical publications development; and (3) MACRIT
system improvement. As a TRADOC integrating center, LOGCEN is similar to a
proponent school in its proponency role for selected logistic systems. LOGCEN
also develops some TOEs for maintenance units.
LOGCEN indicated they had specific information requirements related to
system considerations for affordability and supportability, including
(1) accurate RAM data (based on historical data and accounts for realistic
utilization rates, actual failure rates, and combat damage); (2) workload data
(as a function of direct productive and indirect productive annual maintenance
manhours (AMMH), plus available productive manhours); (3) density of equipment
(TOE-related); (4) unit-focused manpower requirements; and (5) LSAR-format
task data associated with MOS and equipment needed for training analysis.
LOGCEN's MPT timing requirements were twofold: (1) LOGCEN needed early
(front-end) training device information to prepare for both early system
testing and the final system design configuration, as well as (2) solid
manpower requirements for supporting accurate MOS and organizational design
decisions.
Design discussions about MPT projection models focused on LOGCEN1s
requirement for accurate and reliable (RAM) data. The Annual Maintenance
Manhour (AMMH) data that LOGCEN presently receives should be made separate and
distinct from reliability data. MPT information was needed in an LSAR data
format and would be more useful if broken down by component, task, and skill
level. It was felt that this could then be used with an MPT simulation to
determine impacts of utilization rate, combat damage, and/or hypothetical
changes in RAM characteristics.
A concern was expressed about the accuracy of data to be used for MPT
analysis. The availability of "hard" LSAR data is critical to the development
of useful MPT information. Given an absence of system fielding experience and
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correspondingly mature LSAR data (such as would be the case when substantial
technological changes in equipment are introduced), it was recognized that it
would be difficult to obtain reliable data. However, it was also recognized
that, if there is minimal technological change, the MPT information should be
readily available.
g. Devices and Systems Training Directorate (TRADOC) Responses.
This organization is involved in policy development, training-device pro-
ponency, and training-plan approval.
In general, this directorate indicated needs for both manpower and
training information for the purpose of developing the individual and
collective training plans (ICTP) of systems under development. A new Array
thrust called Integrated System Support (ISS) now requires the generation of
MOS information that is system- as well as unit-specific. It was also
suggested that an improvement to the current MPT process would be to provide
sufficient front-end task manloading and training information to allow the
design to be influenced early in the acquisition process. One final expressed
requirement was to have an MPT projection model that more effectively flags
MOS "overload" (i.e., a model that detects and documents additional needed
manpower, both numbers and skills).
h. Logistics Evaluation Agency - LEA (DCSLOG) Responses. As a
field-operating agency of the DA staff, LEA is the independent logistician in
the materiel acquisition process responsible for monitoring ILS requirements
for systems under development. Supportability of the more than 800 systems to
be evaluated was cited as a key driver for needing MPT information, along with
other factors such as degree of interoperability and performance levels.
LEA users indicated a need to be able to use MPT projections (before
Milestone I) as constraints during system development. These MPT projections
should include RAM goals, new skills and training device concepts. Following
Milestone I, it was suggested that readiness considerations include a 3- to
5-year lead time to acquire and prepare logistic support personnel prior to
system fielding. LEA information requirements also included a complete and
accurate listing of tasks and skills required to maintain the system
(including all subsystems). Finally, there was an expressed requirement to
look across systems (horizontal analysis) to assess overall impact on logistic
support and training.
i. Force Modernization Cell - Manpower Programs and Budget
(PCSPER) Responses. This organization provides staff support to DCSPER for
the Army Systems Acquisition Review Council (ASARC). They are chiefly
concerned with resource management for force modernization and bridging demand
and supply issues in both manning and force-structuring. DCSPER is concerned
with matching the number and kinds of "spaces" needed to operate and maintain
systems with the required qualified personnel (i.e., "faces"). In this
respect, they are also concerned with the personnel training. Because of
congressionally-tnandated "end strengths" for the Army, information concerning
distribution of personnel is important. Recognizing that affordability and
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user supportability concerning the supply of personnel is a realistic
constraint, DCSPER therefore suggested that a horizontal look across systems
would permit analysis of the impacts of shifts in the numbers and types of
manpower required. Tradeoff analysis at a high level was also cited as useful
for conducting Army-wide optimization studies (e.g., hardware vs. manpower vs.
system performance).
Finally, it was indicated that the design and output of an MPT model
should be compatible with existing reporting processes (QQPRI, BOIP, ASARC
Milestones, etc.). In line with this requirement, it was also suggested that
there is a need for a more effective (interactive) information system, with
appropriate access to relevant data bases of MPT information.
j. Industry Responses. Three industrial associations
(Aerospace Industries Association, Electronic Industries Association, and
National Security Industrial Association) were surveyed about their needs for
logistic support (MPT) information in responding to Requests for Proposals
(RFPs). It was discovered that industry is very interested in improving its
understanding of logistic support and human factors concepts associated with
systems under development. Some suggested means to accomplish this were (1)
earlier user contact, (2) user involvement in RFP preparation, (3) better
implementation of human factors analysis, and (4) improved information
dissemination to industry. Two basic concerns of industry have been to
address human factors before the system design is fixed and to specify
contract arrangements for implementing MPT analysis.
Industry also indicated a need for reliable information concerning the
intended/planned concept of system operation and supporting organizational
design. The participants also suggested DOD strengthen its estimates of the
kinds of personnel expected to operate and maintain the system. Scenarios
depicting both threat, environment, and realistic usage rates were cited as
important in preparing RFPs. The expected performance of a system, plus
maintenance concept, were two other critical data points contributing to
industry's ability to conduct or contribute to early MPT analysis.
The industry-users interviewed also indicated a need for MPT information
to be centrally located for accessibility. Charts and graphs were suggested
as being especially helpful in transmitting to industry the necessary
information. An historical data base was also suggested to permit comparisons
with other developed systems or analysis of system designs that were rejected.
2. Tabulation of Individual Interviews into Matrix Format
After all user interviews were completed, the raw discussion notes
were assembled, reviewed, and transcribed onto interview forms for clarity.
Key words and ideas were highlighted. Two requirements analysts then
separately analyzed the information and jointly tabulated the responses to
facilitate analysis of the results. Once the answers were transformed into
rough requirement statements, they were entered into a matrix format to permit
a clear indication of which users were associated with each user need. The
detailed matrix of users and user answers is shown in Appendix B.
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D. TRANSLATION TO USER REQUIREMENTS
1. Procedure
The user needs were divided into two categories - one category
containing "output" (data) needs, and the other containing "design" needs for
an MPT projection system.
User requirement statements were generated from the Appendix B matrix
information and the interview forms. When appropriate, similar ideas or
requirements expressed by different users were translated into a comprehensive
user requirement statement.
The separate requirement statements developed by both analysts were then
compared to ensure agreement and completeness. To establish priorities among
the requirements, criteria were developed to evaluate the requirements in the
matrices. A final user-requirements list was developed after applying these
criteria.
2. Criteria for Assigning Priorities
The following criteria were considered essential to determine
which requirements were necessary or desirable for an MPT projection model:
(1) The requirement's role in addressing key drivers associated
with MPT projections for Army systems (i.e., affordability,
supportability, and sustainability).
(2) The importance of the requirement in providing useful and
timely MPT information to the Army system acquisition
process.
(3) The breadth of users stating the requirement.
3. Requirements List
As stated earlier, the user needs were categorized by "output" and
"design" needs and then prioritized according to the degree of fit with the
three criteria stated previously. Once this procedure was completed, the user
needs were grouped into mandatory and desirable requirements. Below is the
final list of user requirements (including output and design requirements) for
a projection system that conforms to the needs of the key Army players in the
MPT arena. For the purpose of this evaluation, all the following mandatory
requirements were given equal weight because, ultimately, they were primarily
used to test the "reasonableness" of the methodology:
(1) Mandatory Output Requirements:
(a) Operator/Maintainer task data should be provided as
required for a system and its support equipment
(including task description and frequencies), based on
a replaced or comparable system.
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(b) Maintenance manhour projections must be based on a
specified maintenance concept (levels of maintenance,
specific RAM data).
(c) Operation and maintenance manpower, personnel, and
training (MPT) projections must reflect realistic
system usage rates as determined by acquisition-
specific mission/scenario drivers.
(d) Reasonably accurate (i.e., acceptable to the
budget-control community) total manpower demand
(number, MOS, skill level, additional skill
indicators) is required before Milestone I.
(e) The MPT model must include and document projected
availability of personnel for the system (demographic
data such as number, age, sex, size, skills,
education, MOS, term of service).
(f) The MPT model should document MOS alignment data
showing current status; authorizations vs.
requirements to indicate MOS overloads.
(g) The model must incorporate, document, and use target
audience description (TAD). This includes reading
ability, grade levels, experience, skills, and
previous training of available personnel to determine
accurately testing/training requirements (the TAD
would be input to the Letter of Agreement).
(h) The "T" of MPT must include the formulation, descrip-
tion and use of comprehensive training concept
elements: (1) classes or training required (including
any increases) for unit or institutional training;
(2) time to train; (3) training frequency; and
(4) training support (devices, facilities,
instructors).
(i) There must be documentation of MPT impacts and costs
on the Army as a whole.
(j) Trade-offs must be conducted between hardware and
people to determine the optimal balance for best
system performance, costs (LCC), and support
requirements (Decision/Tradeoff matrix needed).
(k) Output should include reports with well-labeled,
easy-to-read graphic formats such as graphs, tables,
matrices, charts, as well as an executive summary of
the report that could stand alone.
(1) Outputs should be in both hardcopy as well as on CRT
display for permanent archiving.
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(m) Reporting procedure must include any pertinent caveats
about the data source availability/reliability or
assumptions about the system. This information should
be provided at major decision points or steps in the
analysis. Appropriate actions to resolve identified
weaknesses in the analysis should also be noted.
(2) Desirable Output Requirements:
(a) A complete historical MPT data base is highly desir-
able. MPT projections should be updated throughout
the life of the system to increase accuracy of LSA/
other data.
(b) MPT impacts should account for geographical constraints
on manpower pools "available" to run the system.
(c) MPT system output should be compatible with accepted
LSA reporting format.
(3) Mandatory Design Requirements:
(a) Projected MPT impacts/costs must be available at the
front end of the acquisition cycle (before Milestone
I) for early design influence and early MPT (cost)
warnings.
(b) Front-end determination of a system's candidacy for
MPT analysis should include criteria such as the
potential for high payoff (e.g., selection should be
based on type and amount of change in the technology
that drive significant MPT costs/changes).
(c) To facilitate training analysis and to support
proponency for MOS changes or additions, the system
should have the capability to compare the proposed
operator and maintainer tasks associated with a new
system with a comprehensive, automated data base of
tasks detailed in the Soldier's Manual, ARTEP, POI,
SQT, T.G. and AR 611-201 (Enlisted Career MOS
Management Fields).
(d) Output should include comparable MPT projection data
for both alternative/proposed and existing systems as
support for decision milestones.
(e) The model should incorporate horizontal analysis
across systems to determine total MPT and logistic
impacts and to facilitate Army-wide equipment and
personnel optimization, as well as support
end-strength decisions.
(f) The MPT model should provide compatability with
existing DOD documentation and reporting structures.
It should, however, evolve into an interactive
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information system with remote terminals, including a
time line oriented to both the budget and systems
acquisition processes. Signalling mechanisms are
needed for late/missing/incomplete data.
(g) The MPT system must identify and provide resolutions
to both weaknesses in data inputs and inaccuracies
resulting from the use of the data.
(h) There must be a documented and accessible audit trail.
(i) A universal information system should be designed to
allow multi-user access and update.
(A) Desirable Design Requirements:
A more detailed O&O plan is needed to act as a "hingepin" to
initiate MPT analysis at the front end of the acquisition
cycle.
E. RELEVANCE OF USER REQUIREMENTS TO EXISTING HARDMAN DESIGN
Having stated the user requrements in the preceding section, it is now
possible to determine the extent to which the HCM has application to the
requirements for the Army's existing (or near-term) MPT process. Through a
comparison of the HCM to user requirements, it was possible to establish one
measure of the face validity of HARDMAN (i.e., how well the HCM fits the
Army's MPT needs). This was achieved by checking the relative applicability
of each step in the HCM to specific portions of the requirements. As stated
earlier, both the ARI replication exercise and the HARDMAN applications audit
were conducted in parallel with the requirements analysis. These parallel
studies afforded an in-depth understanding of each step in the methodology.
The additional familiarization with the complete array of data inputs,
algorithms, methodology logic process, and outputs, provided the essential
background to perform a comparison. Table 4-3 presents the results of the
compatibility analysis by indicating which portions of the HCM have high,
medium, or low applicability to the user requirements. The degree of
applicability provided an indication of the utility of various portions of the
technique to the Army's MPT users.
Out of the thirteen total mandatory output requirements, the HCM
demonstrated good compliance in essentially six of the user need areas. Of
the seven requirements where elements of the methodology appeared to exhibit
low applicability, only five of the user areas were considered of immediate
importance to developing a sound MPT projection scheme. These key user areas
were (1) establishing the accuracy of the MPT methodology; (2) including other
demographic data such as age, sex, size, etc., in personnel allocations;
(3) considering the demands of possible future acquisitions on MOS, (4) per-
forming a complete life-cycle cost analysis as part of the tradeoff studies;
and (5) indicating weaknesses in the analysis and respective resolution
actions. Items (2) and (3) appear to be somewhat of an Army-wide constraint
resulting from the general lack of readily available information. Therefore,
only requirements (1), (4), and (5) seem to be achievable, close-range
deficiencies that should be incorporated as improvements to the HCM.
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Table 4-3. Comparison of User Requirements to the
HARDMAN Comparability Methodology
User Requirements
Applicability of HCM Technique
to User Requirements
High Medium Low
Manadatory Output Requirements
Operator/maintainer task data as required X X
for system and support equipment (Primary (Support
(description/frequencies) based on System) Equipment)
replaced or comparable system
Maintenance manhour projections must be X
based on specified maintenance concept
(levels of maintenance, accuracte RAM
data)
Operation/maintenance requirements must X
reflect realistic system usage rate as
determined by mission/scenario drivers
Reasonably accurate total manpower demand X ?
estimate (number, MOS, skill level, addi- (Manpower (Accuracy
tional skill indicators) required before demand) unknown)
Milestone 1
Model must include and document projected X
availability of personnel for the system (No.,
(Demographic data such as - number, age, skills,
sex, size, skills, education, MOS, term MOS,
of service) Term of
service)
Model should document MOS alignment data
showing current status; authorizations
vs. requirements to indicate MOS overload
Model must incorporate and document target
audience description - including reading,
grade levels, experience, skills, previous
training of available personnel to accu-
rately determine testing/training require-
ments (would be input to Letter of
Agreement)
X
(Current
system
demands)
X
(Model
assumes
prede-
cessor
training
is
adequate
(Age/sex/
size
education)
X
(Future,
multi-
system
demands)
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Table 4-3. (Cont'd.)
User Requirements
Applicability of HCM Technique
to User Requirements
High Med ium Low
Manadatory Output Requirements
The "T" of MPT must include the formula-
tion, description and utilization of
comprehensive training concept elements:
classes required (including any increases)
for individual; unit or institutional
training: time to train; training
frequency; and training support (devices,
facilities, instructors)
Documentation of MPT impacts and associ-
ated costs for MPT projection
Tradeoffs between hardware and people
needed to determine optimal balance
between performance: costs (LCC) and
support requirements (decision/tradeoff
matrix needed)
Output should include well-labeled, easy-
to-read formats such as graphs, tables,
matrices, charts, as well as an Executive
Summary of the report that can stand
alone
Outputs should be in hardcopy as well as
CRT display for permanent archiving
Reporting procedure must include briefing
re: any pertinent caveats about the data
source availability/reliability or
assumptions about the system, at major
decision points or steps in the analysis.
Actions should be noted to resolve
weaknesses identified
X
(Insti-
tutional
train-
ing
X
(Limited
tradeoff
capability)
(Executive
Summary)
(Hardcopy)
(Not consis-
tently done)
(Collec-
tive unit
training)
X
LCC and
other O&S
elements)
X
(CRT)
X
(Resolu-
tion
actions
on major
weak-
nesses)
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Table 4-3. (Cont'd.)
User Requirements
Applicability of HCM Technique
to User Requirements
High Medium Low
Desirable Output Requirements
Historical MPT database highly desirable. X
MPT projections should be updated through- (Histor-
out life of system to increase accuracy of ical
LSA/other data database)
MPT impacts should account for geo
graphic constraints on M.P. pools "avail-
able" to run the system
MPT system output should be compatible
with accepted LSA reporting format
X
(Update
over
system
life)
Mandatory Design Requirements
Projected MPT impacts/costs must be avail-
able at the front end of acquisition cycle
(before Milestone I) for (a) design
influence and (b) early MPT (cost)
warnings
Front-end determination of system's candi-
dacy for MPT analysis should include
criteria such as potential for high
payoff, e.g., selection should be made on
type and amount of change in the technol-
ogy that mightttdrive significant MPT
costs/changes
To facilitate training analysis and
proponency for MOS changes or additions,
the model should have the capability to
compare operator and raaintainer tasks
associated with a selected system with a
comprehensive automated database of tasks
detailed in the Soldier's Manual, ARTEP,
POI, SQT, T.E. and AR 611-201 (enlisted
carreer-MOS Management Fileds)
X
(New
skill
identifi-
cation)
X
(Auto-
mation)
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Table 4-3. (Cont'd.)
User Requirements
Applicability of HCM Technique
to User Requirements
High Medium Low
Mandatory Design Requirements
Output should include comparable MPT
projection data for alternative (proposed)
and existing systems as support for
decision milestones
Should incorporate horizontal analysis
across systems to determine total MPT and
logistic support to facilitate ARMY-wide
optimization and support end strength
decisions
MPT model should provide compatibility
with existing DOD documentation and
reporting structures; however, it should
evolve into an interactive information
system with remote terminals, including a
time line oriented to both the budget and
systems acquisition processes. Signaling
mechanisms are needed for late/missing/
incomplete data
MPT system must identify/resolve weak-
nesses in data inputs and resulting
analysis
Documented and accessible audit trail is
essential
Universal information system (CDB) should
be included and designed to allow multi-
user access and update
X
(Exist-
ing docu-
menta-
tion)
X
(Remote
terminals
with
time-line
overlay)
X
(Consol-
idated
data-
base)
X
(User
access)
Desirable Design Requirements
More detailed O&O Plan required as
"hingepin" to initiate MPT analysis at
front end
X
(Army
responsi-
bility)
4-19
Out of the nine mandatory design requirements, the technique seemed to
be in reasonable agreement with seven of the user needs. The two areas where
there was low agreement were considered critical for the near term. These two
areas were, (1) consideration of the horizontal effects of other systems on
the manpower drain and (2) construction of a means to flag and resolve
weaknesses in the MPT analysis. Both Items (1) and (2) were already discussed
as being an equally important consideration on the "output" side of the system.
Overall, this discussion suggests that the HCM is reasonably applicable
to the Army's major user needs in its present design. More specifically, the
present HCM basically meets seventeen of the twenty-two crucial user needs.
Therefore, by being largely commensurate with the present user requirements,
the technique seems to have considerable near-term utility to the Army.
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SECTION V
OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS
A. OVERVIEW
Section IV provided one measure of face validity by indicating the
relative compliance of the HCM with independently-derived user requirements.
This part of the analysis suggested that the methodology had considerable
utility to the Army. Other important face-validity considerations were
introduced in Section III. These considerations refer more to the general
integrity of the technique and include such elements as potential error
sources, logic, reasonableness or credibility of the projected results,
inherent ambiguities in the logic or outcome, and how supportable the model is
by its respective input data sources. To close out these last elements of the
face-validity analysis, a multi-leveled approach was structured, basically
consisting of (1) a comparison of the HCM against any MPT modeling schemes
delineated in existing DOD and MIL-STD instructions; (2) a comparison of the
HCM against a host of other known MPT projection or modeling schemes; and
(3) an independent, detailed, step-by-step audit of actual applications of the
technique. This part of the overall study was termed "operational analysis"
because every aspect of the methodology was actually exercised quite
rigorously. The following paragraphs first provide the detailed rationale and
approach used to investigate the various remaining face validity issues,
followed by the actual analysis and conclusions concerning the "general"
integrity of the HARDMAN system.
B. APPROACH
To ensure that the HCM was generally sound, beyond the user requirements
compliance, several additional face-validity elements were considered. The
additional face-validity elements and respective tests were as follows:
(1) Logic - A simple examination of whether the proposed technique
maintains a well-structured, credible train of logic throughout
the model.
(2) Usability - A simple study of both the utility of the model and
the ease with which the model can be applied by others.
(3) Error Sources - An investigation of whether the methodology
incorporates data inputs or internal procedures that can cause
inaccuracies in the projections.
(4) Data Availability - A basic check on whether the modeling
technique draws on real-world, available data sources to act as a
foundation for the projections.
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(5) Ambiguity - An examination of the ability of the model to be both
consistent and succinct in its respective use of data and overall
design (e.g., having each successive step build on previous
steps). The ambiguity test also includes a look at how clearly
the results relate to the model's original objective(s).
(6) Credibility - A simple test of whether the results seem
reasonable, based on the inputs and whether the technique
incorporates a means of weighing the quality of the data inputs
and results.
A three-phased analysis was structured within the context of the
preceding face-validity tests. The first and second phases of the analysis
primarily addressed the logic, usability, error source, and data-availability
elements. The third phase of the face-validity analysis encompassed all six
of the above elements.
As an initial step in evaluating any new modeling scheme, it is useful
to compare the new methodology against similar techniques that appear
reasonable and/or are already tested and in use. This comparison serves
several purposes in the context of the above first four validity elements.
First, it provides a basis to examine whether the overall logic and structure
of the model are reasonable. Second, the comparison establishes a yardstick
against which to measure improvements in the versatility and subsequent
utility of the model. Third, it assists in flushing out inherent sources of
errors. Last, the comparison sheds light on the availability and quality of
data.
To these ends, the first phase of the validity analysis examined
existing DOD and MIL-STD guidelines to see if any credible MPT projection
schemes have already been established. Similarly, the second phase consisted
of conducting a much larger literature search inclusive of past and present
MPT models from both the government and private sectors.
The third phase of the face validity study was a detailed audit of three
applications of the projection technique. This part of the operational
analysis proved to be a pivotal component because it encompassed all the
validity insights provided by the above literature searches, as well as a
grasp of (1) the ease with which the model could be applied by others; (2)
whether the technique contained discontinuities between its inputs, internal
mechanics and results (therefore introducing ambiguities); and (3) whether
there was a clear indication of the quality and limitation of the outcomes.
The three applications chosen for the audit were the Single Channel Ground
Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS), Remotely piloted Vehicle (RPV), and the
Division jsupport Weapons jSystem (DSWS). The results of the three remaining
phases of the face-validity analysis are detailed in the following paragraphs.
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C. ANALYSIS OF EXISTING DOD MPT PROJECTION GUIDELINES
As indicated in Section II, there are several DOD and MIL-STD documents
that refer to MPT. For example, DOD 5000.1 and 5000.2 describe the structure
and supporting procedures for planning and completing major system acquisi-
tions (1,2). As a precursor to 5000.2, the 5000.1 directive calls out the
necessity to define, estimate, and budget accordingly, MPT at the acquisition
management level. The 5000.2 directive, acting in a supplementary role, more
specifically addresses how the new acquisition will be evaluated against the
various support parameters such as MPT. For example, using a top-down
approach, it first defines the acquisition review council (DSARC or ASARC)
advisory roles and then establishes both the content and approximate time
frames for the major acquisition and system development review phases. From
the standpoint of threat mitigation, affordability, and supportability,
detailed guidelines are provided for developing the system acquisition and
support strategy. The 5000.2 directive states the necessity to consider MPT
needs under the "System Readiness, Support, and Personnel (ILS)" portion of
the document. Although this subsection requires that MPT estimates consider
both peacetime and wartime manpower demands, skills, costs, and training, it
does not indicate a methodology to assist in making these estimates.
Similarly, the 5000.1 directive provides even less distinct guidelines for
determining, and budgeting for, MPT costs. Because MPT falls under the
heading of Integrated Logistics Support (ILS), the next step was to examine
directives more specifically related to system support. Perhaps one of the
best of the family of directives associated with system support is MIL-STD
1388A (11). This MIL-STD states up front the requirement to develop human
engineering and safety programs as part of the overall system support analysis
plan. The document then proceeds to delineate key MPT variables and sup-
porting data that must be considered to determine whether the proposed system
meets manpower readiness, supportability, and affordability goals. These
variables include (1) the number of systems to be supported; (2) missions per
unit of time; (3) mission duration; (4) operating parameters (days, miles,
hours, flights, etc.); (5) maintenance and transportation periods; (6) des-
criptions of system components and operating environment (in terms of their
impact on MPT); (7) task descriptions; (8) costs; and (9) special support and
test equipment MPT impacts. Additionally, MIL-STD 1388A requires that all the
various support scenarios for each proposed design alternative be compared
against each other to optimize the design selection.
As in the case of the previously described DOD directives, MIL-STD 1388
also fell short of providing an analytic structure for projecting new
acquisition MPT demands. Although a dead-end from the analytic standpoint,
MIL-STD 1388A did provide more depth on some positive characteristics of the
HCM. These characteristics revolved around the reasonably close match between
the DOD MPT guidelines and structure of the data inputs and outputs of the
HCM. Because MIL-STD 1388 provided more specific guidelines on MPT support
considerations than DOD 5000.1 and 5000.2, it was decided to probe one level
deeper into specific Army directives having to do with MPT. At this final
level it was anticipated that all key MPT variables and data elements would be
defined along with the supporting analytic structure. Probably the most
concise Army directive in the MPT area is Army Regulation (AR.) 570-2 (12).
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This service regulation, entitled the "TOE Manpower Authorization Criteria
(MACRIT)," provides criteria and standards that help establish an "equitable
relationship between services performed and types of personnel utilized." To
achieve this match the MACRIT requires that system manpower studies be
conducted and the results approved by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
(DCSPER) for the Army. The studies must provide the number of direct workers
necessary to effectively perform a specified work activity. Direct (actual
task performance), nonproductive (sleep), and indirect (travel and task
preparation) times must be considered in the manpower calculation. The MACRIT
defines some approximate time factors for these three elements and ultimately
provides a simple equation to calculate manpower. This equation is as follows
(12):
WORKLOAD FORCE STRUCTURE
(in direct and X (in number of MANPOWER
indirect manhours per system) systems to be procured) = (number of
AVAILABLE PRODUCTIVE HOURS people)
Figure 5-1 shows that the above expression can be depicted graphically
as a rectangular function.
One interesting aspect of the MACRIT manpower equation is that the
number of support people is calculated for the complete procurement totally
independent of the acquisition time cycle. Therefore, if the manpower require-
ment per year was graphed as a function of the system life cycle, one would
observe the same type of step function as shown in Figure 5-1, indicating no
change in the manpower requirements over time. This function is discussed in
greater detail later in this section. The most important aspect of the above
discussion is that AR570-2 presently represents the key manpower projection
and planning document in the Army. It is now also obvious, based on the HCM
summary provided in Section II-B, that the methodology is strongly aligned
with the manpower guidelines as specified in the MACRIT, as well as the
o 5Q- rn
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NUMBER OF SYSTEMS
Figure 5-1. MACRIT Manpower Curve
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broader policy guidelines spelled out in major support and acquisition
planning documents such as MIL-STD 1388A, DOD 5000.1 and DOD 5000.2.
It is clear from this discussion that related DOD directives do not seem
to provide much analytic guidance in the area of new acquisition MPT projec-
tions. Although one appraisal element was obtained via the MACRIT, this data
point only represented one aspect of evaluating a much more complicated metho-
dology encompassing task and skill analysis, personnel identification, training
identification, costing, and tradeoff analysis. To obtain more data points on
the manpower algorithm and evaluate the other methodology elements, it was
obvious that a broader literature search was required. The following section
provides the results of this broader effort.
D. CRITIQUE OF OTHER EXAMPLE MPT PROJECTION METHODS
The summary of directives provided in the previous discussion was not
meant to be an exhaustive review of all related MPT DOD documentation. For
the purpose of this study it sufficed to point out that the immediate and most
widely used DOD acquisition and support guidelines are not fruitful sources of
detailed MPT modeling techniques. A somewhat similar approach was taken with
the literture search. Again, the intent was not to cover all modeling
developments in MPT. For this study it was adequate to examine a sufficient
number of related papers and models to obtain a solid understanding of other
accepted techniques and logic employed in government and the private sector,
compare shortcomings of both the DRC and other models, and ensure that a large
enough array of models was examined so that all aspects of the HARDMAN
methodology could be evaluated. This approach turned out to be very efficient
because the literature search revealed a considerable amount of redundancy in
the MPT material. In line with this finding, the following summary and
analysis encompass a select group of papers that appeared to have the best
data and analytic foundations as related to their respective aspect of the MPT
problems. As stated earlier, the HCM covers a broad number of MPT topics.
Therefore, to prevent any confusion in understanding how the various papers
apply to the different topics, the following discussion is organized by each
step in the methodology. The methodology steps described earlier in Section
II-D are restated here in a little more depth to assist the reader in seeing
the distinctions, or parallels, between the different projection techniques.
1. Summary of Papers Related to Building the HCM Historical Data Base
(Step 1)
Step 1 of the HCM requires the development of a reference system
that is representative of the proposed system (meets the functional require-
ments) and is generally composed of technically and operationally similar
predecessor components. The development of the reference system is a pivotal
point in the MPT analysis because a conceptual error in system configuration
could result in gross MPT errors later in the analysis. The premise for
conceptually building the proposed system out of predecessor components is
based on the idea that technology growth is usually evolutionary rather than
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revolutionary in nature. Two references were discovered, Pong's unmanned
spacecraft cost model and Gordon's review of mining equipment R&D, that
illustrate the "evolutionary" concept of technology development as being a
reasonable and supportable assumption (13,14). Both the Fong and Gordon
papers were chosen to show that the accepted concept of evolutionary
technology development in fact spans several industries (i.e., the
aerospace/communications industry to the mining industry).
2. Summary of Information Related to the Manpower Algorithm (Step 2)
As stated earlier in this section, one type of manpower projection
algorithm is the simple Army MACRU form (12). This form is the one employed
in Step 2 of the HCM where the mission, operational, and maintenance data
(extracted from the proposed and adjusted predecessor system data bases), are
combined to establish the new system manpower requirements. Quade and
Boucher, in their book entitled Systems Analysis and Policy Planning, employ
the same basic rectangular function for projecting weapon system manpower
support (15). They suggest that this algorithm is desirable largely because
it provides a simple approximation of manpower (15). Another interesting
insight, somewhat in conflict with the Quade and Boucher approach, is provided
by Putnam in his paper dealing with projecting manpower to operate a new
computer software system (16). Putnam provides essential reference backup
supporting the theory that medium-to-large sized systems follow a life-cycle
pattern of (1) rise in manpower, (2) peaking, and (3) gradual tailing off as
the system gets older and is attrited. This cycle is termed the Norden/
Raleigh cycle and closely approximates a critically damped oscillating system
or a Weibull curve as shown in Figure 5-2.
o
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Figure 5-2. Typical Norden/Raleigh Manpower Curve
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The equation, depending on the boundary conditions and how gradually the curve
peaks and tapers off, is of the form:
MP = GX+ C2t e~bt, or, MP = C^ C^ e~bt
where Cj, C2> and b are constants determined by the boundary conditions
MP = 0 @ t = 0, dMP/dt = 0 @ t = tp (t peak), MP = MPmax @ t = tp
(t peak). The total manpower required for the life of the system is
determined by integrating the above funtion(s) over the total life cycle. The
important thrust of this paper is not determining the exact MP equation, but
the fact that the author provides substantial backup indicating that small,
short-lived projects can be modeled fairly accurately, using a rectangular MP
function (16). However, large, long-lived programs (such as a large-weapon
system) may require a manpower curve reflecting the more accurate buildup and
tapering off of real-life systems (16). This could have major impacts on
early- or later-stage, life-cycle MP requirements because the rectangular
function would show a larger requirement than actually needed. Consequently,
a new system being jointly phased—in at the same time or at a later stage
might not have access to a needed manpower pool if the rectangular curve were
used as an acquisition planning guide.
3. Summary of Papers Related to the HCM Training Resource Assessment
(Step 3)
Step 3 of the HCM addresses the determination of training
resources. Step 2 of the procedure provides both the number and types
(skills) of people required for the proposed systems. Drawing on this
information, simple programmatic matchups based on existing schools and
training algorithms are employed to calculate the kinds and number of courses,
instructors, training devices, and total training costs. The approach uses
present curricula, devices, and associated costs where predecessor system
components, similar to the proposed system, already exist. However, where new
skills and training may be required the methodology provides logic algorithms
(in the form of decision trees) for (1) determining whether additional
training is required and (2) whether (and what kinds of) generic training
devices are required. Ballpark cost estimates are then developed by using
present costs of the generic devices as they exist in the other services or
industry.
The PACER document, introduced earlier in Section II, is almost
uniformly in consonance with the HCM (7). One effort derived from the HCM and
developed by Winston, "A Preliminary Report on the Early Comparability
Analysis (EGA) Methodology," examines the difficult problem of identifying,
focusing in on, and training for, new hard-to-find skills (17).
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Winston's effort primarily addresses the issues of force modernization
versus the recruitment/retention of manpower. The object of the comparability
analysis is to identify potentially high MPT drivers early in the acquisition
process. Data on specific problem tasks or "high drivers" would be supported
by historical, current, or projected data on MPT. Examples of data sources
include (1) Army Occupational Survey Program (AOSP), (2) proponent schools
(TRADOC), (3) subject matter experts, (4) Logistic Support Analysis Records
(LSAR), and (5) Army Publications. The basic methodology involves the
following steps:
(1) List the required tasks and MOS for the proposed system by using a
similar predecessor.
(2) Establish task criteria such as % of people performing a task
(PPT), task difficulty (TD), frequency of task performance (FTP),
risk involved if task not performed properly (Rl), task learning
difficulty (TLD), training time (TT), and task decay rate (TDR).
(3) Assign subjective values of 1-4 (where 1 is "low" and 4 is "high")
to each criterion, for every task identified with the proposed
system.
(4) Calculate a subjective task score for each task (i.e., PPT x TD x
FTP x RI x TLD x TT x TDR = Task Score).
(5) Identify high drivers.
(6) Conduct task analysis of high drivers.
(7) Establish learning/training requirements for high drivers.
(8) Determine personnel required based on test scores and available
skills.
The logic algorithms employed in the HCM decision tree analysis of new skills
use the same subjective task criteria as listed in Step 2 of the preceding
comparability methodology.
4. Summary of Papers Related to the HCM Personnel Requirements
Analysis (Step 4)
Step 4 of the HCM establishes the necessary number of people in
the training pipeline to support the manpower and skill projections made in
Step 2. The pipeline figure considers that personnel move in and out of
various skill categories for reasons such as retirement, promotion, or
changing to different skill areas. The fractional change in people moving in
and out of various skill areas is based on historical data.
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Several papers associated with modeling this flow process were found.
Driven by a desired manpower ceiling for various skills, each model basically
establishes the monthly or yearly proportional ebb and flow of people within
each skill category (based on historical data) and compares the final remain-
ing stock of people in each skill area against the desired ceiling to estab-
lish manpower shortages. Papers by Enke (18), Holz (19), Safeer (20), and
Doong (21), apply specifically to the military (i.e., Army and Navy); while
papers by Drummond (22), and Leeson (23), examine the problems of.statewide
agricultural labor shortages and police shortages, respectively. Although the
terras in the equations describing the personnel flow process vary from paper
to paper, the general algorithms are the same. The algorithms have the
following basic form:
n n
V (MP ) = V P (1 - (f - f
2^  A'i 2, i OM IM
n
MPE - (MPC).- <MPA>.
where
(MP ). = Manpower available in the ith skill category after reducing
the existing pool
P. = Existing or prjected pool of people in the ith skill category
£ = Fraction of people out-migrating from skill category iOM
f = Fraction of people in-migrating
f = Fraction of people retiring
JX
(MP ). = Desired manpower ceiling for the ith skill category
C x
MPF = Total entrant manpower required to sustain the desired
manpower ceiling
Enke suggests using probabilities in place of the fractional adjustments of
the manpower pool to determine the possibility of joint events occurring
(e.g., the chances of an individual leaving the Army within the interval t + n
given that he has attained a certain level of training in a given skill area)
(18). Enke further indicates that variables such as the state of the economy,
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whether there is cr is not a draft, or massive reorganizations can effect the
personnel flux greatly (18). Of all the papers, the most satisfactory approach
to dealing with these variables is provided by Enke. Enke points out that
historical manpower flows are only useful if (1) stable socio-economic condi-
tions have existed and will continue to exist in the near future, (2) there is
enough cause-effect data to catch most reasons for reenlistment/loss, and
(3) the cause-effect data are supportable by accurate statistics. However, to
gain experience on how historical manpower flows are perturbed by, for example,
a varying economy, he suggests using the Decisions Elements Analysis (DEA)
technique (18). DEA is a survey approach whereby statistically significant
sample populations of personnel enlisting, leaving, and staying are queried to
establish the main drivers affecting their respective decisions. Modeled
after similar successful consumer product-oriented sales DEAs, this approach
provides a more accurate picture of how the population will largely behave
during periods of rapid, sizeable socio-economic change. The different splits
in the sample populations are then used to proportionally adjust the pools
within various skill areas so that the true manpower availability more closely
resembles the real world. Enke anticipates that, with time, sufficient
experience with widely varying socio-economic conditions can be gathered so
that personnel flow models can employ different sets of probabilities as they
apply to the given (or projected) national or international situation.
By comparison, the HCM differs in the use of a starting manpower pool
and desired ceiling. Both of these variables are required data inputs to all
of the previous models examined. The HCM calculates the desired manpower
ceiling from Step 2 of the methodology and does not depend on a historical
starting pool. Instead, the HCM uses an optimization routine initiated by
placing one hypothetical individual (unity) in the first open-skill area
associated with a given task. The value of unity is multiplied by the
historical fractional manpower flows and what initially remains is a fraction
of an individual. The model then proceeds to input more individuals in the
same manner, stepwise, until all the skill areas are filled in accordance with
the manpower requirement. This stepwise calculation results in the total
number of people in the pipeline that must be recruited and trained to
compensate for the various personnel losses. The HCM does not appear to
address the use of compensating factors to adjust its historical personnel
loss rates according to socio-economic fluctuations.
5. Summary of Papers Related to the HCM Determination of Manpower
Shortages (Step 5)
Step 5 of the HCM draws on the results of the personnel flow
analysis and ultimately makes a comparison between the pipeline requirements
and the present (or two-year projection) of available manpower. The resultant
difference indicates manpower shortages in the various skill areas. The key
difficulty with this step is finding a reasonable estimate of available
manpower. If the manpower shortage is required for a near-term assessment,
then the existing manpower pool is a reliable number. However, if the
potential shortages must be calculated for a system deployed five to ten years
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from now, then the current (or near-future) availability number may be
inadequate. Several papers address the long-term manpower projection
problem. All of the studies (Lindsay's future Army enlistment regression
(24), Barnes1 soldier 90 regression (25), and Grissmer's year 2000 manpower
supply scenario (26)) were service-specific. Both the Lindsay and Barnes
papers were standard linear regression models that project outyear manpower
requirements. Grissmer employed a non-linear regression model that further
adjusted its manpower trends up or down through the use of elasticities (i.e.,
weighting factors such as declining economy, unemployment, pay changes, etc.),
which are projected to take effect at various time intervals and therefore
distort the curve up or down as they occur. The major drawback of this
techniques is that adjustments are not made to account for the lower
confidence associated with outyear projections.
6. Summary of Papers Related to the HCM Tradeoff Analysis (Step 6)
The last step in the HCM is reflective in that various "what if"
scenarios are developed in response to excessive costs or manpower and
training shortages revealed by the results of Step 5. Many of the "what if"
scenarios revolve around cost because it is a common denominator for many
design decisions. In performing the various tradeoff analyses as a function
of cost, the HCM usually does not extend beyond those elements directly
associated with MPT (e.g., tradeoffs related to billet definition and costs,
task definition, system reliability, task training, or training devices).
Other life-cycle cost elements such as spares, support and test equipment, and
technical documentation are not addressed.
One paper summarized in Section II was the HARDMAN Life-Cycle Cost Model
.(HLCCM) developed for the Navy (8). This model was specifically designed for
performing a wide range of system tradeoffs. The complete program consists of
several interactive life-cycle cost models that allow the designer to change
input values for one or more of the life-cycle cost variables and observe the
impact on the relative cost of the other support elements. The cost variables
include (1) production, (2) wages, (3) spares, (4) support and test equipment,
(5) maintenance, (6) technical documentation, and (7) maintenance and operator
training. For example, if a new, expensive acquisition demands a large number
of highly skilled maintenance people, it may be worthwhile to examine the
impact of reducing the tasks and skill level by investing more money in
support and test equipment to prevent the reliability from decreasing and
subsequent spares from increasing. Similar to other life-cycle cost models,
the HLCCM technique seems to explore more adequately the range of possible
cost tradeoffs.
7. Summary of Papers Encompassing the Complete HCM
One immediate implication of the preceding discussion is that
there are apparently very few modeling processes that cover the complete MPT
arena. Indeed, the HCM seems to be the one process that achieves this level
of coverage. However, another MPT procedure examined, which appeared to be
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designed to the same level of detail, was the Air Force "Acquisition of
Supportable Systems Evaluation Acquisition Technology (ASSET)" methodology
(27). One of the reasons the Air Force procedure demonstrates reasonable
equivalence to the overall HCM is because ASSET was originally designed by the
same co'ntractor. In its present form, ASSET represents the combined past and
present design efforts of the HCM design team, Westinghouse Corporation, and
the Air Force (27).
In contrast to the HCMs six major steps, ASSET has eight:
(1) Define the specific application and identify major data sources
and planning documents.
(2) Construct the consolidated data base (similar to the HCM CDB).
(3) Define all operator and maintenance tasks, tools, and test or
support equipment.
(4) Develop maintenance action networks.
(5) Establish other logistic support resources based on the task
analysis and maintenance network.
(6) Compare the new system alternative designs against a baseline
system to identify different maintenance and resource demand
scenarios.
(7) Perform a life-cycle cost assessment using all of the above
logistics support inputs.
(8) Develop a design option decision tree that indicates various
tradeoff situations critical to logistics and human resources.
Although the Air Force technique seems to use more detailed modeling
routines, it admits to having some data availability, data manipulation, and
subroutine integration problems (e.g., problems with obtaining data for
maintenance network probabilities or the mismatch between the ASSET personnel
availability model and the equivalent information generated by the Air Force
Manpower and Personnel Center) (27).
In summary, it seems that the HCM does not strongly diverge from either
standard DOD MPT doctrines or other accepted MPT modeling practices. Although
distinctions were made throughout the preceding discussion, the following
section summarizes the major positive and negative differences more concisely.
E. COMPARISON OF DOD AND OTHER MPT GUIDELINES AGAINST HCM
The major differences between the HCM and the other various MPT modeling
techniques were pointed out in the preceding paragraphs. In some cases the
distinctions of other modeling practices represent improvements because they
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address real-world considerations that could affect the projection accuracy.
In other situations, the HCM strengths provide a stronger theoretical founda-
tion. Table 5-1 summarizes the areas in which the strengths and weaknesses
were apparent.
Table 5-1 clearly indicates that overall the HCM is fairly similar to
other MPT models in its logic, use of associated MPT parameters, and input
data. The major differences considered as weaknesses originated from (1) using
a rectangular manpower function, (2) not making allowances in the manpower
flows for the possible impacts of major socio-economic fluctuations, (3) not
considering long-range manpower trends on personnel availability, and (4) not
considering all operations and support variables in the tradeoff and life-
cycle cost assessments. Item (1) above is important because of the potential
life-cycle end point problems cited earlier during the discussion of Putnam's
approach. Enke's point reiterated in item (2) cannot be overlooked because
some socio-economic impacts, such as a rapid defense drop-off with change in
administration, are not minor perturbations. Perturbations such as this can
affect the supply of manpower for several years. Item (3) is an important
consideration because the normal seven- to ten-year acquisition period far
exceeds the two-year manpower planning projection used in the Army and HCM.
Admittedly, the Grissmer, Lindsay, and Barnes papers referred to in Table 5-1
do not include a confidence factor in their manpower projections. However,
the use of confidence intervals is standard practice and could easily be
incorporated. Recommendations such as this are discussed in greater detail
later in this report. The last area, item (4), was considered a weakness
because all life-cycle elements must be considered to completely assess costs
and design tradeoffs.
The HCM clearly exceeded some of the other studies in the areas related
to building the data base and describing tasks and the personnel pipeline
calculations. The data base and task area descriptions were comparatively
better than the Fong or Gordon papers because these studies were not
projection models. The advantage of the HCM over the series of papers related
to the pipeline projection was the optimization routine. By not requiring
either manpower ceiling or starting pool data inputs, the model reduced the
chance of contaminating the outputs with incorrect or obsolete data.
Having identified some of the strengths and weaknesses of the HCM via
the literature search, the next step was to investigate some actual applica-
tions of the methodology, drawing on the familiarization provided by the
preceding comparative examination. Inferences about the overall face validity
of the HCM were withheld until the audits were completed, and any obvious
parallels between the literature search findings and applications analysis
were identified. The final results are provided in the following paragraphs.
F. USE OF AUDITS TO EXAMINE FACE VALIDITY
The audit phase of the face-validity analysis was designed to follow the
literature searches so that the inquiry might be better organized (having
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obtained some foreknowledge of the HCM process and its shortcomings). As
stated earlier in this section, the three applications selected for the audits
were SINCGARS, RPV, and DSWS. These three systems were chosen primarily
because they represented the most recent applications of the HCM. These cases
were also selected because, being at different stages in the acquisition
process, they also typified different levels of study detail that is useful
for examining potential data availability or credibility issues. Finally, the
RPV analysis was executed by a different contractor team than the one
responsible for SINCGARS and DSWS.
As an introduction, SINCGARS is a sophisticated inter-communication
radio system consisting of a manpack subsystem (i.e., radio backpack) and six
other radio configurations that can be mounted on different types of vehicles,
i.e., trucks, tanks, etc. (28). The RPV, a small, drone-type aircraft that is
remotely piloted from a mobile command center, provides surveillance informa-
tion on enemy target locations (29). Last, the DSWS system is a self-propelled
Howitzer linked with three other respective ammunition resupply, operations
center, and maintenance vehicles (30).
Each design is fairly complex because several major components make up
the complete system. Given the time and budget constraints for the total
evaluation, it was decided that only select components from each system could
be examined in any depth. The three following selection criteria were
developed in an effort to choose key components that could surface validity
problems:
(1) The component should be a major manpower driver in terms of
quantity and skills.
(2) The component should require maximum exercise of the mechanics and
judgmental portions of the methodology to explore validity issues
such as error sources, data availability, logic, and credibility.
(3) Where possible, the component should demonstrate the least
quantity and quality of source data, therefore requiring an
exercise of the most judgmental portions of the methodology.
These criteria would provide insight into the most likely areas
where error sources, credibility, logic, or ambiguity problems
could arise.
Although it was difficult to find components that simultaneously met all
criteria, generally the four to six components selected for each system
satisfied at least two of the guidelines. Once the studies were reviewed and
the components analyzed, a detailed list was assembled that addressed all the
areas where various face-validity issues could arise. The next step was to
interface with the HCM designers to trace and understand exactly what was done
to confirm the problem areas. This was accomplished by converting the problem
list into a questionnaire, visiting the contractor's facility, and replicating
in detail the analysis performed (31). The complete questionnaire is shown in
Appendix C.
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Two caveats pertaining to the audits should be stated at the onset.
First, only the RPV and DSWS audits were actually conducted at the con-
tractor's facility. The SINCGARS audit was performed off-site under the same
guidelines as a test of the internal reliability of the methodology (32). The
test of internal reliability requires that an independent group of trained
individuals, given the same data inputs, attempt to replicate the results of a
previous application of the methodology. Although the details of the internal
validity test are provided later in Section VI, it suffices to state here that
the face-validity issues surfaced during the on-site RPV and DSWS reviews also
appeared in the separate SINCGARS replication.
The second caveat applies to the presentation and interpretation of the
audit results. Appendix C contains approximately eighty questions related to
both the three specific systems and the methodology as a whole. It should be
noted that of the eighty issues examined, which covered the complete
methodology, roughly 85% (or 68 of the potential issues) were adequately
addressed and resolved during the audits. A summary of the remaining problem
areas follows.
1. Results of the SINCGARS Audit
The major findings of the SINCGARS audit revolved around the
clarity of the methodology, usability of the technique, and data management.
The clarity issues primarily applied to the early Step 1 and 2 analysis done
in support of the ultimate manpower and personnel projections. For example,
functional requirements had to be developed as a subset of selecting
predecessor components to both construct a reference system and load the
historical data bank. The participants in the replication found that the
detail to which the requirements could be defined had a direct relationship to
the number of technically different components selected to build a reference
system and, therefore, could affect the number of people needed to support the
system. There were no clear guidelines provided for determining the depth to
which the requirements should be developed.
Another area of contention developed over the construction of the
reference system. The reference system is constructed using predecessor
components that meet the functional requirements and, in turn, are similar to
the proposed system(s) one desires to model. The study group discovered
through the SINCGARS example the possibility that, if two or more contractor-
proposed designs differed substantially, it could be very difficult to con-
struct one reference system similar to both designs. This dilemma could
result in a weaker manpower projection for one case than the other. Although
the obvious solution was to develop two reference systems, the larger problem
was the matter of defining how much two proposed designs could diverge before
one reference system was insufficient to resemble the performance of both.
One area closely associated with the manpower projection is'the process
of evaluating design differences between the predecessor and proposed com-
ponents and defining the fractional improvements in maintainability and
reliability performance. The first major difference occurred over the selec-
tion of the so-called "perturbation values," which are the ratios used to
adjust reference data to better represent the performance of the proposed
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component. The study participants found that, because there were not estab-
lished guidelines for selecting perturbation values, their perceptions of
certain design improvements varied widely. This variance could have a major
affect on the manpower outcomes.
The study group suffered similar confusion over guidelines associated
with the selection of indirect productivity and induced failure values.
Although distinct values were provided for SINCGARS, the group recognized that
the MACRIT, which is the source of these values, provides a range of selec-
tion. Again, not being given guidelines in the methodology on how to select
either a high or low factor over a fairly wide range of potential values, the
study participants felt that the final manpower projection could be affected
considerably.
The last, most important, difference was associated with a misunder-
standing of how the perturbation values were actually used in the manpower
calculation. It was discovered that the HCM presently uses perturbation
values only to fill data gaps in the proposed designs. Occasionally, HCM
analysts find that contractors do not provide performance data on all the
components in the proposed design (such as SINCGARS). While constructing the
reference system out of similar predecessor components, the analysts will
select the predecessor component equivalent to the missing component in the
proposed design and "perturb" the historical performance data in order to
complete the data set for the new design. However, in the final manpower and
personnel projections the total reference system predecessor data are not
upgraded (using perturbation values) to allow the complete new design to be
modeled based on proven historical information. This procedure represented a
major logic problem to the control group because one of the primary reasons
for modeling new system manpower requirements is to prevent contractors from
being overly optimistic about the impacts of new technology improvements. By
not upgrading the old technology to a roughly equivalent proposed configuration
and establishing a revised historical data base against which to equally com-
pare proposed designs, the methodology cannot test the integrity of con-
tractors. Without making an equivalent technology-based comparison, the same
trivial outcome will always result; the new technology will appear to perform
better than old technology (i.e., the new technology will require either fewer
or lower-quality skilled people).
One area of contention that arose over the personnel assessment portion
of Step 2 in the methodology was the matching process between tasks and
skills. The participants found that the cookbook approach outlined in the
methodology was not completely accurate. This definitive approach is normally
followed up with the analysts actually contacting various Army training
schools to confirm, or update, the task and skill matchups. Because this
caveat was not passed on to the participants, there was general disagreement
between the skills selected by the original methodology designers and the
skills selected by the control group.
The last two areas pertaining to the usability and data issues were more
related to the methodology as a whole. The analysts discovered that, although
they jointly had backgrounds in mathematics, engineering, and personnel, they
still lacked the range of training and experience necessary to completely
comprehend the pitfalls and nuances of the methodology. The overall con-
clusion was that the methodology could not be properly exercised unless a
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well-seasoned, multidisciplinary team having joint military, engineering, data
management, and personnel backgrounds was employed. The last problem area,
data management, was not necessarily viewed by the study participants as a
shortcoming of the methodology. The observation was made that the complex
nature of the MPT issues alone caused the methodology to contain many places
where errors could be introduced due to (1) the prodigious quantity of data
required and (2) the large amount of data manipulation required.
2. Results of the RPV Audit
The RPV audit surfaced several potential validity problems
involving elements of the early data-sorting process, manpower and training
projections, as well as the later tradeoff analyses. The most important
finding related to the initial data base step was the lack of a clear decision
process for selecting and using different sources of performance data (e.g.,
reliability and maintenance data). For example, it was stated earlier in this
section that the methodology normally requires historical data to be used for
modeling new system performance. However, in the RPV case, most of the
components had already been prototyped so that actual reliability and
maintenance test data existed. Nevertheless, the decision was made to use
only some of the contractor test data. The remaining maintenance data were
discarded and relaced by comparable information listed in the design speci-
fications that were part of the original proposal. The reason cited for this
action was that experience dictated the contractor data was not reasonable.
Another example of non-distinct direction for data selection pertained to
modeling component performance on the small RPV using comparable components on
full-sized aircraft. The reason the contractor opted to use this information
was because the Army, having no history of using drones, did not have com-
parable predecessor data. Closely associated with this decision was the fact
that the original designers did not differentiate between the different
performance and environmental envelopes of the aircraft. These differences
could affect the stress levels and resultant wearout rates experienced by the
RPV components. The confusion over the selection of data sources, although
somewhat linked to concerns about accuracy, more specifically revolved around
(1) identifying the various data sources and ranking them as a function of
quality and (2) determining when to use one source in preference to another.
In the manpower and personnel step following Step 1, the analysts found
the same problems with selecting perturbation and induced failure values that
were discovered with SINCGARS. Similarly, the step of matching skills with
tasks lacked a clear audit trail as to how the final skills were selected.
This particular audit problem was derived from the fact that the Army did not
list skills for operating and maintaining drone-type aircraft. Therefore, the
HCM analysts had to search outside the normal cookbook procedure to define the
new skill areas and obtain associated wage and training information. Regarding
the final manpower projection made in Step 2 of the methodology, the step
function deployment assumption discussed earlier in the literature search was
confirmed. As indicated before, this assumption is considered a problem
because of the potential personnel allocation conflicts imposed by other
acquisitions under concurrent development.
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Step 3 of the methodology, the training resource assessment, surfaced
some interesting problems with respect to RPV. The analysts discovered that,
although the methodology provides for a very detailed instructor, training
resource and cost asessment, it has only been marginally exercised because of
lack of data. Critical training considerations such as the identification of
safety related tasks or task difficulty were not highlighted. Additionally,
the audit team found that the methodology did not differentiate between the
instructor contact hours required for critical versus non-critical tasks. The
analysts felt that this was particularly important because RPV appeared to be
a new technology area not previously employed by the Army.
An in-depth investigation of the personnel shortage projection in Step 5
of the RPV study was.very revealing. The investigators found that, although
the modeling algorithm for calculating shortages was sound, the weakness
pertaining to the use of the short-term manpower availability projection cited
in the previous literature summary was verified.
In the final step of the RPV study, tradeoff analysis and conclusions,
the analysts experienced considerable confusion over the criteria for
(1) performing certain tradeoffs and (2) identifying the one MPT projection
that represented the best estimate of the real-world performance of the
proposed system. For example, in the training assessment several cases were
found where the design dictated the use of low pay grades in certain task
areas. However, when the training courses were structured based on pre-
decessor systems, it was found that rather high skills were actually required
for the same tasks. Although the study indicated that this mismatch was a
major conflict, the training and cost implications were never pursued in the
tradeoff analysis. This ambiguity about the relative importance of various
tradeoffs did not give the analysts confidence that (1) all possible tradeoffs
had been considered; (2) important tradeoffs, such as the above example, had
not been overlooked; and (3) the tradeoffs finally pursued represented the
pivotal issues. The largest source of ambiguity in the RPV study revolved
around the presentation of the final MPT and cost projections. The present
summary format for the projections displays both the reference and proposed
results together. However, where wide variations between the projections
occurred (such as SINCGARS) or when several proposed systems were presented
(such as RPV), it was not clear which set of results represented the most
accurate approximation and MPT planning guide. The audit team found that the
source of the confusion originated from not having an indication of the
relative credibility of the data inputs and outcomes.
One final interesting aspect noted by the analysts applied specifically
to RPV but not to SINCGARS. The observation was made that because the RPV
study was completed roughly one year before this evaluation, the members of
the original HCM study team did experience memory decay with respect to their
decisions and judgments about the use of certain data sources and the ultimate
selection of one of the proposed system designs as the best planning figure.
This last finding was important because it demonstrated that, even with a
seasoned corporate bank of knowledge, the judgment areas in the methodology
must be better structured to allow a firmer audit trail.
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3. Results of the DSWS Audit
The findings of the DSWS audit were quite similar to both SINCGARS
and RPV. The main reasons for the similarities were (1) the DSWS reference
system'was compared against several, widely varying proposed designs; (2) a
significant amount of data sorting and selection was required; and (3) the
original DSWS analysis was also completed well before the methodology validity
evaluation. The chief problems encountered by the investigators related to
item (1) above were those associated with defining the proper level of detail
for the functional requirements and building one reference system to model
four widely varying contractor concepts. Like the SINCGARS audit, it was felt
that the lack of sufficient detail on functional requirements and singular
reference system constraints could cause major variance and errors in the
operational and maintenance manpower support projections. Item (2) above was
extremely important because of the confusion generated in trying to sort and
categorize generic component repair times by specific task, establish the
credibility of the various data sources, and understand which data sources had
priority over others. The DSWS data question was analogous to the earlier
defined RPV data problem. Item (3) addresses the audit trail decay dilemma
similarly revealed with the RPV study.
As was the case with both the SINCGARS an RPV investigations, the
analysts did not clearly see the selection criteria for the DSWS perturbation
values, indirect productivity factors, and final choice of skills. Finally,
the investigators were confused by the way the data were presented for the
final design option selected as the MPT planning guide. Similar to RPV and
SINCGARS, the study team felt that the best option should have been
respectively chosen as a function of (1) the relative quality of the various
data inputs and (2) a comparison against a reference system that had been
perturbed so that the historical and proposed designs were compared on an
equal technological basis.
G. VALIDITY IMPLICATIONS
The preceding discussion highlighted many strengths and weaknesses of
the HCM. The overriding strengths were:
(1) The methodology conformed well with DOD and Army doctrines.
(2) The technique basically resembled other known, accepted MPT
modeling techniques in its logic, use of MPT variables, and input
data.
(3) The methodology was reasonably well supported by its data sources.
(4) The HCM surpassed most other models in its completeness and
integration of various MPT modeling techniques.
(5) The methodology provided a better modeling foundation in some
areas than other simulations (e.g., manpower pipeline projections).
(6) The HCM stood up reasonably well under an extensive audit (i.e.,
85 percent of the test issues were adequately answered).
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However, the audits confirmed some problem areas outlined in the
literature search. During the process of replicating the three case studies
the remaining 15 percent of the test issues revealed that (1) the HCM
conformed with the MACRIT in its use of a rectangular manpower curve with no
consideration of the Norden-Raleigh reduced end point demands; (2) the HCM did
not address Enke's potential impacts of major socio-economic fluctuations on
personnel flows in and out of various skills, and the Army as a whole; (3) the
technique did not project manpower availability and shortages at the actual
projected deployment time of the new system; (4) the HCM incorporated, but did
not exercise, a technique similar to Winston's subjective critical task
assessment; and (5) the HCM MPT system examined only a small number of life-
cycle cost tradeoffs (e.g., wages, reliability changes, task redefinition,
training programs and devices). Additionally, in the data base construction
phase, early in Step 1 of the methodology, there was a wide variance in (1)
the types and sources of data selected, (2) the reliability and maturity of
the data, and (3) the methods used in screening and manipulating the data to
conform to the methodology or to fill data gaps. This wide variance caused a
major problem in establishing the credibility of both the analysis and final
projections. It was also discovered in Step 1 that, by not reaching the
proper level of indenture for the functional requirements, key tasks and
subsequent manpower support could be left out. Another major finding
associated with the reference system portion of Step 1 was particularly
apparent in the SINCGARS and DSWS audits. It was discovered that where
several widely varying new designs were being considered, the use of a single-
reference system could be an inadequate performance comparator for some of the
proposed concepts. Also linked to the reference system procedure was the
problem of not adjusting the predecessor historical data as a function of the
proposed design improvements. This was a pivotal discovery because the
contractor—projected manpower and costs could not be assessed on an equal
basis with what would be considered a reasonably equivalent extension of
existing technology.
The manpower and personnel projection phase of the audits uniformly
revealed that a better logic structure was required for selecting perturbation
values, indirect productivity factors, and induced failure rates. It was
found that arbitrary selection of these different values would affect the
ultimate manpower projection, particularly where small variations in manpower
support (such as at the field level) could cause critical shortages. In the
personnel selection step it was found that HCM's actual skill matching process
extended beyond the scope of the stated methodology. The resultant skill
mismatch and cost impacts were felt to be potentially sizeable.
In the tradeoff and conclusion portion of the methodology, Step 6, the
audits revealed a definite need for (1) a clear structure for selecting
tradeoffs and (2) a subjective weighting mechanism of the various data and
judgmental elements of the methodology to establish the credibility of both
the final design selected and the accuracy of the analysis as a whole.
Overall, the findings of the audits suggested that the structure of the
judgmental portions of the methodology still needed to be improved to offset
the observed audit trail decay. Furthermore, the sophistication of both the
MPT problem and the HCM design did not make the process amenable to use by lay
people. Although the preceding discussion indicates the various sources of
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potential errors, logic problems, ambiguities, or credibility issues, Table 5-2
more concisely illustrates the link between these findings and complete array
of respective face-validity elements defined earlier in this section.
The face-validity analysis provided an indication of the strengths and
weaknesses of the HCM, as well as a first-cut, general examination of the
integrity of the technique. The next step was to investigate and tailor
validity tests to examine more specifically the accuracy and reliability of
both the overall methodology and its projections. The validity tests selected
for the reliability portion of the study, selected to conform with the project
time and budget constraints discussed in Section III-E, are discussed in
detail in Section VI along with the results of the complete reliability
analysis.
5-22
CO
^JC
cu
B
cu
t™4
w
>^^?-»
4-1
• iH
"O
•rl
rH
CO
t>
1
cu
o
CO
fa
<4H
O
CO
cu
H
C
•H
CO
-U
r-4
D
GO
QJ
C*
•U
•H
•0g<
*4H
O
><H
CO
B
3
CO
•
CSI
1
10
cu
i-H
XI
CO
H
CO
4J
B
cu
B
cu
i-H
W
>%) 1
• •H
•o
• H
I-H
CO
>
cu
u
CO
fa
>>
I-H 4-1
CO -rl B
• iH i-H CU
4J -rl rH
B X> X>
CU -rl O
It Tf+ I ,4«^ w M
O CU PL,
PM h
U
CO
4J CO
CO r-l 3
CO 3 O
CU co 3
0 CU 60
O Pi -H
I-i X>
CL. M E
O <
CU
i-H
X)
CO 4J CO
4J O i-H
ca a -H
O CO3^
*«
CU
i-H CU
XI M 0
•iH O >-l
co V4 3
CO r4 O
O U CO
cv>
>,
CU rH
3 'r»
er co -a
•rl CO CU
^"^U 4-1cu o
H *rft
4J
CU U
rH CU O
XI rl -H
•rl rl 00
CO O O
CO 0 1-3
O C
PW M
CO
14-1 (X
CO O CU
CO 4J
cu £ co
rl O
< -rl >.
4-1 00
B o o
CU C r-l
•-H 3 O
£> fa T3o o
ri co J3
PL, CO 4J
£
X X X
X X
*
X X X X
'
X X
X X
1
rl
cu00 r-i VM
C CO CU 00 rl
(H-rl r * C » J C O C " O
O 4 J O « 4 H O rH-rl C O O C
M H C O ( 4 H O - I H C U C U > » C O l - i C O C f l
3 U C * O V 4 4) <0 -|H
CU'i-1 C U r H O O O C O IH O 3 rl CU
t - i T 3 > H C U C B > C Q O a ) O * C O U C O3co s>3 MH c -a cu a c g
4-1 4J 0) 14-1 O O >, 60 4J CU g C U C U
UT) Ui-H 4J rH -rl (3 Vj 3 O (H 4J
3B 3 M H C O C CU CO CU O. O O CU CO
(-1 CO CO Ki 60 O 4J O B Tl 0) B r-l WH >->
4J 4J 4JC B - r l C U - H - O 4-1 rH rH >, CU CO
CO 60 CO CO .rl CU CU 4J 4J 3 CO CO Cfl 60 rlCTJ C r i B ow -a 3o o - a
«4H-rl U-l -rl 3 (U 3> ,« - ICU " - > . H O r - l C C U
i-H O 4-1 4) O B 4 - 1 ^ t H C O C O c O -O U 4-1 O CU CO CM
UU C C -rl 4J HO COO C CU OOb ^ cu t-i M v v s co cu cu ex i 4J co 4: 3 a a
CU O r-l 3 O 4J T) CT C O > O C CO 4-1 CJ 4-1 O CU
4-1 C O C U O C8 CU C CU O C 41 H O -rl CO 41 CU rl 4J
CO rJ CO TO rJ -O -rl rl O 4) CO Ou Z X: T3 4J X> D- CO
X
X
X
1
•o
1 B
B cu co
Cfl TJ
8 rl B
CO CU CO
rl -rl 3 g
CO O CU
i-H 4-1 r-l -O
3 CO
oo x: o ri
B 4-1 4-1 CU
<0 *
4-1 4) 41 Ocj > > a.
OJ rl 'H B
rl 3 4J CO
o -n B
>4H CO
0 rl B 4J
CU 41 C
W 3 « -rl
CO O B O
D ft'H PL,
5-23
•rt^3
*
U
>.x
•
CN
ir\Ui
01w
»
03
H
00
4J
C
0)gI-l
w
4J
•I-l
•o
F-l
CO
0)
u
5*.
*« " g
•i-l i-l 0)
c .0 .0
4) -i-l O
4J T3 M
O 4) PH
PK h
CO
^J CO
oo i-i 9
oo 9 O
0) » 9O V 60
0 OS -H
M .0
*SI
(U
I-H
CO 4J CO
4J O i-H
CO Z -H
O CO
"*
0)
•-I 0)
JO 1-1 0
•i-l O I-l
00 M 9
03 l-l O
O W CO
PH
0) i-l
9 -H
cr to -o
•H CO VC u oo
J= C>
U 4J
^^
4J
V 0
t-» 4) U
^ I-l •!"!
•i-l M 60
CO O O
W 0 ,J
0 Cd< I-l
CO
IH Cu
co o 0)
CO 4-1(U c co
»-" O
<! •!-!>,
4J 60g o o
Ol C i-l1-190jQ C^ T3
o o
I-l 00 X
PJ CO 4J
0)
X
X
X X X X
X X
•o
- C «w 1 u
C C « O C M-I h
o o o E <u
.,-1 .H « to C C O 5
4J 4J >-, 0) O CO
O C 0 4 J 9 - I - I T 3 O O .
4) J3 -H ^H 4J CO CC U - I U C
i-l P > CO &.T3 01 O CO O 0) CO
41 D T-I > -r-l C to ••-< 1 €
C 0 4 J 4 J M C Q C O 4Ji-l C O
I-i O 41 U 4) C O C O O -H C
T 3 0 ) 9 V l C 0 6 0 U • H C J C O - H O O
4) CX -O 3 4) C O 4J -H ^ 4 - I O
1-1 O i-l X) '--I 1-1 C 4 J C O CO CO CO >,3 (-1 ^  -H uro. o i - ^ c o i-i C4- i
4J O D. CO 4> O V J I - I 4 J 4) U-l O T-I
O U - I I 4 - I 4 J 4 J C 4) O t3 O '"-I i-l
3 4J 4) CO O <4-l i— 1 - I - I 4 J * ! - !
I - I C O U T ) i— 1 g -H IM C CO CO CQ CO ^ D
4J CO 4) 4) P- 4J CO - i - I O l U <• C 4 J 9 C O lA
CO O) l-i O B « - I O •OCU- ' - 1 O O A J i - l
1 O -r-l 3 O •— I 4> G. 1 3 4J (X o CO O -H O.
C O T3 T) O -H i-l 0) C 4 J > H Ol (X 3 CO 0)O M C C e .* 4) 4j o 41 i-i 4J o g »-i > t->
Z O.-I-I *H M C O C O tO Z jD U CO Z -H <4-l CO CO
X
X
X
1— 1
CO
9
4J CO
I-l O 4-1
O CO co
M-l M -0
cu C
4) S O 4J
I-i O C
9 CXT3 01
•o c 01 e
4> CO CO X
U g CO O
O JZ •-(p 60 a
O. C co 01
• •-1 0) T3
14-1 4J 60
O u co E
01 4J 0)
^ »i— ) ^| 4j
u o o co
>J O. CO CO
5-24
/~s
•
"
"
C
O
e_>
CMii
m
01
_
CO
H
T-l 4Jco -H e
•i-l i-l CU
4J -i-l iH
q X> rO
CU >H O
4J -0 to
O 0) PL,
PL, M
CJ
0)
4J CO
CO i-H 3
co 3 O
0) co 3
U CU 60
O £X! -H
CO
4-)
C 01
CU i-l
§ CO 4J "CO
r-l 4J O rH
w co a -i-i
P co
1 1 ^
•o
•H CU
co xi to o
> -H O >H
W) M 3
O> co I-i O
u o u en
CO PL,
0> •-!
3 -H
er co >a
•H CO O)
JC P
O 4J
o> oH a
4-1
O) U
r-l 0) O
JZ to "*
• •H IH 60
CO O O
CO O rJ
o c
PL, M
CO
U-l (X
co O 01
CO 4J
cu c en
to O
4J 60B o o
cu q 1-1
1-130
XI PL, 13
0 0
W W ,£
PL, CO 4J
0>
s
X X
X X
X Sy*1^
4J
CO CO
0 -H
U CO
to ^»
01 O r-l
r-l to CO >4-l CO
u o u-i c
>, >4-l >4-l CO CO
U O h
1 CO 0) O T3
CU -i-l T3 4-1 C
U-l r-l CO CO CO
•H 0) 1-1 O
i-H 4-1 4-1 •!-!>-,
•rl T3 4J >~,
cu t-i 60 e -H 4-i
4J O C • i-l i-l • i-l
O) CO 'i-l CO i-l
i— i >r-i to 4-i >*-i 3 -i-l
vo ex co co u o crxi
£ ^ CU 3 "^
(X O i— 1 i— ' "O !^ CO t3
CU UCO O C O 4-1 QJ4-1 qq co w co v-i
en M co ^ o r J ' D U
X
X
X
1— 1
r— 1 4Jin cu o
0 » S
•o
PSrH CO C
fl -i-l O
U CO 0) U
eu to >
TD 4-1 CO E
JC 1 CO
•O 4J -H 0) 5*.
01 -H O 4J 4J 60
,> -O 4J i-l O
l^ 3 3 p*t •— '
CU CO 4J g H O
CO (S CO T3
XI <U 0) •> C Oo 4J e -o -i-i jsi-i co cu eu 1-1 4JI-H 4J to to q tx cu
CO f O -i-l O "i-l BIH 60 (X 3 CO U
cu TH IH tr co to eu
> r-i o cu eu -H jcO en u oi to TS 4-i
5-25
SECTION VI
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
A. OVERVIEW
As explained in Section III, the reliability, or accuracy, of the HCM
was explored via three avenues. The reliability of the HARDMAN methodology
was assessed by examining internal reliability, to a limited extent an
examination of the experience of individuals who have already applied the HCM
(or other similar methodologies) to real-life applications, and event series
validity.
For the internal reliability test, it was decided to use one of the Army
test cases (i.e., SINCGARS). A controlled experiment was designed to
establish whether a group of individuals, trained to use the methodology,
could both replicate the original answers and also demonstrate a low degree of
variance in their answers. A group of seven individuals (four civilians and
three career Army soldiers) of varying backgrounds, were selected for the
experiment. Given the small sample size (primarily due to restrictions in
available people, time, and budget) it was decided to dispense with detailed
statistical comparisons and simply establish general conclusions about the
repeatability and consistency of the results. The replication was also used
to develop a list of critical factors that have major impacts on MPT
projections. For purposes of consolidating the internal reliability findings
and to find ways to improve future versions of the HARDMAN methodology, each
participant went through a formal debriefing. Furthermore, a discrepancies
resolution conference, attended by the study group, ARI, and HCM designers,
was held following the completion of the replication.
Another important step in the reliability examination was a qualitative
accuracy check of past Air Force and Navy experience with the same (or
reasonably close) methodology. This was done by personally contacting
pertinent project personnel.
The last step in the reliability examination was a manpower sensitivity
analysis. Sensitivity analysis is a useful tool for testing how well a
technique like the HCM must conform with the real world. This type of test is
often referred to as an "event series validity test" because it ultimately
provides an acceptable accuracy or reliability envelope for the outcomes of a
modeling process. If the envelope is rather large, then a quick-and-dirty
approximation is acceptable. As the envelope shrinks, greater emphasis must
be placed on improving the quality and accuracy of each data input and
algorithm. In this evaluation, the sensitivity (or event series) analysis was
done last to assist in formulating and prioritizing the closing recommenda-
tions for improving potential problem areas in the methodology. To obtain an
indication of the required accuracy of the HCM, a simple top-down cost
sensitivity analysis was designed to establish the allowable variance in the
manpower projections which would still provide accurate MPT estimates. The
estimates of the allowable variance in the manpower projections were performed
for one sample acquisition using an actual Army system. Each element of the
reliability analysis is described in greater detail in the next subsection.
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B. APPROACH
1. Internal Reliability
The replication effort for evaluating internal reliability
involved the application of the first two steps of the HARDMAN methodology to
the Army's Single Channel Ground Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS). These two
steps were:
(1) Establishing a consolidated data base.
(2) Determining manpower requirements.
The remaining four steps were not included for several reasons. First,
preliminary review of the HCM process suggested that there were a substantial
number of judgments, having considerable influence on the manpower estimates,
in the first two steps. Second, at the time the replication was performed,
HCM designers had only completed their analysis on the first two sections of
the methodology. Third, other duty commitments mandated that the experiment
be simplified so that the Army participants could finish the replication
within a maximum time frame of three weeks. The SINCGARS components included
in the replication were as follows:
(1) Receiver/Transmitter Unit (R/T).
(2) Electronic Counter-Countermeasures Unit (ECCM).
(3) ECCM fill device.
(4) Securable Remote Control Unit (SRCU).
These components were confirmed as offering the greatest number of judgment
exercises.
A group of seven individuals with varying technical backgrounds (i.e.,
math, engineering, psychology) and experience (JPL, Soldier Support Center,
Army Research Institute) were selected for the testing. This group attended
the HCM training course, which was held at the HCM designer's facility in
Boston, Massachusetts, during February 1983. The goal of the course was to
familiarize the participants with the key analytical and judgment areas in the
first two steps of HARDMAN. During the training sessions, the methodology was
applied to an example subsystem of the Army's Multiple Launch Rocket System.
For the SINCGARS replication effort the two steps were divided into
eight different data packages. Each package required the determination of key
judgment and calculational outputs and was preceded by (1) a problem statement
related to the judgments that were required, (2) a list of the enclosed data
items to facilitate making the judgments and necessary calculations, and (3) a
brief statement about how to use the data. The problem statements and descrip-
tions of the data packages are given in Table 6-1.
In general, the participants were to proceed independently and
sequentially through the eight data packages until the four components of
SINCGARS identified for the replication effort were evaluated. Three weeks
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Table 6-1. Data Package Problem Statements and Descriptions
Problem Statement Date Package Description
Develop system functional
requirements
Construct reference system
Define tasks
Reliability and maintenance
determinations for inherent
versus induced component
failures and assignment of
task echelons
Determine design differences
(design difference analysis,
impact of design differences,
derivation and application of
perturbation values (PV) to
appropriate tasks)
Select and assign MOS
System/component
usage rates
Determine workload and
manpower requirements
Descriptive data for proposed system
and one worksheet for each subcomponent
Candidate list of predecssor systems
and description of contractor proposed
systems
List showing range of generic classes of
tasks and! contractor task definitions
for proposed systems
Task time data, component failure data,
induced failure data, equipment break-
down structures, predecessor task echelon
assignments - one worksheet for each
component
Data extracted from 1, 2, and 4, above,
summaries of contractor correspondence
with component contractors and one
worksheet for each component
List of candidate MOS from which to
choose appropriate specialties for each
task
Select data extracted from the operational
and organizational plan
Data extracted from 1-7, above, available
manhours - one worksheet for summary of
results
were allowed to complete the SINCGARS replication. The study group was
permitted to ask the HCM designers questions of clarification only by way of a
mediator. It was originally planned to provide feedback to the students at
selected audit points in the analysis for the first two SINCGARS components
(to allow mid-course corrections) and to provide no feedback for the last two
components to get a feel for what the end-point variance might actually be,
given no student coaching. In actuality, because of the huge quantity of data
involved and the relatively short time frame, feedback was given to the
students after each data package completion for all four components.
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The internal reliability was primarily assessed by reviewing the study
group1B answers to the data packages and by comparing them to the baseline HCM
designer answers. Besides a reliability measure, convergence of answers would
suggest that the judgment activities could be done by any individual with
appropriate training whereas divergence would indicate inadequacies with the
methodology, student background or experience, or HCM training (or possible
combinations of these problems). Another major step in the analysis was a
structured telephone debriefing of each participant to identify subjectively
major problem areas in the replication or methodology.
The analysis of each data package within the reliability effort involved
either a subjective review of the participants' responses or a numerical
evaluation of the key answers as compared to those of the HCM design team. To
protect the confidential nature of the replication, the participants were
referred to by number only (from 1 to 6). After the replication was
completed, each participant was debriefed to define individual problem areas
with the packages and to get feedback for possible future improvements in the
methodology. The debriefing specifically addressed relevance to present
assignments, difficult portions of the replication, discrepancies between the
HCM designer and study group answers, and the adequacy of the HARDMAN training
course (see Appendix D for a sample debriefing questionnaire).
The last major component of the internal reliability analysis was a
discrepancies resolution conference, which was held during August 1982 at the
Soldier Support Center at Ft. Benjamin Harrison, Indiana. This conference was
attended by the study group, representatives of JPL, the Army Research
Institute, and the HCM designers. The purpose of the meeting was to provide a
structured means of resolving differences and misunderstandings resulting from
the replication. This conference was a two-day activity in which each of the
eight data packages was examined and discussed in detail.
2. Qualitative Accuracy Check
The qualitative accuracy check was conducted by using participants
in existing military projects that have used some form of similar manpower
estimating methodology. The projects covered included the Advanced Lightweight
Torpedo (ALWT), the DDGX destroyer, the VTXTX flight trainer, and the SUBACTS
submarine combat system. The pertinent project personnel were asked their
opinions on the validity of the HARDMAN methodology as compared to other
methodologies, as well as real-life data.
3. Manpower Sensitivity Analysis (Event-Series Validity)
The objective of the sensitivity ef for t was to roughly approximate
the permissible variation in the manning variable. To accomplish this objec-
tive, four tasks were undertaken. The first was to develop a data set of
actual costs for the SINCGARS system. The second was to develop approximate
manning data for SINCGARS. The third task was to determine broad, acceptable
limits of error on total life-cycle cost estimates according to authorities
engaged in the budget and acquisition review process. The final, and largest,
task was to determine the extent of error allowable in manpower and training
cost estimates, given that other cost elements cannot exceed the limits of
their allowable ranges.
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Within Task 1, data were collected reflecting typical costs of various
elements of life-cycle cost. The major components of total cost were
identified in an attempt to determine approximate ranges. It was decided that
if possible, the more difficult-to-identify elements of life-cycle cost would
be ignored if their relative sizes were small. In Task 2, actual training,
manpower, and training estimates associated with SINCGARS were determined. In
Task 3, a variety of participants in the acquisition process were interviewed
to determine what guidelines they use for the range of acceptability of
errors. The groups contacted included OSD or CAIG, who are involved in the
review of DOD acquisitions. The results of these interviews were resolved
into perceived admissible limits of error on total life-cycle cost and each of
its components. In Task 4 the allowable variation in manpower cost in the
presence of other acceptable errors in the estimate was determined. This
study used an already developed life-cycle cost and level-of-repair model to
study the interrelationships between projection errors for several quantities
(8). The central idea was to determine how large or small the pennissable
error in manning estimates could be as a result of these relationships.
The first step in Task 4 was to identify all the variables that
influenced manning and manning estimates. Next, other readiness-critical
quantities estimated in the model that depended on the same inputs were
identified. There are five major sources of variance in manning require-
ments. These are the equipment operating program, the deployment plan,
reliability, maintainability, and manpower characteristics. Together they
determine actual manning, and estimates of the variables that describe these
areas subsequently impact the accuracy of manning estimates.
The operating program describes the number of hours during which the
force is expected to operate the equipment. This might be twenty hours a
week, one or one hundred sixty-eight. During the life of the system, these
numbers will aggregate to a total usage that will have a fundamental effect on
total life-cycle cost. But for any given period within the life cycle, the
rate or pace of operations will help determine the demand rate for repairs.
The deployment plan simply tells how many units will be purchased and-
deployed in the field. By extrapolation, the equipment operating hours are
determined, both over the entire life cycle and per unit of time. The
deployment plan also usually explains how usage rates are distributed among
operating units. This is important because of the effect of geographic
separation on various costs (i.e., pipeline delay times, number of maintenance
facilities, etc.). For example, a division may generate the requirement for
only one half a manyear of labor per year to repair a type of equipment.
While most labor costs would therefore be accounted for at half cost, training
would not, because a whole man must be trained for each division.
The reliability of an equipment expresses the rate at which failures
occur as a result of usage. In company with the operating program and
deployment plan which determine the usage rate, the reliability measure
(either mean time between failures (MTBF) or failure rate) gives the demand
rate for repair services. These three areas jointly determine how many
failures must be repaired per unit of time.
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The maintainability of an equipment is expressed by the average time
required to repair it. In most systems this can be divided into two repair
times. The first is system restoration time estimated as the mean time to
remove and replace a faulty component (MTRR). The second is the mean time to
repair the faulty component after the system has been restored (MTTR). The
system support policy is usually developed by analyzing the relative costs of
undertaking these two repair actions in different ways and at different
places. An item is discarded if the cost of repairing it, including all the
training, equipment and manpower consumed, exceeds the cost of buying a
replacement. When the converse is true, then the difference between repair on
the spot versus repair at a depot must be computed. At the organizational
level, the system is generally repaired through fault isolation and replace-
ment of the failed module. The failed module may then either be repaired or
discarded.
The last major determinants of manning are characteristics of the
manpower itself. These will include quality (skills) and a version of
quantity. The quality of manpower will have an effect on repair times.
Generally speaking, these skills are set at the lowest level capable of being
trained through the service schools and cannot be dealt with in the estimation
process. Quantity is related to the amount of work available from a single
individual in a period of time. Typical times are 40 to 60 hours a week.
Depending on the circumstances, these limits may also be exceeded.
It should be noted that other LCC variables such as special support
equipment, tooling, etc., can effect manpower and, therefore, represent
additional manning drivers. However, for the purposes of this top-level
sensitivity study, variables such as these were not major manpower
determinants and were therefore not considered.
SINCGARS was selected as the system to illustrate the error bound
interrelationships because it had been studied previously in the HARDMAN
project and because it represented a small (therefore, easy to model) but
important electronics system. The cost model used to perform the analysis is
an adaptation of the LCC model summarized earlier in Section V developed by
the Navy HARDMAN Office (8). The bulk of the modifications made to the LCC
model were aimed at converting the computer software to a fast turnaround
system suitable for extensive sensitivity analysis. In addition, certain
values were added to the printed output, along with the ability to impose
predetermined support policies at the line replaceable unit (organizational)
level.
The model is a level of repair and life-cycle cost model that was
developed especially to be sensitive to the relationships that drive manpower
costs. It is roughly based on the MIL STD 1390 group of level of repair
models although the errors implicit in those models have been corrected, and
several innovations have been added to the computational procedures (8).
An example baseline cost estimate is shown in Table 6-2. The SINCGARS
life-cycle cost estimate is $784 million, excluding batteries. The batteries
were left out of the cost estimation process because they consumed a great
deal of computational time and added little to the analysis. Manning (in
manyears) is summarized in the lower right corner of the table. Real manning
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Table 6-2. Baseline Life-cycle Cost Sensitivity Analysis Run
Cost Elements, M$ System Rates
Life-Cycle Cost
System-Unit Cost
783846.0
11.1
Number of LRA Types
Number of LRAs
17
17
INITIAL COSTS:
Production 312296.0
Maintenance Training 1104.2
Operator Training 70280.0
Misc. Manpower 0.0
Spares 2512.2
S+TE 67048.6
Technical 55.2
Documentation
TOTAL 453296.0
OPERATION AND SUPPORT COSTS:
Maintenance Wage 27457.5
Operator + Office 31019.4
Wage
Maintenance Training. 3390.6
Operator Training 215920.0
Misc. Manpower 0.0
Spares 9577.7
Repair 1962.7
Transportation 17.6
S+TE 41198.5
Technical 5.5
Documentation
TOTAL 330550.0
Confidence Against
Stockout
System MTBF
'System MTTR
0.999
472.3
3.0
SUPPORT POLICY SUMMARIES:
LRAs coded COD
LRAs coded MOD
LRAs coded local repair
LRAs coded discard
0
9
4
4
TRAINING BILLETS BY TYPE:
Equipment Operators 28112
Org. and Int. Maint. 420
Depot Technicians 6
REAL MANNING REQUIREMENTS:
Org. and Int. Maint. 205.12
Depot Maintenance 4.27
OPERATORS 7028.00
requirements indicate the total number of manyears of labor, for all skills,
actually consumed by SINCGARS each year. These manyears are not necessarily
consumed in full manyear increments because labor requirements are distributed
over a number of geographical units (28 divisions, in this example). The
effect of geographical distribution is to expand the real manning requirement
to a larger number of billets required for training purposes. Because it is
not possible to train portions of people or to give people part of the
training required, training billets are constrained to be full integers; and
one must be developed for every individual who is required to work on the
system, no matter how little time is spent with it.
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The most extensive manpower requirement is for operators. This shows up
in the consumption of real manning requirements as well as in the establish-
ment of training billets. A glance at the list of costs also shows that, with
the exception of production cost, operator training and billet costs constitute
the largest elements of life-cycle cost for the SINCGARS example. However,
while operator costs appear to be important in the estimation of total cost,
they are unimportant in this study because they are unresponsive to changes in
most of the input variables that influence maintenance manning. It is
understood that the relationship between operators and maintaitiers may vary
from system to system.
The SINOGARS manpack version was modeled as a collection of 17 (18,
including the battery) line-replaceable units. In fact, the SINCGARS program
office basically views the equipment as consisting of four modules (R/T,
handset, whip antenna, battery) among which the R/T breaks down into LRUs.
Because the other three modules have only one piece and are discard items
anyway, the equipment's structure was simplified to accommodate the computa-
tional problem, treating modules as LRUs along with the LRUs that make up the
R/T.
The model is driven by inputs that describe the support and deployment
environment, the system design, and the particulars of component design. The
data used in this exercise were selected as representative acquisition values
and are reported in Appendix E, along with the component cost sheets.
The model operates by estimating life-cycle cost for each component in
four different support postures. Normally, the least costly of these is
determined, and the output data associated with it are forwarded to the system
cost estimate. In the current example, support policies had already been
determined, and these were used to override the cost-minimizing routine of the
program.
At the same time that costs are aggregated by the system model, certain
variables of concern are aggregated as well. These include reliability,
maintainability, and system-configuration summary data, as well as an
accounting of the support postures selected for the different LRUs. While it
is understood that skill tradeoffs cannot be examined using aggregate costs,
the use of total costs for a top-level sensitivity study such as this was
acceptable. Finally, the cost tableau is broken down into investment of
initial cost and operating and support costs. Initial costs include both
production and logistic investments. Drawing on both the Table 6-2 baseline
costs and perceived acceptable LCC error bounds, the above cost model was
iterated until the relationship between manning and the previously identified
five major LCC variables could be clearly plotted.
C. SINCGARS REPLICATION RESULTS
1. Work Package 1 - Develop System Functional Requirements
The functional requirements data package consisted of three
subtasks:
(1) Identification of functions and performance standards of
SINCGARS Manpack system.
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(2) Organization of the functions and standards into a
functional hierarchy.
(3) Allocation of the functions to equipment and people.
The HCM designers' answer sheet was a matrix that matched subsystem
elements and performance standards to functions (see Table 6-3 for a sample
answer sheet).
There were no numerical answers to evaluate in this package. Part of
the study group adjusted the answer format. Additionally, differing semantics
among the participants complicated the analysis. That is, a "participant"
could mean the HCM designers but use different wording. Neither of these last
two factors necessarily made an individual's answers incorrect. In order to
evaluate the answers, it was decided to determine whether or not the par-
ticipants included the major functional requirements in their answers. As
shown in Table 6-4, none of the respondents had the function "Operate
SINCGARS." However, the remainder of the answers indicated that the study
group understood that this was included. All respondents had "Communicate"
and four (2,3,4,6) had "Accommodate Mobility," but only two had "Command
Control." It should be noted that an "X" indicates matching answers between
the HCM contractor and respondents.
In terms of format, one participant had three extra element columns
(adaptor, shorting block, COMSEC), while another individual never used the
backpack column. Two individuals itemized tasks rather than functions. Three
individuals missed at least some performance standards. On the other side of
the spectrum, five of the study group included extra items such as "pass
through retransmission" and "monitor net," which the original HCM designers
did not have. In this sense, the study group's answers were more complete.
In the debriefing it was found that two of the group were confused as to
the HCM usage of "end item." The study group as a whole was unsure about much
detail to give in its answers. Regardless of some of the above confusion, the
major functional areas were basically understood and covered by the
participants even though they were limited by an open-ended answer format.
2. Work Package 2 - Reference System Selection
The objective in this package was to select the reference system
based on the following given information:
(1) Functional requirements.
(2) Reference system candidate equipment.
(3) Proposed system design data.
The analysis of this package was based on the ability of the replicants
to specify the four major system components: R/T, ECCM, ECCM Fill, and SRCU.
Given the correct selection of the radio/transmitter (AN/ARC-114), the
remainder of the components generally followed. As it turned out, all
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Table 6-4. Work Package 1 - Respondent vs. Dynamics Research
Corporation Results
Major
Functional Requirements DRC
Respondents
1 2 3 4 5 6
Total
Number
Correct
Operate SINCGARS Not specified but
inferred
Communicate
Command Control
Accommodate Mobility
X
X
X
X X X X X X
X X
X X X X
6/6
2/6
4/6
participants had doubts concerning the HCM designers' answer. Several felt
that their selections were better suited as the baseline system. In the
discrepancy review the HCM designers explained that the 114 had the most
available data. This was obvious from a data source matrix that was not given
to the study group. This mismatch also suggested that the group did not
understand the relationship between comparable component selection and data
availability for that component.
This package was among the easiest to grade of all the packages (see
Table 6-5 for the answer comparison). Three individuals (3,5,6) had the
correct R/T. Two of these three had the remaining major components correct as
well. As in Package 1, the level of indenture was again a concern. All
participants were missing at least some detail. Minor subsystems such as fill
cable and battery were missed by everyone except Participant 1. Two indivi-
duals had some detail (i.e., programmer gun, antenna) that was not included by
the HCM contractor. Aside from the doubts on the HCM designer selection, most
participants felt that the material was too technical, while two participants
felt that there was not enough time allotted for this task.
In summary, without knowing the complete HCM contractor rules used for
the reference system selection, and without all necessary input information,
it was difficult to obtain the same answer.
3. Work Package 3 - Task Identification
The objective of this part was to take the previous reference
system design as specified by the HCM designers, plus the data included in
work package 3, and develop generic and reference task lists and assign the
tasks to equipment.
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Table 6-5. Work Package 2 - Respondent vs. Dynamics Research
Corporation Results
Major
System Components
AN/ARC-114 R/T
SN 416/APX 76 ECCM
KYK-13/TSEC Fill
C-2328/GRA-39 SRCU
DRC
X
X
X
X
Respondents
1 2 3 4
X
X
X
X X X
5 6
X X
X
X X
X X
Number
Correct
3/6
2/6
3/6
5/6
The answers to this package were similar to those in Package. 1 in that
there was a fair amount of subjective matching of tasks to equipment. This
again complicated the grading. Therefore, it was decided to check for major
categories of equipment only. A major problem arose for the study group here
because in Package 3 there were three new major equipment categories (antenna
coupler, digital data device, COMSEC), which were not included on the original
work Package 2 answer sheet. All three of these categories were missed by
almost everyone (see Table 6-6). Only one participant broke his answers into
generic and reference categories. Even the HCM designers' answers were not
broken down this way. The HCM contractor did not use the workload worksheets
for his answers even though they were provided to the participants. Only one
participant used the appropriate worksheet from the methodology. This had
been done in the training course but was not a requirement of the replication.
The level of indenture was again a problem for the study group. Everyone was
missing at least some detail.
The HCM designers pointed out during the discrepancies review that this
type of effort would typically be a multi-person effort and that missed areas
could be picked up within later data packages. Almost all of the participants
felt that either not enough detail was provided or the solution did not
logically follow from the methodology instructions. Upon clarification of the
problems within this element of the replication, it appeared that the par-
ticipants had a reasonable understanding of how to apply tasks to equipment.
4. Work Package 4 - Reliability and Maintainability (R&M)
Determination
In this package the analysts were directed to use given input data
and then to perform a reliability and maintainability analysis of the SINCGARS
system manpack configuration. The final result of this ef for t was the deter-
mination of the system equipment maintenance workloads. The participants were
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Table 6-6. Work Package 3 - Respondent vs. Dynamics Research
Corporation Results
Major
Equipment Categories
Man pack
Receiver Transmitter
Antenna Coupler
ECCM Unit
Digital Data Device
SRCU
00 MSEC
DRC
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Respondents
1 2 3 4 5 6
X X X
X X X X X X
X
X X X X X X
X X X X X X
Number
Correct
3/6
6/6
1/6
6/6
0/6
6/6
0/6
to take the tasks and equipment on the workload worksheets, perform the cal-
culations as specified in the instructions, and ultimately derive maintenance
ratios (see Table 6-7, column 14, for a sample workload worksheet). This was
to be done for three types of systems: a reference system and two proposed
systems, one from Cincinnati Electronics (CE) and one from ITT. This exercise
resulted in an examination of approximately 300 maintenance ratios for each
participant. Unfortunately, wrong frequency information was given in the
instructions for using operating hours. The wrong usage metric (annual
operating hours) was given for the CE ECCM module. The contractor answer
sheets had several problems. General and direct support were interchanged for
the reference system ECCM module. CE SRCU answers were given even though the
participants were only supposed to use reference system data. A few minor
components (e.g., battery) were missing. Most importantly, several answer
sheets were wrong and had to be replaced by corrected ones.
In view of the above problems, it was decided to grade the study group
based on what they thought was the proper procedure. The use of reference
system data for components of the CE and ITT were not included. Because one
participant (1) did contact the designers and obtain the correct CE ECCM usage
metric, the use of the incorrectly given value was counted as wrong. Table 6-8
gives the percentage of correct answers with clarifying comments. The use of
the correct usage metric for the CE proposed system is obvious for Respondent
1. His percentage correct was 94 while everyone else varied between 59 and
71. Several respondents (3,4,5) were missing some system components. Par-
ticipant 6 disregared some columns on the workload worksheet but still managed
to obtain high scores. Similarly, Participant 3 seemed to differ from the HCM
designers in his approach but still arrived at correct answers.
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Table 6-8. Work Package 4 - Respondent vs. Dynamics Research
Corporation Results
(% Correct-Maintenance Ratios)
Respondent Reference CE ITT Comments
1 70
2 95
3 95
4 40
5 50
6 100
94
61
59
• 60
71
71
87
94
82
95
89
89
E
A
A,
A,
A,
C
B,D
B,E
B
75 69 89
A - Wrong usage metric for CE
B - Missing items - Reference, ITT
C - Missing calculation steps
D - Different calculation procedure than DRC
E - Wrong total actions - ITT, Ref
The study group had several comments on the incorrect and confusing
replication instructions. Most commented on the extensive calculations, time
limitations, and tedium caused by the task. One participant (3) resorted to
using a programmable calculator.
During the discrepancy review, the HCM designers noted that this
procedure has now been simplified by using updated LSA data sheets and by
automating the worksheet.
Despite all the problems, the number of answers that matched the con-
tractor 's calculations were relatively high (generally between 60 and 95%).
This indicated that at least for SINCGARS, the study group probably understood
how to apply this phase of HARDMAN.
5. Work Package 5 - Design Difference Index (DDI)
The participants were directed to develop the SINCGARS proposed
design in the manpack mode for the two contractors (CE and ITT) by evaluating
and compiling a list of reference system versus proposed system design dif-
ferences. The study group was then supposed to determine the impacts on
system workload of each design difference. The resultant perturbation values
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(PV) were to be used for adjusting the reference system design so that equit-
able comparisons could be made between the reference and proposed systems.
This task generated the most discussion during the discrepancy review.
The discussion centered on the nature of the comparisons. For instance, should
a reference system be used "as is" or should there be an adjusted reference
system if reference and proposed systems have significantly different tech-
nologies and time frames. This question was not addressed during the training
course or the replication. Because this problem was discussed earlier in
Section V, it will not be pursued here.
As in packages 1 and 3, the work that Package 5 answers were quite
subjective (see Table 6-9 for a sample contractor answer sheet). This package
had the highest variance among participant answers. The contractor answers
had only two PVs. Participant 3 had 30 values. Individual 6 had 16. Par-
ticipants 4 and 5 had none. Participant 5 left out the ECCM, ECCM Fill, and
SRCU subsystems. Individuals 4, 5, and 6 made no reference to the LSA-02
reference data.
It was found in the debriefing that the study group had trouble
determining the design differences and did not understand the use of the PV.
In summary, it is apparent from the study group feedback and work package
answers, that this step could not be closely replicated and further
clarification is needed.
6. Work Package 6 - Select and Assign MOS
The objective in this part of the replication was to record the
MOS and skill levels that are currently performing each operation and
maintenance task for the reference system equipment in column 6 of the
workload worksheet. MOS and skill levels were also to be recorded for the
contractor proposed systems. Lastly, for those tasks omitted by the
contractor, the reference system data were to be used.
Because the study group had previously calculated the column 14
maintenance ratios on the workload worksheets, it is likely that the
replication effort would have proceeded more easily if this task had been done
earlier. This was reiterated during the discrepancy review. Additionally, it
was pointed out that the MOS selection process needs additional refinement by
the HCM designers. Presently there are no systematic decision procedures for
deciding which tasks are to be matched with the appropriate MOS and skill
levels.
Once again, there were problems with the given answers. The grader was
not given all the answer sheets. LSA answers were supplied for components
where reference data should have been used. Lastly, CE R/T answers were given
when the study group had not been given the inputs. As opposed to Package 4,
the reference components jointly included in the proposed systems were
included in the grading. This inclusion is not very significant (6 out of 151
answers for the CE (4%) and 13 of 141 for the ITT (9%)), but it was done here
because the participants were directed to do so in the instructions.
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All participants primarily had problems with, or could not understand,
the contractor MOS selection process. In fact, one individual used pre-
decessor system MOS instead of those of the reference system. Even though it
was only necessary to copy MOS from the correct data sheets, the average scores
were not particularly high (55-80%) (Table 6-10). Two possible contributing
factors are (1) the recurring problems with the methodology instructions and
(2) the boredom caused by the tedious nature of filling in approximately 300 MOS
and skill levels.
7. Data Package 7 - System/Component Usage Rates
In this package the usage rates for the components of SINCGARS
were to be determined. This data is required for column 15, usage rate, of
the workload worksheets (see Table 6-7). Because only one value for each
component (R/T, ECCM, ECCM Fill, SRCU) was required, this was the most
straightforward assignment of the entire replication effort. The entire study
group had the correct answers. Note that in doing a firsthand application in
the real-weapon development environment, usage data might be difficult to
acquire.
Table 6-10. Work Package 6 - Dynamics Research Corporation
vs. Respondent Answers (% Correct MOS Answers)
Respondent Reference CE ITT Comments
1
2
3
4
5
6
50
77
73
50
45
36
95
87
79
97
44
85
79
73
67
63
91
69
A
C
C
C,D
A,C,D
B,D
55 81 74
A - Missing Reference System R/T MOS.
B - Assumed DRC used predecessor rather than reference.
C - Missing CE or ITT R/T MOS.
D - Missing Reference Components for ITT.
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8. Work Package 8 - Determine Workload and Manpower Requirements
The goal of this final package was to determine the workload
results and manpower requirements for the reference and proposed systems. The
workload results were obtained by multiplying the maintenance ratios from Work
Package 4 by the scenario usage rate from Package 7. That result was to be
multiplied by the indirect productivity factor (IPF) to obtain the workload
results. The next step was to add the workloads, by component, to get the
total. The manpower requirements were to be obtained by multiplying the
workload totals by one of two manpower availability factors that were supplied
by the contractor. Because this last step was trivial, only workload totals
were analyzed in detail.
The HCM design team answers had several shortcomings. Calculation
mistakes were found that had to be corrected, and LSA data were incorrectly
used in place of reference system data. With respect to the study group, the
use of wrong MOS was evident for five respondents. Reference data were left
out by four of the participants. Four individuals also made calculation
mistakes. The participants were confused by the contractor justification for
selection of IPF and manpower availability factors. Two also commented on
time limitations. Given the above problems, in addition to the problems with
the previous packages, it was surprising that the study group got any of
Package 8 correct. Actually, the average percent correct was between 25 and
45 (Table 6-11). One individual (2) averaged 69% correct for each of the
three systems.
D. QUALITATIVE ACCURACY STUDY
The names of pertinent military personnel were supplied by ARI and the
Navy HARDMAN office. These contacts covered a wide range of Navy and Air
Force procurement projects that required manpower and training forecasts
(Table 6-12). The feedback on HARDMAN with respect to these real-life
applications varied from highly positive to negative. It was noted that these
impressions could be at least somewhat affected by the personal biases of
people contacted. Nevertheless, as a rough estimate of accuracy, it was felt
that these contacts were a good initial step.
The Advanced Lightweight Torpedo (ALWT) project logistician was highly
favorable (33). He was impressed with HARDMAN in that its initial application
could start with very little input data. Its resulting projections appeared
to be within about 10% of actual manpower data. His immediate experience
applied to the reliability and maintainability areas. He also pointed out
that these estimates went through the Navy's Logistics Review Council (LRC)
unscathed. This typically happens only thirty percent of the time. Most of
those projects that do not pass have unsatisfactory manpower and training
estimates. HARDMAN also saved ALWT large sums of money because of its ability
to highlight possible problems. These comments were reiterated by the ALWT
ILS manager although he added that the HCM was difficult to understand (34).
He also pointed out that HARDMAN provides a consolidated data base that
facilitates sensitivity analyses. The ALWT and SIRCS MPT logistic element
manager felt that once the total integrated methodology (HARDMAN plus training
requirements determination plus life-cycle costing) is developed, it will be
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Table 6-11. Work Package 8 - Dynamics Research Corporation
vs. Respondent Results
% Workload Results Correct
Respondent Reference CE ITT Comments
1
2
3
4
5
6
0
86
29
0
29
14
70
80
60
10
30
20
25
42
50
8
17
8
B,C,D
A
A,D
A,B,D
A,B
A,B,C
26 45 25
A - MOS Discrepancies
B - Component answers wrong
C - Left out reference maintenance
D - Did not use all reference data for CE or ITT
Table 6-12. Qualitative Accuracy Study Contacts
Project Contact
SUBACTS - Submarine Combat System
ALWT - Advanced Lightweight Torpedo
ALWT - Advanced Lightweight Torpedo
DDGX - Destroyer
ALWT - Advanced Lightweight Torpedo
SIRCS - Shipboard Intermediate Range Combat
System
VTXTX - Flight Trainer
Air Force - ASSET and other similar
techniques
Training Manager
ALWT Logistician
ALWT ILS Manager
Personnel and Training
Analyst
MPT Logistics Element
Manager
MPT Logistics Element
Manager
Project Manager
ASSET Operations Research
Analyst
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very useful for the early identification of manpower requirements (35). In
comparison with other similar methodologies he felt that HARDMAN was less
cumbersome and more accurate. He also pointed out that one drawback of this
type of methodology is that it does not interface with hardware design
requirements.
The training manager for the SUBACTS program felt that, although the
HARDMAN manpower forecasts have been fairly accurate, there were problems in
understanding the approach (36). The SUBACTS program brought in an independent
contractor to use HARDMAN, which helped make the approach more understandable.
Concurrently, the new projections proved to be as accurate as the original
forecasts.
One of the DDGX destroyer training analysts has had MPT experience on
pilot programs within NAVC, NAVAIR, and NAVLX. He stated that there was no
standard, overall methodology for manpower estimates at present although it is
planned (by January 1984) to evaluate a Navy program (SYSCOM) with the help of
the HARDMAN office. He felt that, although total feedback on HARDMAN has not
been received as yet, it is probably quite useful and will have many
applications within the Navy (37).
The project manager for the VTXTX flight trainer was too far removed
from forecasting to say how closely HARDMAN resembled real life. With respect
to other similar methodologies, he stated that it has typically been difficult
to match their outputs to actual performance. This has usually been due to
the differing ways the methodologies define system components as compared to
the actual system design (38).
An operations research analyst at the Air Force's Human Resources
Laboratory has been involved with several Air Force projects. She has worked
with HARDMAN-type methodologies (e.g., coordinated Human Resources Technology,
ASSET) but has found to date they have not been widely applied (39).
E. RESULTS OF MANPOWER SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
The problem explored in this portion of the reliability analysis was how
accurate manning estimates must be in a new system acquisition. Because the
penalty and cost of estimation can be quite high, it, is important to be clear
about the benefits of accuracy and the costs of inaccuracy, particularly when
developing a projection technique such as the HCM. Further, because manning
is not estimated in a vacuum, it is important to establish whether concentra-
tion on accuracy in other related variables will have any impact on the
manning estimation.
In this portion of the analysis, permissable error bounds were
determined and applied to the SINCGARS program to study the interplay of
manning estimate accuracy and the accuracy of other variables. Error bounds
were determined through interviews with decision makers involved in program
review offices such as the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) or the
Cost Analysis Investigation Group (CAIG). For this small study, most of the
individuals contacted were associated with OSD. Data descriptive of the
SINCGARS system were obtained from the SINCGARS program office. Error
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relationships were investigated through the use of an interactive life-cycle
cost model developed for the U. S. Navy and adapted to this particular
exercise (8).
The overall conclusion of this brief study is that accuracy of manning
estimates may not be a significant issue in the development of tools and
methods for acquisition support and cost analysis. For example, if manning
estimates were scrutinized by the budget controllers and were found to be as
poor as the 15% boundaries allow, the error in spare stockage costs (a major
LCC variable) would be almost 50%. Therefore, budget controllers would most
likely flag other important quantities long before the manning estimates would
exceed their permissable limits. This conclusion is explored in greater
detail in the following paragraphs.
1. Permissable Error Criteria
The costs of error vary by circumstance and direction. Many
believe, for example, that the "cost growth" phenomenon marking system
acquisitions of the past decades is partly explained by poor cost estimating
in the early stages of acquisition. Nonetheless, this facet of many programs
has been a contributing factor to cancellation.
A theoretician would relate the permissable range of error to the
trade-off between the cost of error and the cost of reducing it. In the case
of manning estimation error, the major variables have to do with establishing
appropriate personnel pipeline flows at the right times to make required
resources available on time. Conversely, excess flows are to be avoided.
When these flows are of the wrong size, costs are incurred in adjusting them.
Costs of concern to the Department of Defense come in two forms: dollars and
readiness. These are looked upon differently by decision makers.
OSD (or CAIG) personnel responsible for questioning the estimates of
cost and support requirements for new systems look for (1) gross error in cost
estimates and (2) errors in readiness-critical quantities. If total dollars
is the only issue, an estimated error of about $50 million (in an estimated
quantity) seems to be required before decision makers are willing to slow down
the progress of a program to check for more accurate estimates. By the same
token, very small amounts of dollars may be involved in such decisions if the
variable being estimated is critical to readiness. Here the rule is that the
cost estimate may not be off by more than about 15%, regardless of how small
the total dollar amount is.
The mechanism by which these limits are employed is the application of
experience and judgment to assess cost projections from program offices. The
decision makers queried have all studied the relevant issues for many years on
a variety of systems. It was assumed that their experience provided them with
a reasonable, independent assessment of the value of specific quantities of
interest. If their assessments differ from those presented by program offices
by more than the amounts indicated above, this gives rise to a question and
request for further analysis.
To formalize this mechanism, it can be compared to a statistical test of
hypothesis. The decision maker's estimate is the population mean and the
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program office submission is the sample mean. The decision maker acts as if a
15% difference is sufficient to reject the hypothesis that the sample is drawn
from the same population.
2. Results of the Analysis
The procedure followed was to drive manning to +15% of its value
in the baseline estimate by varying several different input values. The
results for MTTR, MTRR, MTBF and usage rate are shown in Figure 6-1. The
figure shows the positive error boundary for manning on the vertical axis as a
function of various LCC input values on the horizontal axis. The closer the
plot of each variable is to the horizontal axis, the less responsive manning
is to variations in that variable. Reading the figure, the farther to the
right a line intersects the +15% line, the greater the error in that variable
necessary to produce the fixed error in manning.
The most powerful variable is usage rate because this simply acts as a
scalar against all demand rates. Failure rate (the inverse of mean time
between failure) is the next most powerful determinant, driving manning to its
lower boundary at half its baseline value. The two maintainability variables
are the least powerful, mean time to remove and replace having a greater
effect than mean time to repair. This is explained by the fact that in the
basic data set, the latter is only one hour while the former is three hours.
This difference is accentuated by the fact that four of the LRU are coded
discard at failure, which means that they will be removed and replaced but not
repaired.
Figure 6-2 is a plot of life-cycle cost variation against manning levels
produced by changes in the four major variables. It is clear that usage rates
have a strong effect throughout the cost estimate while reliability and
maintainability statistics have a much smaller influence. Notice also that
mean time to repair, even when driven to zero, cannot produce the -15% manning
error.
Another comparison of value is the different effect of MTBF errors on
manning and spares. The error bounds on spares are reached at 86.7% and
118.5% of baseline MTBF. The corresponding manning error, however, is only
4.7% and -4.6% at these limits. To reach the +_15% manning errors, the
multiples required are 66.8% and 200% of baseline MTBF. These relationships
are illustrated in Figure 6-3. Thus, it appears that for this particular
case, reasonable scrutiny of the spares cost estimate (and hence reliability)
would be likely to confine the value of the manning error well within
prescribed limits. Similar comparisons cannot be made for the maintainability
variables because they do not affect readiness-critical outputs other than
manning and training.
The remaining possible source of excess error in manning estimates is
from joint errors in input variables. This problem can be illustrated by
joint errors in maintainability and reliability data. MTRR is used for the
former and MTBF for the latter.
Figure 6-4 illustrates the accelerated effect of joint errors in MTBF
and MTRR in the presence of errors in the manning variable. The two graphs
are the locus of manning errors produced by different levels of error in MTRR,
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given a certain error has already occurred in MTBF. The graphs have been
drawn for those values of MTBF that produced the upper and lower boundary
errors in spares estimates.
1
 Notice that even under the joint error condition, a relatively large
error in MTRR is required to produce a 15% error in manning. For an MTBF
(118.5% of the baseline) that produces a 15% underestimate in spares, MTRR
must also be understated by almost fifty percent (0.542) of its true value to
produce a manning estimate 15% lower than its true value. Under the same MTBF
error an overestimate of 87.6% in MTRR is required to produce a 15% overstate-
ment of manning requirement. For an understated mean time between failure
(86.7% of the baseline), the MTRR must be misestimated at about two thirds its
value (0.37) and almost a third again its real value (133.9%) to produce mann-
ing estimates off by minus and plus 15%, respectively. This one example sug-
gests that manning may not be a particularly sensitive variable in comparison
to other dependent LCC variables.
F. RELIABILITY IMPLICATIONS
1. Internal Reliability
The four major findings of the SINCGARS replication were as
follows:
(1) There were problems in understanding how to construct the
reference system.
(2) There was confusion over the selection and use of design dif-
ference indexes, perturbation values, and indirect productivity
factors.
(3) There was a lack of understanding of MOS/skill-level determination.
(4) It was apparent that this type of analysis should be performed by
a multidisciplinary team, not one analyst.
Among the causes for these findings, beyond the general problems of lack
of methodology clarity and inaccuracies caused by not having the technique
automated, were problems with the instructions, insufficient or missing supple-
mental input data, and excess emphasis on calculations instead of reasoned
judgments. It was also apparent that the replication deviated too much from
the training course content. Additional constraints included incorrect answer
sheets upon which later analyses were based, syntax differences in the subjec-
tive work packages, and the tedium brought on by the enormous quantity of
answers required by Work Packages 4 and 5. Interestingly, the average number
of answers that matched the HCM design team was high (78% in Package 4, 70% in
Package 6) in some of the packages. However, in the all-important Data Pack-
age 8, only 32% of the answers matched the corrected contractor response.
This is a function of both the HCM clarity problem and the snowballing effect
of previous administrative irregularities already present in the inputs of
Package 8. Even with all the problems previously discussed, the study group
appeared to understand how to apply HARDMAN to SINCGARS within the regulated
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atmosphere of the replication. This finding was derived from the reasonably
good performance on roughly half the data packages and the apparent improve-
ment in methodology comprehension, once the discrepancies review conference
was held. It is probably only now that the designers understand all of the
problems that existed within the replication. If the original replication
were used as a pilot study, a comprehensive and consistent reliability check
could be performed.
2. Qualitative Accuracy Study
It seems that some of military contacts who deal with manpower and
training have somewhat consistent opinions with the results of the face
reliability and replication analyses. That is, the methodology is complicated
and hard to understand, but when understood and applied correctly, has the
potential to provide reasonable manpower and training forecasts for new
procurements. This difficulty in understanding HARDMAN negatively influenced
some of the personnel queried, or else others surmounted this obstacle and
were able to make good use of the technique. It can be conjectured here that
the comprehension difficulty experienced by the personnel contacted is similar
to the problems encountered during the replication experiment. Once the
methodological loose ends are corrected, it appears that HARDMAN could have
widespread acceptance.
3. Manpower Sensitivity Study
The sensitivity analysis suggests that manning estimates may be
fairly robust; they may not be as responsive to errors in input variables as
the other important LCC elements. Because several of these quantities, such
as MTTR and MTBF, are scrutinized for accuracy during the review process, and
because they are more responsive, it appears likely that errors in inputs will
be detected through them before they drive manning estimates out of the
permissable boundaries.
With regard to the data that drive these estimates, the results suggest
that it would be unwise to devote extensive resources to their refinement for
the purpose of improving manning estimates. The more serious sources of
significant error in manning estimates that can be isolated from this study
are the inappropriate selection of an operating scenario or deployment plan.
The TRADOC and DARCOM communities control cost and manning estimates to a far
greater extent than normally realized. By setting the number to be purchased,
the number of operating units, and the hours of operation for the equipment,
the program offices have the largest single effect on estimated quantities of
anyone in the design process. Because early in the acquisition process these
values are frequently not known with any precision, they are often considered
unimportant when, in fact, they are pivotal LCC elements. For example, a
system of which 100 will be purchased should be designed and built differently
from one where 10,000 will be built. As a second example, usage rate dif-
ferences of plus and +_ 13% will produce error in manning estimates +15%.
These can be produced through an error in the estimated hours of opera-
tion per year or in the number of units to be purchased. If both are off
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by 6.3% or more, then the joint effect on usage rate will be 15% or more and
the manning error will exceed the permissable limits. These remarks should be
taken as a caution to program offices to devote the time and energy necessary
to establish reasonable, stable values for these variables. Understanding
that the sensitivity analysis provided here is somewhat limited by (1) the
sample size and variety of acquisitions studied and (2) assumptions concerning
the use of Navy billet data as representive of the Army billet structure, the
findings are significant enough to warrant repeating the analysis once the
Army has its own billet costing system completed.
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SECTION VII
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. OVERVIEW
The preceding sections provided the findings in the four major validity
areas of face, internal reliability, event-series, and qualitative accuracy.
At the end of each section, the validity implications were assessed, along
with supporting rationale. In this last section, the findings are first
pooled and then summarized to illustrate the strengths and common major
weaknesses that became apparent after examining and comparing all the validity
implications. Next, the resolution of these common problem areas is addressed
within the context of (1) the ranking of the weaknesses as a function of the
user requirements and their impacts on the accuracy of the methodology; (2)
the practical aspects of improving weak areas in terms of difficulty and
potential for other organizations besides the original designer to adopt the
technique; and (3) the reasonably low requirement to have extremely accurate
MPT projections. Ultimately, a condensed, prioritized list of weaknesses and
recommended corrective actions is provided. Additionally, follow-on study
areas deemed important to closing out issues that could not be addressed
within the time and budget constraints of this evaluation are also recommended.
B. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
In total, the HCM proved to be reasonably sound. Table 7-1 summarizes
the strengths. The net strengths were based primarily on the high degree of
conformance with the user requirements, the reasonable similarity to other MPT
modeling processes, and the closure of eighty-five percent of the audit
issues. It was also promising to discover that the projections did not have
to be extremely accurate, considering the remaining twelve to fourteen problem
areas that were found to potentially affect the accuracy and credibility of
the projections. The potential concerns or problem areas uncovered, which
generally spanned all the user requirements, operational, and reliability
analyses, are shown in Table 7-2.
C. PRIORITIZATION OF VALIDITY ISSUES
Before any recommended revisions to the methodology can be made, it is
essential to examine each of the issues from Table 7-2 and weigh their
importance to meeting the Army's MPT needs and their implications relative to
effecting the accuracy and usefulness of the projections. It is important to
recognize in the near term that the methodology is reasonably sound. It is
equally important to know the major limitations and the supporting fact that
allowances can temporarily be made for some of the limitations in light of the
inherent acceptable error bounds on the manpower projection. For the near and
intermediate terms it would be useful to improve those areas most important
and amenable to immediate correction, followed by a plan for improving the
remaining far-term areas, perhaps requiring more supporting data.
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Table 7-1. Net Results of HARDMAN Evaluation
Evaluation Area Net Results
User Requirements
Operational Analysis
Comparison with other
MPT methods
Audits
Reliability Analysis
Internal reliability
Qualitative
Accuracy check
Event Series Validity
Technique complied with majority of
mandatory user needs
Methodology conformed with other known,
accepted MPT modeling schemes and data
foundations
Methodology demonstrated sound logic and
reasonable results for 85% of test issues
examined (remaining issues considered
reparable in near term)
Test group correctly replicated half of
selected test points (two of four remaining
test points found to be repeatable after
clarification)
Two of nine individuals having experience
with HARDMAN applications indicated a rough
accuracy of 80-90% with actual manning
requirements; remaining individuals had
insufficient experience to comment
Manpower variable found to be least
sensitive of all life cycle cost variables,
demonstrating good utility of existing
methodology even without near-term
improvements
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Table 7-2. Common Validity Issues
Methodology Step Validity Issues
Step 1 Data base construction
and functional requirements
Step 2 Build reference system
and establish manpower/
skill requirements
Step 3 Determine training
requirements
Steps 4 and 5 Determine
personnel requirements/
shortages
Step 6 Perform tradeoff
analyses and present results
Overall methodology
No firm criteria for selecting, altering,
manipulating, or rating data sources
Unclear indication of functional-
requirement level of indenture
No firm guidelines for constructing
reference system (particularly when modeling
two widely varying proposed designs)
No consideration given to observed reduced
manpower at end points of life cycle
No firm range and criteria for selecting
design difference indices (perturbation
values), induced failure factors, or
indirect productivity factors
No complete means provided for equally
comparing reference and proposed
technologies
Incomplete guidelines provided for
selecting MOS/skills
No quantitative means of differentiating
between critical/non-critical tasks and
resultant impact on training
Projection does not consider manpower
available at actual time of system
deployment
Unstructured tradeoff process
No indication provided for either relative
credibility of projections or best
estimate for manpower planning
Incomplete life-cycle cost analysis
No standardized assessment of study
weaknesses and proposed resolution actions
Low usability by anyone other than a
well-seasoned, multidisciplinary team
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1. Near-term Issues
The issues having both sizeable user value and accuracy
implications, and jointly found amenable to solution within the immediate
one-year time frame were as follows:
(1) No standardized criteria for selecting, altering, manipulating, or
rating data sources.
(2) Lack of proper level of indenture for functional requirements.
(3) Insufficient guidelines for constructing reference system.
(4) No consideration for reduced manpower demands at system life-cycle
end points.
(5) Unequal comparison of perturbed state-of-the-art technology
against new proposed designs.
(6) Lack of guidelines for selecting MOS and skills.
(7) Unstructured tradeoff process.
(8) No credibility indication of projections.
(9) Non-standardized assessment of study weaknesses and resolution
actions.
Logic and credibility issues such as items (1), (3), and (5) above, are
probably most important because they affect both the accuracy and usefulness
of the methodology. Although removal of these problem areas would not
guarantee improvement in absolute accuracy, it would certainly provide the
users with a better subjective, relative indication of accuracy to aid
decisions on budgeting of additional hardware tests or favoring one projection
over another for planning purposes until additional information is received.
All of these items were considered candidates for immediate resolution
because elements of the solution for each of the issues often already existed
in both the HCM design team and the Navy concerning the relative quality of
various data sources (31, 40). For example, actual field or controlled
collection data probably ranks highest on the list of preferred information
for modeling new system performance because of its maturity, followed by
operational or field-test data (reasonably mature), development test data, and
free-flow or semi-controlled data collection information (limited sample
size); and finally, contractor estimates (no test or sample data).
As with the inherent experience available on data sources, it was
discovered that solution structures similarly existed for items (3) and (5)
above. The use of two reference systems to model two widely varying
contractor designs was introduced earlier in Section V-F (the SINCGARS
audit). Because the structure already existed for perturbing historical
predecessor component data to fill data gaps in the proposed system, it
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appeared that a simple extension of the same procedure would allow a
"top-level" comparison of the total predecessor and proposed systems on an
equal basis.
The next near-term priority closely associated with credibility is the
resolution of potential error sources. Items (2), (4), and (6) serve as
potential error sources and therefore have accuracy and credibility
implications. As indicated in the preceding paragraphs, it was learned that
much of the solution framework already existed within the joint experience of
the HCM design team who normally perform the HARDMAN analysis (34). The
reduced end-point manpower demand issue, item (4), was considered a fairly
simple error source to correct, considering that the deployment period and
life cycle could be broken down into yearly time periods to be sensitive to
the gradual buildup or tapering off of systems. Item (6) above, was another
near-term issue that was found easily rectified based on knowledge obtained at
both the audits and discrepancy review.
The final near-term priority area is the resolution of some of the
ambiguity issues. Items (7) and (9) are somewhat linked together and are
rated as the last priority because their solutions serve more to improve the
clarity of the process and projections than to contribute directly to accuracy
and credibiity. Again, because the solution components for listing all
potential tradeoffs, weaknesses, and proposed actions already existed to
varying degrees, it was felt that these adjustments to the methodology could
be a simple enhancement to the decision-making quality of the technique.
2. Intermediate-term Issues
Some of the validity issues discovered during the evaluation were
found to have accuracy implications, but, upon closer examination during the
audits and SINCGARS discrepancy review, were also found to be not amenable to
immediate solution. Although some data and models were available and appeared
to represent means of closing the issues, it was obvious that a certain amount
of additional research and methodology restructuring were required and would
probably consume one to two years of effort. The issues from Table 7-1 that
are relevant to this intermediate category are as follows:
(1) No firm range and criteria for selecting perturbation values,
induced failure factors, or indirect productivity factors.
(2) No consideration for manpower availability at the projected system
deployment date.
(3) Incomplete life-cyle cost analysis.
In line with the reasoning provided earlier, items (2) and (3) above
would have to be given highest priority because they both impact the accuracy
and credibility of the projections. For both of these issues modeling
processes, introduced earlier in Section V, have already been developed and
with slight redesign could be incorporated in the existing methodology. Item
(1) is fairly important because it could represent a major error source. Of
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the three different types of factors, the perturbation value is probably the
most crucial element. Some information presented during the SINCGARS
discrepancy review is available to help define the problem of determining what
can reasonably be expected regarding improvements in new technology
performance. The induced failure and indirect productivity factors were
considered slightly larger problems because it is difficult to determine when
mistakes in selection of an arbitrary value for either one will generate a
serious error in the outcome.
3. Far-term Issues
Some of the validity issues uncovered were found to require a
substantial amount of data and time (probably about three to five years) to
resolve them. In most cases the issues, although important, only surfaced in
either the user requirements or the operational analysis and were therefore of
a singular nature. The issues fitting in this category were as follows:
(1) No quantitative differentiation between critical and non-critical
tasks.
(2) Incomplete consideration of demographic data such as age, sex, or
education.
(3) No consideration of the manpower impacts of other emerging systems.
(4) No consideration of major socioeconomic fluctuations on manpower
availability.
Probably the largest potential error source is item (3) because the
overall acquisition and planning process for new systems spans several years.
Consequently, new concepts being approved have a very good chance of
overlapping each other in their respective design and support planning
stages. The remaining items are fairly equivalent in their level of
importance.
Great care was taken in the preceding paragraphs to refrain from
including suggestions for improvements to concentrate on presenting a clear
rationale for the near-, intermediate-, and far-term ordering of the various
problem areas. Having prioritized all the various validity issues as a
function of their potential for weakening the methodology and ease of
solution, the final step is to explore sensible solutions.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS
One way to develop a plan for implementing recommendations is to first
convert each issue into a positive proposed action and then summarize the
total scope of intended actions. Table 7-3 first provides a summary plan for
improving the existing methodology, followed by a detailed discussion of each
suggested corrective action.
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Table 7-3. Recommended Plan for Improving HARDMAN Methodology
Potential for Improving Methodology
Prioritized List Near-Term Intermediate Far-Term
of Recommendations High Med. High Med. High Med.
Establish criteria for rating,
selecting, altering, or
manipulating data
Provide indication of credibility
of projections
Establish top-level method for
comparing technology of total
reference/baseline and proposed
systems
Provide better guidelines for
constructing reference systems
Firm up guidelines for functional-
requirements level of indenture
Provide a better structure for MOS
and skill selection
Reduce MACRIT manpower projection
down to one- or two-year projec-
tions to be sensitive to lower
end-point demands
Provide a more structured
tradeoff process
Establish standardized assess-
ment of study weaknesses and
resolution actions
Project manpower availability
out to actual system deployment
date
Provide more complete lift-cycle
cost/tradeoff analysis
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Table 7-3. (Cont'd)
Potential for Improving Methodology
Prioritized List Near-Term Intermediate Far-Term
of Recommendations High Med. High Med. High Med.
Firm up ranges for perturbation
values, induced failure, and
indirect productivity factors
Incorporate potential manpower
impacts of other emerging
systems
Provide quantitative
differentiation betwen critical
and non-critical tasks
Incorporate more demographic
data into personnel/availability
projections
Consider major socioeconomic
fluctuations in manpower
availability projection
The following paragraphs develop each of the recommendations in
Table 7-3 by suggesting possible corrective actions. First, consideration is
given to the methodology design, followed respectively by suggested training
for potential HARDMAN analysts as well as follow-on research.
1. Methodology Design
Because the key credibility issues were primarily centered in the
near- and intermedite-term time frames, the following discussion focuses on
those recommendations that fit in that one- to two-year time span. Far-term
corrective actions are discussed in the "follow-on" portion of this subsection.
a. . Suggested Corrective Actions for Data Management and
Credibility Indication. It is generally the intent of any modeling technique
to act as a guide or tool to assist decision makers. As suggested earlier in
Section IV, the Army users indicated a need to be able to apply HARDMAN as an
assist to the ASARC or program management budget decisions. Paramount to
making program direction, budget priority, and type manpower decisions is
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understanding both the kinds and quality of data employed in the analysis.
Consequently, a simple data rating matrix is suggested as a means of both
summarizing the net credibility of the projections in the executive summary of
HARDMAN applications as well as aiding the construction of the consolidated
data base in Step 1 of the methodology. Table 7-4 is provided as an example.
Table 7-4 basically applies to the proposed design. The listings of
both the weighting criteria and data source quality were based on the joint
experience of the Navy and contractor HARDMAN analysts. The table has
considerable flexibility in that the analyst can fill it out solely for the
proposed system if the predecessor reference or baseline system data are good
or evaluate both the reference and proposed systems separately if each con-
tains suspect information. Similarly, the data evaluation can be done on a
component-by-component basis. In all these schemes the analyst merely has to
indicate the availability, maturity, and type of data employed that auto-
matically places the outcomes in a low, marginal, or good credibility
quadrant. Once the data source(s) has been located, the remaining table
elements can be answered. Probably the final credibility assessment will span
two quadrants (i.e., low to marginal or perhaps marginal to good). Ultimately,
a summary table such as Table 7-4 could provide an overall assessment of the
data and projections to the decision makers so that MPT planning and budgeting
can always be supported by the more reliable projection throughout the system
development phases.
Processes for changing or manipulating data were also recommended as
part of the suggested improvements. Although not as complicated as the
data-rating scheme, a simple delineation of helpful hints for when to alter
data inputs (along with supporting examples) is necessary to help clarify the
data management process in Step 1 and improve the audit trail. Based on the
findings of the previously described audits, the basic guidelines for handling
data appear to be as follows:
(1) When building the consolidated data base, first check the proposed
system operator and maintenance data for completeness; if data are
missing for any components, select appropriate component data from
a similar existing system, perturb the data per instructions
provided in Step 2 of the methodology, and complete the proposed
system data set (see the SINCGARS HARDMAN results for an example)
(28).
(2) All proposed system data inputs should be filtered by a group of
experts to establish confidence that the data are reasonable. For
example, basic maintenance repair times should be checked to
determine if sufficient time is allowed for obtaining test
hardware and tools by comparing them against similar tasks on
predecessor components. If erroneous failure rate, indirect
productivity, or induced failure data are encountered, replace the
data with comparable historical values (best choice) or select
appropriate values from the original minimum performance criteria
stipulated in the request for proposal, RFP (next best choice)
(see the RPV HARDMAN results for an example) (29).
7-9
CO
e
0
-H
4J
U
0)
o
M
PH
M
O
0. C
Ci O
eg co
•O co§ 0.g
o
CO
<u a
u cu
3 co
O t*i
co co
cO 0)
•u u
a) CQ 0)
IH CU
O m
60 Pi
*J CCO CO
Pi
^*S
4J CO
•H 0
rH P.
•H O
•8 M
^
1
r-s.
0)
o
CO
cu
u
3
o
en
CO
AJ
0)
O
*co
" j^
C
cu
AJ
Oft-
•o o
•-« in
•H *O[z* 0} 4)
.-« eg •-»
CO Q 0
3 W
2 §
u
•-i
AJ Q
GO C
CU O
H OJ --4
1 AJ AJ
•O CO CO
-< Q M
CU 4)
•«-( O.
6u O
v
"'
gs
o
OJ <0
> cu
oj H
Q
1
*E -*-^
Q) Q
CO Q
CO in
CO O 'O
0 OJ
*o o ^
^ i ^ O
•H | AJ
fi- 41 C
0) O
5°
2.2
CO Uh ey
c o*
O V"
O ft-
60
c
•at
•H OJ
0) AJ
CO 0
(0
Q
4^4
c •»*
60-^
b -O
« OJ
X h
U
A^J
^_,
3 -H
O A
J <i-l
OJ
u
V £*
•H I 0- C
AJ J= O O
AJ -H U CD *H >>
CQ CO C h V O ' - i £
AJ AJ V OJ AJ .-I CO O.
AJ CO CO C •-* * i - l U O
C T3 -D O • I - 4 C . C O C 0 6 0
CU CL E — « D. ^-i O C
OJ <j Uh O CO CUV OJ -H AJ
> C C 3 U 6 0 U £ C O
•.-1 OJ C8 AJ -*^ . •-* C C ^ O- t-i
3 C C C O ^ - i c o c o c o n «
O " O J C U E C O C > C C O J C U O -
O J A J AJ C O O CP AJ O O
C C AJ 0 -H AJ C
M-) «»| • H O ' - ' AJ T3 C C CO C
O CO CO C AJ CO OJ >H •«-! C -H
E E 0 X V- AJ OJ QJ
C — « ^-1.^4 3-H O. 4) 60 C 60 AJ
3 CO Q <4-i .-i O ""ITS C -^ C C§ C 4 ) C O J - H O C C Q C O C O W
0 ^H O- i U .Q h l * c o XE £Eeo -^ ja -H ^ i c o c o to o. u uc
4J Q AJ 0] QJ U tU >« O O
f-i V» -H U -H O O- U OO O O *H
03 0) oj oj OJ E — ) i - * " - ) O J " - i >
E o, > a. > oo o coo co D oj c
C A O C O O f f l Zu Z X C XT? ZOi
>,
•<-i
?S
O '<-»
o -otuLI
CJ
,^
AJ
CO i-l
C *H
• H J3
60-H
VJ 13
CO CU
z: f
:^AJ a.
c o
V CD
i-l CO CO | O 60
CO AJ AJ .C «-l C
> QJ oj eo o -ft *H
•HTJ -o AJ c «.c *J
3 C •••* AJ CX cotr a> cu tu AJ ^ wtu y u c a c cu to cu
C C O Li -H O OJ O.t M < o co a 4) c AJ o
o c c e ex cu co
OJ 0) 0 0 60 C C C
A J A J A J t U O C C U * i - < " 4
CC C i- -^ cu oj AJ
3 * H . ^ 3 , _ ( c a £ C W C U
O «0 OJ AJ CO O U ' i - 1 6 0 60E E E C O C X I - I t o c c
f-4 ^7 -H -tJ ° U ^ JAJ
tu o j a > > A J i - i >. co-o uc uc
.£Oi-i O X> C ^ XI O O aj LI*H Li E
eo •-( j2 -H co 3 ca co • i-l -H o AJ O C
C * - > e o AJC »wL i C^« *JX •«-) o j --->O
to LI .H LI eo -a o. 03 C i-io EO E>H
a 41 oj ey eo o E cow Oi-i i-i >
O D. > CX 4> OO WU > O Oi-i OC
o : o to Oh ou o f i co we zca za i
7-10
(3) Where necessary, it sometimes saves time to use more recent
historical data in the data base because it is easier to collect.
For example, if the more recent data are component test data, then
a sample sensitivity study should be conducted to determine
whether the less mature (but easier to obtain) test data produces
significantly different projections than the older, more mature
(but harder to gather) historical data. If not, then replace the
historical component data with the comparable test data where
appropriate (see the RPV HARDMAN results for an example) (29).
(4) Occasionally, it may be difficult to find a predecessor duplicate
of a new proposed component. In this situation a larger or
smaller scale component with similar design characteristics may be
used in the consolidated data base as a last resort. However, it
is extremely important to rate the credibility of these data in
terms of both operational similarities and environment (see RPV
HARDMAN results for an example) (29).
»
b. Suggested Corrective Actions for Perturbing Reference System
to Model New Proposed Design. A framework for perturbing predecessor data to
fill gaps in the proposed system data base was summarized earlier in the
audits. To provide the decision makers with a better means of evaluating the
credibility of contractors' projections, it is necessary to compare both the
total reference and proposed designs on an equivalent technology basis. In
support of the "evolutionary" technology growth concept, several studies have
been done which suggest that industry is often too optimistic about new
technology performance (42). Regardless of the fact that much of the overly
inflated performance is sometimes derived from inadequate testing, it seems
that a 20% improvement in reliability or performance can reasonably be
expected (41,42). With respect to Step 2 of the methodology, a simple
top-level adjustment of the predecessor reliability and maintenance data might
be structured according to the following guidelines:
(1) If the design difference indicates a positive improvement and the
operating environment for the new component is not as harsh as the
predecessor component, then employ a 20% increase in reliability
with a "less than" or "maximum" label on the manpower projection
(e.g., < 5,000 operators required).
(2) If the design difference indicates a positive improvement and the
operating environments are essentially the same, increase the
component reliability by 20%.
(3) If the design difference is insignificant, or the positive design
improvement is offset by a harsher operating environment, then
leave the reliability and maintenance data the same.
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(4) If the operating environment is considerably harsher than the
predecessor system and the design and functional differences are
insignificant, then do not perturb the predecessor data, and
indicate with good confidence that the resulting manpower
projections represent a minimum (e.g., a minimum of 5000 operators
are required; or, the operator requirement is > 5000 people).
With these indications on the manpower projection for the updated
predecessor or baseline design, one can start to identify whether the
contractor projection for new technology performance is reasonable because the
projections will either converge or diverge. Along with the earlier credi-
bility ratings on the various kinds of data, the decision makers have a better
means of making budget decisions in support of the revised predecessor data or
the contractor projection.
c. Suggested Corrective Actions for Constructing the Reference
System. During the audits it was discovered that, the HCM designers used a
more sophisticated way of selecting predecessor components to build the
reference system than explained in the methodology. The following additional
steps are suggested to help clarify and better structure the Step 1 reference
system construction process:
(1) Include a complete listing of documents that help select
predecessor components similar to the proposed system (e.g., U.S.
Army Field Manual 24-24, Washington, D.C., 20 May 1977; Department
of Army (DOA), Aviation Electronics Configuration Directory,
December 1970).
(2) Include a listing of typical Army and industry technical contacts
(by organization and division) in various component classifications
(e.g., radios, surveillance sensing, etc.) that can confirm
similarities or differences between the reference and proposed
systems.
(3) Eknploy two reference systems if two proposed systems, although
functionally similar, employ completely different technologies
(e.g., a Howitzer versus a rocket launcher).
d. Suggested Corrective Actions for Functional-Requirements Level of
Indenture. Similar to the preceding reference system suggestions, the audits
revealed that the HCM designers employed a decision process which, although
simple, provided more functional and task requirements guidance than the
published methodology. It is suggested that the following steps be included
in Step 1 of the methodology to better define the level of indenture of the
functional requirements:
(1) Go to a level in which the associated component tasks stop
branching off (i.e., new tasks requiring different people cannot
be identified, such as a mechanic who can repair both the truck
engine and the chassis).
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(2) Go to a level in which no further technology differences can be
delineated between components.
(3) Go to the same level as available sample predecessor component
maintenance data in the consolidated data base.
e. Suggested Corrective Action for MOS and Skill Selections.
The audits discovered that the cookbook approach outlined in the methodology
was not complete. The additional step not included in the methodology, which
ensures the proper matchup between tasks and skills, is the use of experts
from various proponent schools. Therefore, it is suggested that the
methodology include a list of Army proponent school contacts (for all types of
component groups and technologies) that can confirm or alter the task and
skill selections as necessary.
f. Suggested Corrective Action for Potential End-Point Manpower
Errors. The solution to the end-point manpower shortage problem was outlined
earlier in this section. The basic solution revolved around shortening the
intervals between manpower projections, particularly when considering manpower
demands of emerging systems during the early acquisition or later life cycle
phases. Figure 7-1 graphically displays the solution by showing MACRIT pro-
jections at one-year increments during periods of rapid changes in deployment
and attrition, and the typical long term MACRIT rectangular projection for the
mid-cycle, steady-state period.
g. Suggested Corrective Action for Structured Tradeoff
Process. To instill confidence in the reader that the methodology encompasses
all possible tradeoffs, a simple table could be constructed as shown in
Table 7-5. Table 7-5 could be placed in the executive summary as a means of
displaying (1) the range of potential tradeoffs that the methodology could
provide and (2) the actual tradeoffs conducted for a particular application
POTENTIAL ERROR
INDUCED BY NOT
SHORTENING PRO-
JECTION INTERVAL
EMERGING SYSTEMS
EARLY /I
ACQUISITION
BUILDUP
STEADY-
STATE
MACRIT
SOLUTION LATE
TAPERING
OFF
SHORTENED
MACRIT
PROJECTION
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
LIFE CYCLE, yr
Figure 7-1. Revised MACRIT Manpower Projection
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Table 7-5. HARDMAN Methodology Tradeoffs
LIFE-CYCLE COST
TRADEOFF
PARAMETERS
DECREASE BUDGET CEILING
DECREASE RELIABILITY
DECREASE SPARES
DECREASE MANPOWER
DECREASE SKILLS
DECREASE TRAINING
DECREASE TE(~H PURS
DECREASE SSF
DECREASE TOOLING
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as constrained by time or the sponsoring agency. The actual tradeoffs
explored would be indicated by placing X's in the appropriate slots on the
matrix. It should be noted that Table 7-5 is also useful if it is desired to
display a clean summary of the various parameter sensitivities. Typically,
the sensitivities would be indicated by a relative percentage change (e.g., a
1% decrease in reliability results in a 10% increase in manpower). These more
detailed cost sensitivity relationships could be summarized by placing the
percentage "deltas" in the appropriate matrix slot. For example, continuing
with the reliability illustration, one could read horizontally across the
matrix and immediately see the net impact on the other LCC variables. This
more detailed cost-sensitivity matrix could be used to cite pivotal cost and
tradeoff benefits and jointly close out Step 6, tradeoff considerations, of
the methodology.
h. Suggested Corrective Action for Summarizing Study
Weaknesses^ Although listing study weaknesses is a simple procedure, it is
extremely important information for decision makers. In conjunction with a
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systematic listing of weaknesses, it is also important to suggest possible
resolutions. For example, it is perfectly feasible that both the reference
and contractor manpower projections could have "low-to-marginal" credibility
ratings assigned because of poor or insufficient data. Consequently, the data
problems would be listed as weaknesses and a suggested resolution might be to
fund test programs for the major components that are driving the projection
credibility down. A simple, dual-heading table consisting of "Major Study
Problem Areas" and "Suggested Resolution Actions" could be placed in the
executive summary to assist the decision makers. This adjustment would be
fairly minor because the HCM designers already address problem areas in some
of their applications (see the HARDMAN SINCGARS application) (28).
i. Suggested Corrective Action for Projecting Manpower Out to
System Deployment. Examples of manpower regression models were provided
earlier in Section V. The key problem identified with these models was the
lack of any indication of uncertainty in the manpower availability
projections. Nevertheless, it is extremely important to compare the projected
manpower requirement against manpower available starting at the point of
system deployment. A simple initial approach to this dilemma might be to
employ a linear regression technique, such as Barnes1 Soldier 90, and allow an
end point spread representative of only 75 or 80% confidence (i.e., select a
confidence interval low enough to prevent too large a spread at the projected
system deployment time) (43). The final projection may appear as shown in
Figure 7-2, where the shaded area might represent the zone of confidence in
which 75 or 80% of the observed data points center around the least squares
projection (43).
If the projected manpower requirement resulted in the situation depicted
in Figure 7-2, then obviously there is potential for a critical manpower
shortage. However, if the projected requirement fell within the shaded area,
then for purposes of early planning, it would appear that there
II
STARTING^
MANPOWER
1 2
PHASE 0
ACTUAL MANPOWER
AVAILABILITY
I
PROJECTED
MANPOWER
REQUIREMENT
3 4 5 6 7
TIME, yr
8
PLANNED
SYSTEM
DEPLOYMENT
Figure 7-2. Use of Confidence Intervals for Manpower Projections
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was no immediate problem. The advantage of this approach is that the
projection can be made with greater confidence as the deployment date is
approached and more data points on manpower availability are obtained.
Probably the actual confidence in the projection would not have to be any
better than one minus the allowable error on the manpower projection (i.e.,
roughly 0.8, as determined in Section VI).
j. Suggested Corrective Action for Improving LCC Tradeoff
Analysis. As shown earlier in Section V, some life-cycle cost elements are
already included in the HCM. One of many typical life-cycle cost models was
also briefly summarized (i.e., HLCCM). It is merely suggested here that other
life-cycle cost models be reviewed and the remaining missing cost parameters
be incorporated in the methodology to form a complete cost and impacts
assessment.
k. Suggested Corrective Actions to Firm Up Perturbation,
Induced Failure, and Indirect Productivity Value Ranges. The 20% upper bound
on the expected performance and reliability improvement of new technology was
discussed earlier in this section. This expected improvement, however, is
only one part of the complete picture. The previous discussion also pointed
out the possibility that a different operating scenario or harsher environment
could drive the reliability of a new design below that of its predecessor. At
a top level it was merely suggested that the final manpower projection be
stated as "greater than X number of people." The next step would be to try to
establish an approximate estimate of the potential drop in reliability. A
threefold approach is suggested to obtain this estimate:
(1) Studies such as the earlier referenced Dobbins paper suggest
roughly an order of magnitude difference between contractor
estimates of reliability and actual field operation (42). It may
be enlightening first to determine the components involved in the
above Dobbins reliability tests, choose equivalent predecessor
components, compare the operating environments in terms of
relative harshness, and calculate the incremental difference
between the respective reliabilities to get an idea of whether new
technology (operating in a different environment and adjusted to
its realistic performance level according to Dobbins) experiences
a reduction in reliability below its predecessor.
(2) As a next step it may be useful to conduct a survey of program
managers in all four services to gather examples (and maintenance
data) of systems and components where the reliabilities fell far
short of their original goals. Again, establish the equivalent
predecessors that were replaced by those new designs, compare the
harshness of the operating environments, and calculate the
incremental difference in reliability between the two. Several
different kinds of components should be examined to determine
which technologies are more sensitive than others (i.e.,
computers, propulsion components, firing devices, etc.).
7-16
(3) Finally, establish a group of experts from various technical
fields in DOD to adjust the estimates considering that research
and development programs provide engineering fixes that allow some
of the reliability to be regained before a fairly steady-state
reliability level is reached.
The induced failure and indirect productivity variables can effect the
outcome of the manpower projection even though their ranges are not as broad
as the perturbation value. As a first step it is suggested that a sensitivity
analysis be conducted, using completed HARDMAN applications, by simply
calculating the spread in manpower for the complete ranges of both variables.
If the spread does not aggravate the sensitivity of the manpower variable,
then a single, perhaps mid-point, value should be selected to remove any
confusion in picking a value from the possible ranges. If the spread exceeds
the allowable error, then more detailed breakdowns using industry and services
industrial engineering studies (for indirect productivity factors) or the Navy
200,000 Hour Test Study (for human induced failure rates) will have to be used
(41).
2. Training of HARDMAN Analysts
One of the major results of the audits and reliability analyses
was that the methodology appeared usable by only a select group of
individuals. Comments made during the debriefing following the internal
validity test universally suggested that no one individual could exercise the
methodology reliably; a team effort was absolutely required. It was
discovered that the net expertise required was a combination of the following:
(1) Sufficient military experience to provide both an understanding of
where to obtain training and technical information, as well as the
structure of the military logistics support, personnel and
training environments.
(2) Technical capability in at least one of a wide range of technical
fields encompassing mathematics (particularly modeling),
behavioral sciences, aerospace engineering, mechanical
engineering, electrical engineering, and chemical engineering.
(3) Experience in computer information and data management systems.
(4) Experience with DOD personnel assignment and tracking processes.
Again, based on comments made by replication analysts during the
debriefing and discrepancies review (41), it seems that the most suitable
combination of the above abilities was either items (1), (2), and (3), or
items (1), (2), and (4). Note that the joint military and technical
experience recur in both combinations. The personnel experience could be an
extension of the military experience; and, similarly, the computer information
system experience could greatly enhance the technical experience. All of
these attributes exist to varying degrees in the individuals employed by the
HCM contractor who execute the HARDMAN methodology (31). While some of the
first-year methodology design recommendations are being explored, the Army
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might consider using these qualifications to select and staff its HARDMAN
analyst team(s). In preparation for possibly conducting in-house applications
of the methodology or managing and auditing contractor applications, it is
extremely important that the Army firm up the various judgment areas per the
preceding recommendations. This effort will also provide for a clearer
training foundation. Drawing on both the results of the preceding evaluation
and debriefing comments, the following training suggestions are provided:
(1) The original objective of the HARDMAN training session (in
preparation for the internal validity test) was to concentrate on
developing skills for the judgmental portions of the methodology.
This objective should remain the major training thrust because the
algorithms and number manipulation are fairly straightforward.
Comments made on the debriefing questionnaire suggest that the
first training session concentrated too heavily on the numbers and
data manipulation.
(2) The handouts (particularly the LSA data and examples) should be
designed and their presentation associated more clearly with each
step and judgment in the process. The emphasis should be placed
on defining the judgment process and, where calculations are
required, concentrate on only a few select cases that demonstrate
the possible range of judgments that may be encountered. Note
that the suggested corrective actions made earlier in this section
could help refine the judgment process and that some of the
peculiar data management, reference system construction, and
credibility problems discussed earlier as part of the SINCGARS,
RPV, and DSWS audits could be employed as example problems.
(3) Break down the process by areas of expertise and provide different
focuses for the backgrounds of various individuals (i.e., teach
the team approach and define participant responsibilities).
(4) Train for the complete six-step methodology (e.g., as part of the
training program it may be useful to have the Army analysts work
as apprentices at the HCM contractor's facility as a means of
obtaining experience).
These recommendations should not be construed as only applying to
HARDMAN analysts. Even if the Army only chooses to monitor contractors
performing applications in response to a Data Item Description (DID) in a
contract, it is still imperative that contract monitors have the recommended
training to ensure quality control of the outcomes and answer ASARC or Program
Office audit requests.
3. Suggestions for Follow-on Research
There were four far-term areas identified earlier in this
section. These areas revolved around consideration of emerging systems
(horizontal analysis), quantitative differentiation between critical and
non-critical tasks, expansion of the demographic data base, and consideration
of major socioeconomic fluctuations. Except for horizontal analysis, the
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remaining areas are probably not critical to early Phase 0 and Phase I
top-level budget planning. As a first step, it is suggested that the Army
initiate appropriate directives to require early planning of "most likely"
candidates to be approved as emerging systems, inclusive of early operational
and projected logistics support data. It is recognized that this is a large
and perhaps sketchy task. However, if the Army wishes to meet its user needs
and consider major drains of other systems on the personnel pool, it must
start the mechanism to gather the needed information as soon as possible.
The three remaining areas are considered far-term because they represent
large data-gathering activities. For example, the quantitative critical and
non-critical task differentiation effort might be accomplished by (1) first
establishing criteria for critical and non-critical tasks (e.g., life or
mission endangering, task difficulty); (2) selecting an array of systems
representative of obvious task extremes for operator or maintainer performance
(e.g., aircraft pilot versus an RPV operator); (3) calculating the ratios of
instructor hours for the extremes; and (4) developing a simple rule of thumb
to increase instructor contact hours by "X" percent in Step 3 of the
methodology for those tasks judged critical. The time-consuming aspect of an
effort such as this is the task sorting and rating study associated with item
(1) followed by the gathering of system examples and instructor task hours
associated with items (2) and (3). It is for these reasons that the "obvious
task extreme" qualifier was suggested as a starting point.
The completion of the demographic data base is a massive effort because
it not only involves the gathering of data on age, sex, education, etc., but
also requires expansion of the decision network in Step 2 of the HCM (i.e.,
skill and MOS assignments). It may be worthwhile for the near and
intermediate terms not only to require manufacturers contractually to adher
strictly to accepted human engineering guidelines but also to establish a
design auditing mechanism to ensure strict compliance with sound human
engineering standards.
The last area, socioeconomic impacts on manpower, should be pursued in
the manner expressed by Enke earlier in the document. In the interim, a
subjective weighting mechanism might be employed to indicate the general
direction of manpower trends (up or down), based on expert experience with the
various variables (such as the economy). Referring back to the earlier
recommendation on the use of confidence intervals around the long-term
manpower availability projection, the final manpower projection might simply
indicate that the most likely availability population would be either above or
below the least squares linear projection, depending on the historical effect
of the socioeconomic variables.
The final far-term research area refers to one of the original
constraints imposed on this evaluation. Due to time and budget constraints,
only a qualitative examination of methodology accuracy was feasible. It is
strongly suggested that a feedback loop be constructed so that actual field
data on completed applications are gathered as the new systems are deployed.
If the actual system MPT performance falls outside the allowable error
discussed in Section VI, then appropriate steps should be taken to backtrack
through the studies and strengthen those weak areas in the methodology.
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In conclusion, several different validity examinations were structured
to evaluate the HCM. Table 7-1 indicates that the technique was generally
sound and basically integrated all aspects of the MPT problem well. Although
some weaknesses were discovered, solutions (or solution structures) were
apparent in most cases and appeared attainable within a reasonable time
period. If the Army chooses to pursue the proposed recommendations, several
benefits might be realized:
(1) The Army will move closer to developing its own in-house HARDMAN
capability (if it elects to do so).
(2) The Army will improve the audit trail on MPT projections.
(3) The Army will have a sound tool for producing MPT requirements,
weighing the credibility of projections, and making better
personnel recruitment and budget decisions in the manpower support
arena.
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APPENDIX A
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR USER REQUIREMENTS
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USER REQUIREMENTS
QUESTIONNAIRE
1. To what organizational division of the Army do you belong?
VERBATIM
2. What is the primary charter of your organization?
VERBATIM
3. What are your specific duties within the organization?
RESPONSIBILITY; (Areas of Concern, Deliverables, etc.)
A. What are your key needs in making or using manpower personnel and training
projections (i.e., what do you need to have to do this?)
INPUTS; Type of data, Level of Detail
INTERFACE CONSIDERATIONS
Other Organizational Actors (input/output)
Timing
5. What are the key drivers in needing such MPT projections, e.g., cost,
planning, safety, performance, readiness/force modernization, etc?
SPECIFY AND EXPLAIN, if possible
6. Which ARMY MPT regulations/documents pertain to your organization's
involvement in the M.P.T. process?
7. What technique is presently employed for getting MPT inputs into system
acquisition process?
8. Who has responsbility for this technique-1
9. To your knowledge, does it provide good results?
SPECIFY
10. In your organization, who is (are) the most likely uaer(a) of a
methodology to make MPT projections?
A-3
11. What other users of the the methodology could you identify within the Army
organizational structure?
12. Who in your organization is (are) the most likely user(s) of the results
of such a methodology?
13. What other users of the results of such a methodology could you identify
within the Army?
14. What suggestions do you have for the design of a methodology to accomplish
MPT projections? (OUTPUTS, SCHEDULE, PROCESS, ETC.)
15. What would be the most useful format(a) for the results?
16. At what point in the acquisition process (i.e. Phase 0, I, etc.) do you
require MPT results for (a) design changes, or (b) cost control?
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APPENDIX B
USER REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY
MATRIX OF QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES
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HARDMAN USER REOUOUJMENTS SUMMARY MATRIX (DESIGN)
USERS
REQUIREMENTS (DESIGN)
t- MPT PROJECTIOIS REEDED BEFORE MIIESTOIE 1 OF SYSTEMS
ACQUISITION CYCLE FOR MAXIMUM OESIGI IIFLUERCE AND
COST CONTROL
2 MPT DATA SHOULD RE PROVIDED THROUGHOUT A SYSTEM'S
LIFE CYCLE
3- DATA SHOULD RE DEVELOPED FOR SYSTEM ALTERNATIVES
(PROPOSED), AS WELL AS PREDECESSOR SYSTEM FOR COST
COMPARISONS
4- FEEDBACK MECHANISMS SHOULD BE INCORPORATED TO
PERMIT DEVELOPMENT OF HISTORICAL DATA BASE WITH
UPDATE CAPABILITY
5 SYSTEM SHOULD BASE CALCULATIONS ON RELIABLE DATA
SOURCES AND DOCUMENT THESE SOURCES FOR CREDIBILITY
8- ISA DATA SHOULD BE UTILIZED AND PRODUCED IN ISA
FORMATS FOR EASY RECOGNITION/USE
7 MPT MODEL SHOULD EXPOSE ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS
WHICH DISTINGUISH PROPOSED FROM CURRENT SYSTEM DATA
8 MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM SHOULD FOCUS ON
"FIRST UNIT EQUIPPED," INCLUDING SPACES, FACES. AND
EQUIPMENT DATA
9 MPT MODEL SHOULD BE TARGETED TO BOTH BUDGETARY AND
SYSTEM MILESTONES ON A TIMELINE WHICH INCLUDES
ACTION-SIGNALLING MECHANISMS AND SPECIFICATION OF
RESPONSIBLE PARTIES
10- PERMANENT. CENTRALIZED ARCHIVING CAPABILITY (HARDCOPY
AND DISK STORAGE) IS ESSENTIAL FOR
ACCESSIAUDITIREVIEWIUPDATE
11- FRONT-END COSTI BENEFIT CRITERIA SHOULD BE APPLIED
BEFORE SELECTING SYSTEM FOR MPT ANALYSIS (BASED ON
TECHNOLOGY CHANGES)
12 MPT MODEL SHOULD IDENTIFY SUPPORT SYSTEMIS) OR OTHER
SYSTEMS WITH OVERLAPPING OBJECTIVES IN PROVIDING
COMPREHENSIVE MPT ANALYSIS
13- MPT DOCUMENTATION FORMATSIREPORTS SHOULD BE
COMPATIBLE WITH THOSE USED TO INFLUENCE TRADOC MOS
DECISIONS
14 MPT DOCUMENTATION SHOULD PROVIDE DCS PER WITH
COMPARATIVE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS FOR SYSTEM
ALTERNATIVES 1 PREDECESSORS
IS DOCUMENTATION MUST BE AVAILABLE FROM DCS PER AT FRONT
END RE: AVAILABILITY OF PERSONNEL FOR EACH MOS/SKILL
LEVEL ASSOCIATED WITH SYSTEM
16- TIMELY/ACCURATE DATA MUST BE GIVEN TO CONTRACTORS TO
PREPARE RFF-S ANDIOR ORGANIZATIONAL MAINTENANCE
MANUALS
17- IMPROVED VEHICLE FOR MPT INFORMATION EXCHANGE
MANDATORY TO PERMIT EFFECTIVE! TIMELY COMMUNICATION
(SYSTEM SHOULD BE INTERACTIVE)
18- MPT MODEL MUST MEET MULTIPLE USER'S NEEDS FOR
OPERATIONAL FEASIBILITY & INTEGRATION INTO. ANDIOR
IMPLEMENTATION IN THE ARMY THROUGH EXISTING REPORTING
STRUCTURES
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METHODOLOGY AUDIT
Generic
Steps 1 and 2
1. What judgment determines the level of indenture necessary in determining
the functional requirements?
2. How does one determine the maturity of the data presented?
How does on ensure selecting the most mature data source(s)?
3. The judgments used to determine manpower drivers in the design
difference index are not clear to me:
How are the key drivers flagged?
How is the perturbation value assigned?
When and where is the perturbation value applied?
4. What judgment is required and how is it applied to select the lowest
skill level MOS for any maintenance task when the AR611-201 seems to
define the performance of each MOS quite clearly?
5. What judgments temper the use of the indirect productivity factor? Is
this a blanket application or a selected application? Define why and
when.
6. What judgments allow the incorporation of two tasks, normally performed
by two separate MOS's, into one MOS?
7. What judgments are used in creating a new MOS?
8. When and where are the perturbation values applied to the reference
system to achieve a baseline system with which to compare the contractor-
proposed data?
9. Is the function to address the manpower loading a rectangular or weible
curve?
10. How is the accuracy of the reference system ensured when contractor-
proposed data is used in building a reference system component for which
no predecessor data is available?
11. How do you construct a reference system to be similar to the proposed
system when the proposed systems vary widely?
12. Does the HARDMAN Methodology take into account factors other than those
addressed by the contractor? Are the DRC reference system manpower
requirements more credible than the contractor-proposed requirements?
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METHODOLOGY AUDIT
Generic
Step 3
1. Is the training necessary for the instructors taken into account?
Training for the instructor's instructors?
2. Are the costs of training the instructors taken into account? The costs
of training the instructor's instructors?
3. What judgments are used in identifying and constructing training courses
for any new ratings developed?
4. When the technical factors for determining the baseline skill levels are
analyzed, is memory decay taken into account?
5. Explain the two levels of indenture for determining training
requirements; the Methodology seems to address only the first.
6. What determines the frequency or need for refresher (retraining) courses?
7. How does the TRRA estimate the cost of devices required for training?
8. Are the costs for personnel movement between training schools and
training periods included in training costs? Are these large costs?
9. How often is it required to send personnel back through the training
schools? Is this a large cost?
10. How are the perturbation values determined in steps 1 and 2 applied to
the reference system training courses?
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METHODOLOGY AUDIT
Generic
Step 4
1. How are the personnel required for new MOS's accounted for?
2. Where is the flow of second enlistment personnel taken into account?
3. How is a personnel flow conducted for a new MOS when no historical data
is available?
4. Where do the probabilities to calculate the flow of personnel come
from? How are they applied to the MOS populations to establish the
expected values of availability?
5. Are major socioeconomic fluctuations considered?
6. Is a steady-state population within the Army assumed?
7. How are the perturbation values determined in steps 1 and 2 applied to
the reference system personnel requirements?
Conclusions
1. Why is a Life Cycle Costing (LCC) model not included in the Methodology?
2. When, if at all, is a wartime scenario addressed?
3. How much credibility is lent to the results of the analysis?
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METHODOLOGY AUDIT
DSWS/RPV-Specific
Steps 1 and 2
DSWS
1. What justification does PACCAR have for utilizing an "M-2-like" chassis
in a potential overload situation?
2. What accounts for the vast differences in manpower between the Norden
M109E4 system and the reference and other proposed systems?
3. Why weren't personnel and training analyses performed on the PACCAR
system?
4. The Norden M109E4 system has no Ammunition Resupply Vehicle (ARV). The
PACCAR system uses only one ARV per two Howitzers. How do these two
systems get considerations as proposed systems if the functional
requirements were developed properly? Do you consider the fact that the
PACCAR system uses one ARV per two Howtizers a potential error source?
5. Why was a shipboard gun autoloader chosen for the reference system?
6. For the following subsystems, what judgments were used in determining
the design differences? What judgments were used in assigning a
perturbation value? How were these values applied to the reliability
and maintainability data? How did they affect the manpower projections
for the reference system?
a. Autoloader
b. Fire Control Processor
c. Internal Navigation System
d. Auxiliary Power Unit
e. Suspension: 1. Howitzer
2. ARV (where applicable)
f. Howitzer Engine
g. Suspension/Chassis Combination
7. In building the reference system, what criterion were used to determine
the maturity of the data?
8. How does the use of a trailer with the FMC system affect the reliability
and maintainability of that system? How does the use of a trailer
affect the munitions-loading capabilities of that system?
9. What accounts for the vast differences in manpower projections between
the reference and proposed systems in the following MOS categories:
31V, 31E, 35E, 63D.
10. What accounts for the extremely low number of the following MOS's in the
Norden M109E4 system: 31V, 31E.
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METHODOLOGY AUDIT
DSWS/RPV-Specific (cont'd.)
Steps 1 and 2
DSWS (cont'd.)
11. Why was an airborne unit selected as the reference navigation system?
12. What justification exists for Norden and FMC systems not using an
Auxiliary Power Unit?
13. How was the M-l tank Auxiliary Power Unit data altered to take into
account its lack of predicted performance?
RPV
1. Track the source of the Mean-Time-To-Repair (MTTR) values of the
reference system for the following subsystems:
a. Data link terminal (airborne unit)
b. Airframe assembly
c. Launcher
2. Identify the reference equipment and selection rationale for the
following subsystems:
a. Central Processor Unit (CPU)
b. RPV control and display panel
c. Airframe assembly
d. AV engine
e. Launcher
3. Track the Contractor-Furnished Equipment data from the baseline system
equipment that was used in the reference system for the following
subsystems:
a. Launcher
b. CPU
c. Airborne unit data terminal
4. Identify the subsystems of the baseline system that did not meet the
functional requirements.
5. Identify the baseline equipment that used altered contractor data.
Explain the rationale for altering this data.
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METHODOLOGY AUDIT
DSWS/RPV-Specific (cont'd.)
Steps 1 and 2
RPV (cont'd.)
6. Identify and provide the rationale for the perturbation values (PV)
assigned to the following subsystems:
a. Airborne unit data terminal
b. CPU
c. AV airframe
d. AV engine
If no PV was used in the above subsystems, identify where the PV was
used.
7. Identify baseline equipment where no reliability and maintainability
(R&M) data was available.
8. Track MOS/Skill level assignments for the following subsystems:
a. Airborne unit data terminal
b. CPU
c. Airframe assembly
d. AV engine
9. Page 48 of Volume 1, RPV states that the assumption is made that the MAC
charts exclude the make-ready/put-away times, a value which would
normally be adjusted by the Indirect Productivity Factor. In the
SINCGARS replication, the instructions stated that the make-ready/
put-away times were included in the MAC chart data. Explain this
discrepancy.
10. Explain how full-sized aircraft data was altered in order to meet
miniaturized aircraft data projections.
11. Page 75 of Volume 1, RPV makes reference to certain modeling equations.
Explain these.
12. What is the basis for a two-to-one improvement of the M939 truck over
the M809?
13. What criterion are used in determining the number of systems to be
fielded? Are these criterion adjusted for system availability?
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METHODOLOGY AUDIT
DSWS/RPV-Specific (cont'd.)
Step 3
DSWS
1. How did the perturbation values assigned to components of the following
subsystems of the reference system affect the training resources
requirements analysis?
a. Autoloader
b. Fire Control Processor
c. Internal Navigation System
d. Auxiliary Power Unit
e. Suspension: 1. Howitzer
2. ARV (where applicable)
f. Howitzer Engine
g. Suspension/Chassis Combination
2. What training impacts are effected by the use of a trailer in the FMC
system?
RPV: For Questions 1 and 2
References: RPV Appendix C - pp. 3, 4, 27, 30, 57
Subsystems: Air Vehicle, airborne data terminal, remote ground
terminal
1. What was the rationale for assigning the PV's? What are the values that
were arrived at?
2. What is the rationale for choosing the respective representative
equipments for training estimation? What would the procedure be if a
detailed Training Resources Requirements Analysis (TRRA) was conducted?
3. Identify .the nine new courses in the reference system; the seven
modified courses in the baseline system; the two deleted courses in the
baseline system.
4. Discuss the implications of the fact that, in many cases, Direct Support
(DS) level maintenance was not specified in the Logistics Support
Analysis (LSA) data.
5. Discuss the low performance that may result from high skill requirements
and low paygrade assignments as indicated on page 119, RPV; explain why
this was not identified in the recommendations; how was this addressed
in the reference system?
C-9
METHODOLOGY AUDIT
DSWS/RPV-Specific (cont'd.)
Step 3 (cont'd.)
RPV: (cont'd.)
6. Explain, by example, the four steps in determining the number of
instructors for one course.
7. Show an example of a Program Of Instruction (POl) used for obtaining
training man-days.
8. Since the HARDMAN Methodology does not address Life Cycle Costing (LCC),
and only addresses a potion of the training costs, why address it at
all? Why wasn't it addressed in RPV?
9. In general, how does this step interrelate with the MOS/ASI selection in
step 1?
Step 4
DSWS
1. How did the perturbation values assigned to components of the following
subsystems of the reference system affect the personnel requirements?
a. Autoloader
b. Fire Control Processor
c. Internal Navigation System
d. Auxiliary Power Unit
e. Suspension: 1. Howitzer
2. ARV (where applicable)
f. Howitzer Engine
g. Suspension/Chassis Combination
2. What personnel requirements are affected by the use of a trailer in the
FMC system?
RPV
1. Does the primary output of this step, personnel to be trained per year,
represent requirements at IOC, 5 yrs., 10 yrs., . . . ?
2. Discuss the sources of personnel flow rates. Why does DRC rely on Army
data and not develop its own models, or use the algorithms outlined in
the HARDMAN Methodology handbook? What is the expected error in the
primary output due to inadequate data inputs?
3. Explain, by example, personnel flow in the 13T MOS structure.
4. Are there other Army data sources available, such as TRADOC?
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Step 5
RPV
1. Page 154, RPV states that meaningful results can be obtained in the case
of RPV since it is a completely new system. Does this imply that
meaningful results could not be obtained if this were not the case?
2. Does DRC provide inputs or actually run the Army's Personnel Policy
Project Model (P^ M)?
3. The P^M Model projects personnel suply based on Army internal
variables; what of external variables such as the economy or politics?
4. Are the P^M personnel inputs different from those used by DRC in step
4 of the Methodology?
5. Given the short horizon, one to three years, of the P^M Model, is
there a better way and why?
6. How do authorizations relate to the TO&E?
Step 6
RPV
1. How long does it take to conduct a tradeoff study?
2. Discuss, by example, the tradeoff study of the M939 truck versus the
ML809 truck.
Conclusion
1. What conclusion can you draw from the chart on page 5, RPV; what
conclusions can we draw on how credible the answers are?
C-ll
APPENDIX D
DEBRIEFING QUESTIONNAIRE
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TRAINEE DATA COLLECTION SHEET
HARDMAN PROJECT
In order to analyze and identify possible explanations for divergence in
trainee's solutions to problems worked during the training course, we need to
determine the following background data on each person.
1. TRAINEE I.D. # (NAME)
2. LEVEL OF EDUCATION
NO. YEARS COMPLETED
ADVANCED DEGREES?
CERTIFICATES?
COLLEGE DEGREE
HIGH SCHOOL
3. TYPE OF EDUCATION
ADVANCED DEGREE FIELD(S)
COLLEGE MAJOR
H.S. EMPHASIS
COLLEGE PREP
TECHNICAL
VOCATIONAL _
OTHER
4. PRESENT EMPLOYMENT
TITLE:
EMPLOYER:
DUTIES:
LENGTH OF TIME (IF ANY) AWAY FROM PAST EDUCATION FIELD OF EMPHASIS
(MAJOR, FIELD, ETC.)
5. PAST EMPLOYMENT
IN REVERSE CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER, PLEASE LIST RECENT JOB EXPERIENCE (UP
TO 5 YEARS)
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DEBRIEFING QUESTIONS
1. Did you complete all 8 sections of the replication package?
If NO, state which portion iti incomplete...
2. Were the recommended time frames realistic?
If NO, state specific packages which took more/less time than recommended.
3. Was the subject material or methodology of this replication process directly
or indirectly related to your present job?
If YES, state how (briefly)
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Were there portions of the replication that you felt were part ic.ulurly
difficult? (Beginning with package 1, please give any significant notations
you made about the package while working on the replication. Please omit
problems which were readily resolved by a telephone call of DRC. Also in-
clude comments about possible reasons and solutions for the problem.)
Prompts: Complexity; Course training; Time factors, e.g., lag between course
& replication or time to finish package; Materiels, Preparation of individual..)
D-5
5. How did you generally make corrections to your answer sheets on the KT Unit
and the ECCM?
Prompts: Straight DRC worksheet utilization; Mapping over of my answers
to DRC worksheet or vice versa; Other ; Special problems noted.
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6. Were the Instructions In the data packages generally adequate for interpreting
what was actually required, i.e., calculating the required answers?
If NO, please explain possible reasons and state which data package.
7. Did you note any significant deacrepanciea between your solutions and the
"school" (DRC) solutions during the replication?
If YES, please state reasons, if known. (Prompts: Replicator background;
Training course; Data package instructions, materials; Other (errors,etc.)
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8. What would have been required of you to arive at the school solution (DRC
answers)? Apply comments to specific data packages.
9. Did you read the pre-replicatlon package materlels for the SINCCARS?
If YES, were they useful?
10. Did the course prepare you adequately for tite replication?
EXPLAIN...
11. What criteria could you suggest for selecting analyst trainees to apply
HARDMAN? (Answer may vary for different steps In the process)
12. Do you have any suggestions for training course improvements?
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APPENDIX E
DATA INPUTS FOR THE MANPOWER SENSITIVITY MODEL
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This appendix contains the data sets and baseline runs of the SEDCOM
cost model. The first table is the baseline rim used in the analysis. The
equipment used there is SINCGARS without the battery. This was done because
the battery, with extremely low mean time between failures, takes a long time
to run on the computer and adds nothing to the analysis. For the sake of
completeness a second baseline cost estimate is presented, based on the
inclusion of the battery. It is labeled SNCGARS2.
Most of the input data used to describe both SINCGARS and its operating
and support environments were provided by the SINCGARS Program Office and are
presented in the next several tables. Because the computer program used for
this example was derived from the Navy SECDOM model, the billet structure and
some maintenance level terminology (for example, ship level is organizational
level) were merely adopted to prevent reprogramming. The use of some Navy
terminology and data did not affect the accuracy of the sensitivity study
because this effort was conducted strictly as a top-level (order-of-magnitude)
analysis.
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SINCCARS
* COST ELEMENTS ($'000) *
*******************************************
* SYSTEM RATES *
**********************************
Life Cycle Cost 885323.0
System Unit Cost 11.1
INITIAL COSTS:
Production 3S926S.O
Haint. Training • 1251.2
Op. Training 80850.0
Misc. Manpower 0.0
Spares . 2844.2
S+TE 67048.6
Tech. Doc. 55.2
**TOTAL 511314.0
OPERATION AND SUPPORT COSTS:
Maint. Wage 31587.0
Op. + Off. Wage 35684.7
Maint. Training 3842.2
Op. Training 248394.0
Misc. Manpower 0.0
Spares 11018.2
Repair 2257.9
Transportation 20.2
S+TE 41198.5
Tech. Doc. 5.5
**TOTAL 374009.0
Number of LRA Types
Number of LRA's
17
17
Confidence Against Stockout .999
System MTBF
System MTTR
472.3 hrs.
3.0 hrs.
SUPPORT POLICY SUMMARIES:
LRA's coded COD
LRA's coded MOD
LRA's coded local repair
LRA's coded discard
0
9
4
4
TRAINING BILLETS BY TYPE:
Equipment Operators 32340
Org and Int Maint 476
Depot Technicians 6
REAL MANNING REQUIREMENTS:
Org. and Int. Maint. 235.97
Depot Maintenance 4.92
Operators 8085.00
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SNCCARS2
* COST ELEMENTS ($'000) *
*******************************************
Life Cycle Cost .1126040.0
System Unit Cost 11.2
INITIAL COSTS:
Production 314545.0
MaInt. Training 1618.7
Op. Training 70280.0
Misc. Manpower 0.0
Spares 54779.7
S+TE 67048.6
Tech. Doc. 55.2
**TOTAL 508327.0
OPERATION AND SUPPORT COSTS:
Maint. Wage 39707.1
Op. + Off. Wage 31019.4
Maint. Training 4971.3
Op. Training 215920.0
Misc. Manpower 0.0
Spares 282912.0
Repair 1962.7
Transportation 17.6
S+TE 41198.5
Tech. Doc. 5.5
**TOTAL 617714.0
* SYSTEM RATES *
**********************************
Number of LRA Types
Number of LRA's
18
18
Confidence Against Stockout .000
System MTBF
System MTTR
22.8 hrs.
0.4 hrs.
SUPPORT POLICY SUMMARIES:
LRA's coded COD 0
LRA's coded MOD 9
LRA's coded local repair 4
LRA's coded discard 5
TRAINING BILLETS BY TYPE:
Equipment Operators 28112
Org and Int Maint 616
Depot Technicians 6
REAL MANNING REQUIREMENTS:
Org. and Int. Maint. 296.63
Depot Maintenance 4.27
Operators 7028.00
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File name: SINCGARS
*********************
 NAVY ENVIRONMENTAL AND COST FACTORS *********************
0 Daily cost of C-school training ($/day/student) 250
1 Cost of A-school, maintenance technician ($/student) 0
2 Cost of A-school, operator ($/student) 0
3 Annual billet cost, maintenance technician 30583
4 Annual billet cost, operator 23235
5 Annual billet cost, maintenance technician at depot 38018X
6 Annual billet cost, officer 0
7 Available weekly work hours, maintenance technician 48
8 Available weekly work hours, operator 60
9 Available weekly work hours, depot technician 40
10 Annual turnover rate, shipboard personnel (decimal) 5
11 Annual turnover rate, depot personnel (decimal) 33
12 Annual discount rate (decimal) 1
13 Condemnation rate (decimal) 01
14 S+TE support cost : S+TE purchase cost (ratio) 1
15 Cost of technical documentation development ($/page) 200
16 Annual tech. documentation maintenance rate ($/page/yr) 20
17 Cost of insured freight ($/lb/mile) 0002
************************* SYSTEM OPERATING ENVIRONMENT *************************
0 Nunber of ships on which system is deployed 28
1 Number of systems per ship 1004
2 Length of system life cycle (yrs) 10
3 Length of deployment period (days) 5
4 Number of deployments per year 52
5 Average system operating hours (hr/wk) 15
6 Peak system operating hours (hr/wk) 30
7 Reduction rate (learning curve slope) 1
8 Number of stockage depots 3
9 Number of repair depots 2
10 Cost of LRA repair at contractor depot 1000
11 Ship response time (days) 2
12 Military depot response time (days) 16
13 Contractor operated depot response time (days) 20
14 Distance between repair and supply depots (miles) 750
15 Other personnel costs ($/person) 0
*************************** SYSTEM DESIGN PARAMETERS ***************************
1 Required system confidence level against stockout 95
2 System assembly cost at given lot size 5204
3 Lot size for assembly 100
4 Average LRA weight (Ib) 1.5
5 Fault isolation hardware cost ($/system). 2.35714E+06
6 Support and test hardware cost (S/system) 0
7 Support and test software development cost 0
8 Average LRA specific software development cost 80000
9 Technical documentation for system description (pages) 3
10 Technical documentation for fault isolation (pages) 0
11 System scheduled maintenance requirement (manhr/wk/ship) 25
12 Required number of operators per system I
13 Required no. officers per platform 0
14 Required days C-school for operator training 10
15 Required days C-school maintenance trng (sys orien + LRA R&R) 10
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LRA Configuration for SINCGARS
CHASSIS: 1
0 Estimated unit cost 1400
1 Corresponding lot size 100
2 LRA mean time between failures (hours) 14006
3 Mean time to fault isolate, R & R this LkA (hours) 3
4 Mean time to repair LRA (hours) 1
5 LkA duty cycle (decimal) 1
6 LRA specific support and test hardware cost 67
7 Training hours required for repair of LRA 1
8 LRA repair material cost per failure 20
9 Pages of documentation for repair description 21
10 Quantity of similar assemblies 2
CONTROL: 1
0 Estimated unit cost 375
1 Corresponding lot size 100
2 LRA mean time between failures (hours) 27855
3 Mean time to fault isolate, R & R this LRA (hours)... 3
4 Mean time to repair LRA (hours) 1
5 LRA duty cycle (decimal) 1
6 LRA specific support and test hardware cost 67
7 Training hours required for repair of LRA . 1
8 LRA repair material cost per failure 30
9 Pages of documentation for repair description 21
10 Quantity of similar assemblies 1
PWR ASSY: 1
0 Estimated unit cost.* 180
1 Corresponding lot size 100
2 LRA mean time between failures (hours) 25974
3 Mean time to fault isolate, R & R this LRA (hours) 3
4 Mean time to repair LRA (hours) 1
5 LRA duty cycle (decimal) 1
6 LRA specific support and test hardware cost 67
7 Training hours required for repair of LRA 1
8 LRA repair material cost per failure 30
9 Pages of documentation for repair description 21
10 Quantity of similar assemblies 1
TUNR/MXR: 1
0 Estimated unit cost 370
1 Corresponding lot size 100
2 LRA mean time between failures (hours) 12937
3 Mean time to fault isolate, R & R this LRA (hours) 3
4 Mean time to repair LRA (hours) 1
5 LRA duty cycle (decimal) 1
6 LRA specific support and test hardware cost 67
7 Training hours required for repair of LRA 1
8 LRA repair material cost per failure 30
9 Pages of documentation for repair description 21
10 Quantity of similar assemblies •••• 1
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LKA Configuration for SliCGARS
IF UEMOU: 1
0 Estimated unit cost 325
1 Corresponding lot size 100
2 LRA mean time between failures (hours) 18868
3 Mean time to fault isolate, R S R this LRA (hours) 3
4 Mean time to repair LRA (hours) 1
5 LRA duty cycle (decimal) 1
6 LRA specific support and test hardware cost 67
7 Training hours required for repair of LRA 1
8 LRA repair material cost per failure 30
9 Pages of documentation for repair description 21
10 Quantity of similar assemblies 1
EXCITER: 1
0 Estimated unit cost 950
1 Corresponding lot size 100
2 LRA mean time between failures (hours) 11737
3 Mean time to fault isolate, R & R this LRA (hours) 3
4 Mean time to repair LRA (hours) 1
5 LRA duty'cycle (decimal) 1
6 LRA specific support and test hardware cost 67
7 Training hours required for repair of LRA 1
8 LRA repair material cost per failure 30
9 Pages of documentation for repair description 21
10 Quantity of similar assemblies....... 2
SYNTHSIZER: 1
0 Estimated unit cost 525
1 Corresponding lot size 100
2 LRA mean time between failures (hours) 15674
3 Mean time to fault isolate, R & R this LRA (hours) 3
4 Mean time to repair LRA (hours) 1.5
5 LRA duty cycle (decimal) 1
6 LRA specific support and test hardware cost 67
7 Training hours required for repair of LRA 1
8 LRA repair material cost per failure 30
9 Pages of documentation for repair description 21
10 Quantity of similar assemblies 2
TWO-WIRE: 1
0 Estimated unit cost........ 160
1 Corresponding lot size 100
2 LRA mean time between failures (hours) 22624
3 Mean time to fault isolate, R & R this LRA (hours) 3
4 Mean time to repair LRA (hours) 1
5 LRA duty cycle (decimal) 1
6 LRA specific support and test hardware cost 67
7 Training hours required for repair of LRA 0
8 LRA repair material cost per failure 200
9 Pages of documentation for repair description 21
10 Quantity of similar assemblies 3
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LRA Configuration for SIHCGARS
SWITCH: 1
0 Estimated unit cost 400
1 Corresponding lot size 100
2 LRA mean time between failures (hours) 12837
3 Mean time to fault isolate, R & R this LRA (hours) 3
4 (lean time to repair LRA (hours) 1
5 LRA duty cycle (decimal) 1
6 LRA specific support and test hardware cost........ 67
7 Training hours required for repair of LRA 1
8 LkA repair material cost per failure 30
9 Pages of documentation for repair description 21
10 Quantity of similar assemblies... 2
REMOTE I/O: 1
0 Estimated unit cost 225
1 Corresponding lot size 100
2 LRA mean time between failures (hours) 44444
3 Mean time to fault isolate, R & R this LRA (hours) 3
4 Mean time to repair LRA (hours) 1
5 LRA duty cycle (decimal) 1
6 LRA specific support and test hardware cost 67
7 Training hours required for repair of LRA.. 1
8 LRA repair material cost per failure 30
9 Pages of documentation for repair description 21
10 Quantity of similar assemblies 1
ANT CONTRL: 1
0 Estimated unit cost 175
1 Corresponding lot size 100
2 LRA mean time between failures (hours) 28818
3 Mean time to fault isolate, R & R this LRA (hours) 3
4 Mean time to repair LRA (hours) 1
5 LRA duty cycle (decimal) 1
6 LRA specific support and test hardware cost 67
7 Training hours required for repair of LRA 1
8 LRA repair material cost per failure 30
9 Pages of documentation for repair description 21
10 Quantity of similar assemblies 1
AUU PUR SUP: 1
0 Estimated unit cost 210
1 Corresponding lot size 100
2 LRA mean time between failures (hours) 32573
3 Uean time to fault isolate, R & R this LRA (hours) 3
4 Mean time to repair LRA (hours) 1
5 LRA duty cycle (decimal) , 1
6 LRA specific support and test hardware cost 67
7 Training hours required for repair of LRA 1
8 LRA repair material cost per failure 30
9 Pages of documentation for repair description 21
10 Quantity of similar assemblies 1
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LRA Configuration for SINCGARS
AUD UATA I/O: 1
0 Estimated unit cost 260
1 Corresponding Jot size 100
2 LRA mean time between failures (hours) 14881
3 Mean time to fault isolate, R & R this LRA (hours) 3
4 Mean time to repair LRA (hours) 1
5 LRA duty cycle (decimal) 1
6 LRA specific support and test hardware cost 67
7 Training hours required for repair of LRA 1
8 LRA repair material cost per failure 30
9 Pages of documentation for repair description 21
10 Quantity of similar assemblies 1
BATTERY CASE: 1
0 Estimated unit cost 50
1 Corresponding lot size 100
2 LRA mean time between failures (hours) 86957
3 Mean time to fault isolate, R & R this LRA (hours) 3
4 Mean time to repair LRA (hours) 10
5 LRA duty cycle (decimal) 1
6 LRA specific support and test hardware cost 67
7 Training hours required for repair of LRA 0
8 LRA repair material cost per failure 60
9 Payes of documentation for repair description 21
10 Quantity of similar assemblies 3
AUU DAT CONTRL: 1
0 Estimated unit cost 180
1 Corresponding lot size 100
2 LRA mean time between failures (hours) 21978
3 Mean time to fault isolate, R & R this LRA (hours) 3
4 Mean time to repair LRA (hours) 1
5 LRA duty cycle (decimal) 1
6 LRA specific support and test hardware cost.... 67
7 Training hours required for repair of LRA 1
8 LRA repair material cost per failure 30
9 Pages of documentation for repair description 21
10 Quantity of similar assemblies 1
ANTENNA: 1
0 Estimated unit cost 40
1 Corresponding lot size 100
2 LRA mean time between failures (hours) 13158
3 Mean time to fault isolate, R & R this LRA (hours) 3
4 Mean time to repair LRA (hours) 2
5 LKA duty cycle (decimal) 1
6 LRA specific support and test hardware cost 0
7 Training hours required for repair of LRA 0
8 LRA repair material cost per failure 0
9 Pages of documentation for repair description 0
10 Quantity of similar assemblies 3
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LRA Configuration for SINCGARS
HANDSET: 1
0 Estimated unit cost . 80
1 Corresponding lot size 100
2 LRA mean time between failures (hours) 780
3 Mean time to fault isolate, R S R this LRA (hours) 3
4 Mean time to repair LRA (hours) 2
5 LRA duty cycle (decimal) 1
6 LRA specific support and test hardware cost 0
7 Training hours required for repair of LRA 0
8 LRA repair material cost per failure 0
9 Pages of documentation for repair description 0
10 Quantity of similar assemblies 3
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CHASSIS
INPUT DATA
**********
Quantity
MTRR
Trng hrs
1 UC(lot)
3.0 MTTR
1 Repair parts $
1400 lot
1.0 Duty cycle
20 Tech doc pp
100 MTBF
1.0 S+TE
21 QSA
14006
67
2
******************* SUPPORT POLICY SUMMARIES ****************
Contractor Military Local
Depot Depot Repair Discard
LIFE CYCLE COST
INITIAL COSTS:
Production
Training
Spares
S+TE
Tech. Doc.
**TOTAL
46846.4
39641.3
40340.8
39721.5
40227.0
39356.8
0.0
284.5
0.0
0.0
39356.8
0.1
280.3
80.1
4.2
39356.8
0.9
172.5
81.9
4.2
39616.2
49635.4
39356.8
0.0
1830.2
0.0
0.0
41187.0
OPERATION AND SUPPORT COSTS:
Uage
Training
Spares
Repair
Transportation
S+TE
Tech. Doc.
**TOTAL
251.9
0.0
82.0
6871.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
7205.1
344.9
0.1
82.0
137.4
3.1
49.2
2.6
619.3
335.8
2.7
82.0
137.4
0.0
50.3
2.6
610.8
251.9
0.0
8196.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
8448.4
Support Posture Assigned: Local Repair
**************************************
E-12
CONTROL
INPUT DATA
**********
Quantity
HTKR
Trng hrs
1 UC(lot)
3.0 MTTK
1 Repair parts $
375 lot
1.0 Duty cycle
30 Tech doc pp
100 MTBF
1.0 S+TE
21 QSA
27855
67
1
******************* SUPPORT POLICY SUMMARIES ****************
Contractor Military Local
Depot Depot Repair Discard
LIFE CYCLE COST
INITIAL COSTS:
Production
Training
Spares
S+TE
Tech. Doc.
**TOTAL
14184.4
10542.0
0.0
49.7
0.0
0.0
10591.7
11016.6
10542.0
0.1
48.6
80.
4,
10675.0
11001.7
10542.0
0.9
33.6
81.9
4.2
10662.6
12029.9
10542.0
0.0
257.4
0.0
0.0
10799.4
OPERATION AND SUPPORT COSTS:
Wage
Training
Spares
Repair
Transportation
S+TE
Tech. Doc.
**TOTAL
126.7
0.0
11.0
3455.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
3592.7
173.4
0.1
11.0
103.6
1.6
49.2
2.6
341.6
168.9
2.7
11.0
103.6
0.0
50.3
2.6
339.1
126.7
0.0
1103.9
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1230.6
Support Posture Assigned: Military Depot
****************************************
E-13
IF DEMOD
INPUT DATA
**********
Quantity
HTRR
Trng hrs
1 UC(lot)
3.0 MTTK
1 Repair parts $
325 lot
1.0 Duty cycle
30 Tech doc pp
100 MTBF
1.0 S+TE
21 QSA
18868
67
1
******************* SUPPORT POLICY SUMMARIES ****************
Contractor Military Local
Depot Depot Repair Discard
LIFE CYCLE COST
INITIAL COSTS:
Production
Training
Spares
S+TE
Tech. Doc.
**TOTAL
14493.2
9136.4
0.0
55.0
0.0
0.0
9191.4
9752.3
9136.4
0.1
54.0
80.
9725.4
.4
.9
9274.8
9136.
0.
30.0
81.9
4.2
9253.4
11057.0
9136.4
0.0
321.1
0.0
0.0
9457.5
OPERATION AND SUPPORT COSTS:
Wage
Training
Spares
Repair
Transportation
S+TE
Tech. Doc.
**TOTAL
187.0
0.0
14.1
5100.6
0.0
0.0
0.0
5301.7
256.0
0.1
14.1
153.0
2.3
49.2
2.6
477.4
249.3
2.7
14.1
153.0
0.0
50.3
2.6
472.0
187.0
0.0
1412.4
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1599.4
Support Posture Assigned: Military Depot
****************************************
E-16
TUNR/MXR
INPUT DATA
**********
(Juantity
MTKK
Trng hrs
1 UC(lot)
3.0 MTTK
1 Repair parts $
370 lot
1.0 Duty cycle
30 Tech doc pp
100 MTBF
1.0 S+TE
21 QSA
12937
67
1
******************* SUPPORT POLICY SUMMARIES ****************
Contractor Military Local
Depot Depot Repair Discard
LIFE CYCLE COST
INITIAL COSTS:
Production
Training
Spares
S+TE
Tech. Doc.
**TOTAL
18213.3
10478.1
11236.7
10561.4
11200.1
10534.3
13538.3
10401.4
0.0
76.6
0.0
0.0
10401.4
0.1
75.5
80.1
4.2
10401.4
0.9
45.9
81.9
4.2
10401.4
0.0
519. U
0.0
O.C
10920.4
OPERATION AND SUPPORT COSTS:
Mage
Training
Spares
Repair
Transportation
S+TE
Tech. Doc.
**TOTAL
272.7
0.0
23.5
7439.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
373.4
0.1
23.5
223.2
3.3
49.2
2.6
363.6
2.7
23.5
223.2
0.0
50.3
2.6
272.7
0.0
2345.
0.'
0.0
0.0
o.i;
7735.2 675.3 665.8 2617.9
Support Posture Assigned: Military Depot
****************************************
E-15
PUR ASSY
INPUT DATA
Quantity 1 UC(lot) 180 lot 100 HTBF 25974
HTRR 3.0 MTTR 1.0 Duty cycle 1.0 S+TE 67
Trng hrs 1 Repair parts $ 30 Tech doc pp 21 QSA 1
******************* SUPPORT POLICY SUMMARIES ****************
Contractor Military Local
Depot Depot Repair Discard
LIFE CYCLE COST 8930.8 5524.9 5516.8 5895.6
INITIAL COSTS:
Production 5060.2 5060.2 5060.2 5060.2
Training 0.0 0.1 0.9 0.0
Spares 23.9 23.9 16.2 131.4
S+TE 0.0 80.1 81.9 0.0
Tech. Doc. 0.0 4.2 4.2 0.0
**TOTAL 5084.1 5168.5 5163.3 5191.6
OPERATION AND SUPPORT COSTS:
Wage
Training
Spares
Repair
Transportation
S+TE
Tech. Doc.
**TOTAL 3846.7 356.4 353.5 704.1
Support Posture Assigned: Military Depot
****************************************
135.8
0.0
5.7
3705.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
186.0
0.1
5.7
111.2
1.7
49.2
2.6
181.1
2.7
5.7
111.2
0.0
50.3
2.6
135.8
0.0
568.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
E-14
EXCITER
INPUT DATA
**********Quantity
MTRR
Trng hrs
1 UC(lot)
3.0 MTTR
1 Repair parts $
950 1 ot
1.0 Duty cycle
30 Tech doc pp
100 MTBF
1.0 S+TE
21 QSA
11737
67
2
******************* SUPPORT POLICY SUMMARIES ****************
Contractor Military Local
Depot Depot Repair Discard
LIKE CYCLE COST
INITIAL COSTS:
Production
Training
Spares
S+TE
Tech. Doc.
**TOTAL
35476.6
26910.0
27774.0
26994.4
27681.1
26912.4
35102.8
706.4
0.0
203.6
0.0
0.0
26706.4
0.1
203.6
80.1
4.2
26706.4
0.9
119.1
81.9
4.2
26706.4
0.0
1458.7
0.0
0.0
28165.1
OPERATION AND SUPPORT COSTS:
Wage
Training
Spares
Repair
Transportation
S+TE
Tech. Doc.
**TOTAL
300.6
0.0
66.4
8199.6
0.0
0.0
0.0
411.6
0.1
66.4
246.0
3.7
49.2
2.6
400.8
2.7
66.4
246.0
0.0
50.3
2.6
300.6
0.0
6637.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
8566.6 779.6 768.7 6937.7
Support Posture Assigned: Local Repair
**************************************
E-17
SYNTHSIZER
INPUT DATA
**********Quantity
IITRR
Trng hrs
1 UC(lot)
3.0 HTTR
1 Repair parts
525 lot
1.5 Duty cycle
30 Tech doc pp
100 MTBF
1.0 S+TE
21 QSA
15674
67
2
LIFE CYCLE COST
INITIAL COSTS:
Product i on
Training
Spares
S+TE
Tech. Ooc.
**TOTAL
*******************
Contractor
Depot
21245.9
14758.8
0.0
94.5
0.0
0.0
14853.3
SUPPORT POLICY SUMMARIES ***************'
Military Local
Depot Repair Discard
15552.3
14758.8
0.1
92.9
80.1
4.2
14936.1
15500.0
14758.8
0.9
49.3
81.9
4.2
14895.1
18342.8
14758.8
0.0
612.3
0.0
0.0
15371.1
OPERATION AND SUPPORT COSTS:
Wage
Training
Spares
Repair
Transportation
S+TE
Tech. Doc.
**TOTAL
225.1
0.0
27.5
6140.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
6392.6
349.8
0.1
27.5
184.2
2.8
49.2
2.6
616.1
337.6
2.7
27.5
184.2
0.0
50.3
2.6
604.9
225.!
0.0
2746.6
0.0
O.C
0.0
0.0
2971.7
Support Posture Assigned: Local Repair
**************************************
E-18
TWO-WIRE
INPUT DATA
**********
Quantity
MTRR
Trng hrs
1 UC(lot)
3.0 MTTK
0 Repair parts
160 lot
1.0 Duty cycle
200 Tech doc pp
100 MTBF
1.0 S+TE
21 QSA
22624
67
3
******************* SUPPORT POLICY SUMMARIES ****************
Contractor Military Local
Discard
LIFE CYCLE COST
INITIAL COSTS:
Production
Training
Spares
S+TE
Tech. Doc.
**TOTAL
Depot
8936.4
4497.9
0.0
22.9
0.0
0.0
4520.8
Depot
5728.9
4497.9
0.0
22.9
80.1
4.2
4605.1
Repair
5715.9
4497.9
0.0
14.5
81.9
4.2
4598.5
5366.3
4497.9
0.0
132.5
0.0
0.0
4630.4
OPERATION AND SUPPORT COSTS:
Wage
Training
Spares
Repair
Transportation
S+TE
Tech. Doc.
**TOTAL
155.9
0.0
5.8
4253.8
0.0
0.0
0.0
4415.6
213.5
0.0
5.8
850.8
1.9
49.2
2.6
1123.8
207.9
0.0
5.8
850.8
0.0
50.3
2.6
1117.4
155.9
0.0
579.9
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
735.9
Support Posture Assigned: Discard
*********************************
E-19
SWITCH
INPUT UATA
**********
Quantity
MTKR
Trng hrs
1 UC(lot)
3.0 NTTR
1 Repair parts
400 1ot
1.0 Duty cycle
30 Tech doc pp
100 MTBF
1.0 S+TE
21 QSA
12837
67
2
******************* SUPPORT POLICY SUMMARIES ****************
Contractor Military Local
Depot Depot Repair Discard
LIKE CYCLE COST
INITIAL COSTS:
Production
Training
Spares
S+TE
Tech. Uoc.
**TOTAL
19125.0
11327.7
12093.0
11410.9
12053.9
11381.4
14639.6
11244.8
0.0
82.9
0.0
0.0
11244.8
0.1
81.7
80.1
4.2
11244.8
0.9
49.7
81.9
4.2
11244.8
0.0
564.8
0.0
0.0
11809.6
OPERATION AMD SUPPORT COSTS:
Wage
Training
Spares
Repair
Transportation
S+TE
Tech. Doc.
**TOTAL
274.8
0.0
25.6
7497.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
7797.4
376,
0,
25,
224.
3.4
49.2
2.6
682.1
366.4
2.7
25.6
224.9
0.0
50.3
2.6
672.5
274.8
0.0
2555.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
2829.9
Support Posture Assigned: Local Repair
**************************************
E-20
REMOTE 1/0
INPUT DATA
**********
Quantity
MTKR
Trng hrs
1 UC(lot)
3.0 MTTR
1 Repair parts $
225
1.0
30
lot
Duty
Tech
cycle
doc pp
100
1.0
21
MTBF
S+TE
QSA
44444
67
1
******************* SUPPORT POLICY SUMMARIES ****************
Contractor Military Local
Depot Depot Repair Discard
LIKE CYCLE COST
INITIAL COSTS:
Production
Training
Spares
S+TE
Tech. Doc.
**TOTAL
8596.5
6347.6
6662.0
6431.3
6656.1
6425.5
6919.9
6325.2
0.0
22.4
0.0
0.0
6325.2
0.1
21.7
80.1
4.2
6325.2
0.9
13.4
81.9
4.2
6325.2
0.0
100.2
0.0
0.0
6425.4
OPERATION AND SUPPORT COSTS:
Wage
Training
Spares
Repair
Transportation
S+TE
Tech. Doc.
**TOTAL
79.4
0.0
4.2
2165.4
0.0
0.0
0.0
108.7
0.1
4.2
65.0
1.0
49.2
2.6
105.8
2.7
4.2
65.0
0.0
50.3
2.6
79.4
0.0
415.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
2248.9 230.7 230.5 494.5
Support Posture Assigned: Military Depot
****************************************
E-21
ANT CONTRL
INPUT DATA
**********
Quantity 1 UC(lot) 175 lot 100 MTBF 28818
MTRR 3.0 MTTR 1.0 Uuty cycle 1.0 S+TE 67
Trng hrs 1 Repair parts $ 30 Tech doc pp 21 QSA 1
******************* SUPPORT POLICY SUMMARIES ****************
Contractor Military Local
Depot Depot Repair Discard
LIFE CYCLE COST 8409.7 5352.9 5346.2 5656.8
INITIAL COSTS:
Production 4919.6 4919.6 4919.6 4919.6
Training 0.0 0.1 0.9 0.0
Spares 23.2 22.7 15.7 116.8
S+TE 0.0 80.1 81.9 0.0
Tech. Doc. 0.0 4.2 4.2 0.0
**TUTAL 4942.8 5026.6 5022.2 5036.4
OPERATION AND SUPPORT COSTS:
Wage • 122.4 167.6 163.2 122.4
Training 0.0 0.1 2.7 0.0
Spares 5.0 5.0 5.0 498.0
Repair 3339.5 100.2 100.2 0.0
Transportation 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.0
S+TE 0.0 49.2 50.3 0.0
Tech. Doc. 0.0 2.6 2.6 0.0
**TOTAL 3466.9 326.2 324.0 620.4
Support Posture Assigned: Military Depot
****************************************
E-22
AUD PUR SUP
INPUT DATA
**********
Quantity
HTkR
Trng hrs
1 UC(lot)
3.0 HTTR
1 Repair parts $
210
1.0
30
lot
Duty
Tech
100
cycl
doc
e
PP
1.0
21
MTBF
S+TE
QSA
32573
67
1
******************* SUPPORT POLICY SUMMARIES ****************
Contractor Military Local
Depot Depot Repair Discard
LIFE CYCLE COST
INITIAL COSTS:
Production
Training
Spares
S+TE
Tech. Doc.
**TOTAL
8998.7
5930.6
6309.8
6014.3
6297.2
6003.2
6666.9
5903.5
0.0
27.0
0.0
0.0
5903.5
0.1
26.4
80.1
4.2
5903.5
0.9
12.8
81.9
4.2
5903.5
0.0
126.4
0.0
0.0
6029.9
OPERATION AND SUPPORT COSTS:
Wage
Training
Spares
Repair
Transportation
S+TE
Tech. Doc.
**TOTAL
108.3
0.0
5.3
2954.6
0.0
0.0
0.0
3068.1
148,
0.
5.3
88.6
1.3
49.2
2.6
295.5
144.4
2.7
5.3
88.6
0.0
50.3
2.6
293.9
108.3
0.0
528.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
637.0
Support Posture Assigned: Military Depot
****************************************
E-23
AUO DATA I/O
INPUT DATA
**********
Quantity
HTRR
Trng hrs
1 UC(lot)
3.0 MTTR
1 Repair parts $
260 lot
1.0 Uuty cycle
30 Tech doc pp
100 MTBF
1.0 S+TE
21 U.SA
14881
67
1
******************* SUPPORT POLICY SUMMARIES ****************
Contractor Military Local
Depot Depot Repair Discard
LIFE CYCLE COST
INITIAL COSTS:
Production
Training
Spares
S+TE
Tech. Doc.
**TOTAL
14080.4
7309.1
0.0
52.7
0.0
0.0
7361.8
8033.2
7309.1
0.1
51.9
80.1
4.2
7445.4
8000.7
7309.1
0.9
24.6
81.9
4.2
7420.6
9301.7
7309.1
0.0
322.8
0.0
0.0
7631.9
OPERATION AND SUPPORT COSTS
Wage
Training
Spares
Repair
Transportation
S+TE
Tech. Doc.
**TOTAL
237.1
0.0
14.3
6467.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
6718.6
324.6
1
3
0.
14.
194.0
2.9
49.2
2.6
587.8
316.1
2.7
14.3
194.0
0.0
50.3
2.6
580.0
237.1
0.0
1432.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1669.8
Support Posture Assigned: Military Depot
****************************************
E-24
BATTERY CASE
INPUT DATA
**********
Quantity 1 UC(lot) 50 lot 100 MTBF 86957
HTKR 3.0 MTTR 10.0 Duty cycle 1.0 S+TE 67
Trng hrs 0 Repair parts $ 60 Tech doc pp 21 QSA 3
******************* SUPPORT POLICY SUMMARIES ****************
Contractor Military Local
Depot Depot Repair Discard
LIFE CYCLE COST 2556.6 1802.7 1790.1 1505.4
INITIAL COSTS:
Production 1405.6 1405.6 1405.6 1405.6
Training 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Spares 3.2 3.2 2.9 12.1
S+TE 0.0 80.1 81.9 0.0
Tech. Doc. 0.0 4.2 4.2 0.0
**TOTAL 1408.8 1493.1 1494.6 1417.7
OPERATION AND SUPPORT COSTS:
Wage 40.6 190.4 175.8 40.6
Training 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Spares 0.5 0.5 0.5 47.1
Repair 1106.7 66.4 66.4 0.0
Transportation 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0
S+TE 0.0 49.2 50.3 0.0
Tech. Doc. 0.0 2.6 2.6 0.0
**TOTAL 1147.8 309.6 295.6 87.7
Support Posture Assigned: Discard
*********************************
E-25
AUD DAT CONTKL
INPUT UATA
**********
Quantity
MTKR
Trng hrs
1 UC(lot) 180
3.0 MTTR 1.0
1 Repair parts $ 30
lot
Duty cycle
Tech doc pp
100 MTBF
1.0 S+TE
21 QSA
21978
67
1
******************* SUPPORT POLICY SUMMARIES ****************
Contractor Military Local
Depot Depot Repair
LIFE CYCLE COST
INITIAL COSTS:
Production
Training
Spares
S+TE
Tech. Doc.
**TOTAL
9635.4
5060.2
0.0
29.2
0.0
0.0
5089.3
5585.5
5060.2
0.
29.
80.
4.2
5173.7
5571.2
5060.2
0.9
16
81
4.2
5163.5
Discard
6048.4
5060.2
0.0
156.2
0.0
0.0
5216.3
OPERATION AMD SUPPORT COSTS:
Wage
Training
Spares
Repair
Transportation
S+TE
Tech. Doc.
**TOTAL
160.5
0.0
6.7
4378.9
0.0
0.0
0.0
4546.1
219.8
0.1
6.7
131.4
2.0
49.2
2.6
411.8
214.0
2.7
6.7
131.4
0.0
50.3
2.6
407.7
160.5
0.0
671.6
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
832.1
Support Posture Assigned: Military Depot
****************************************
E-26
ANTENNA
INPUT DATA
**********
Quantity
HTKR
Trng hrs
1 UC(lot)
3.0 HTTR
0 Repair parts
40
2.0
0
lot
Duty
Tech
100
cycle
doc pp
1.0
0
MTBF
S+TE
QSA
13158
0
3
******************* SUPPORT POLICY SUMMARIES ****************
Contractor Military Local
Depot Depot Repair Discard
LIFE CYCLE COST
INITIAL COSTS:
Production
Training
Spares
S+TE
Tech. Doc.
**TOTAL
8717.5
1132.8
1733.7
1212.6
1707.9
1209.4
1697.2
1124.5
0.0
8.3
0.0
0.0
1124.5
0.0
8.2
80.0
0.0
1124.5
0.0
5.0
80.0
0.0
1124.5
0.0
55.3
0.0
0.0
1179.8
OPERATION AND SUPPORT COSTS:
Wage
Training
Spares
Repair
Transportation
S+TE
Tech. Doc.
**TOTAL
268.1
0.0
2.5
7314.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
466.1
0.0
2.5
0.0
3.3
49.2
0.0
446.9
0.0
2.5
0.0
0.0
49.2
0.0
268.1
0.0
249.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
7584.7 521.1 498.5 517.4
Support Posture Assigned: Discard
*********************************
E-27
HANDSET
INPUT DATA
**********
Quantity
NTKR
Trng hrs
1 UC(lot)
3.0 HTTR
0 Repair parts
80 lot
2.0 Duty cycle
0 Tech doc pp
100 MTBF
1.0 S+TE
0 USA
780
0
3
******************* SUPPORT POLICY SUMMARIES ****************
Contractor Military Local
Depot Depot Repair Discard
LIFE CYCLE COST
lillTlAL COSTS:
Production
Training
Spares
S+TE
Tech. Doc.
**TOTAL
130370.0
2249.0
0.0
130.6
0.0
0.0
2379.6
10511.9
2249.0
0.0
130.6
80.0
0.0
2459.6
10063.6
2249.0
0.0
63.1
£0.0
0.0
2392.1
16903.1
2249.0
0.0
1721.0
0.0
0.0
3969.9
OPERATION AND SUPPORT COSTS:
Wage 4522.9
Training 0.0
Spares 84.1
Repair 123383.0
Transportation 0.0
S+TE 0.0
Tech. Doc. 0.0
**TOTAL 127990.0
7863.5
0.0
84.1
0.0
55.5
49.2
0.0
8052.3
7538.2
0.0
84.1
0.0
0.0
49.2
0.0
7671.5
4522.9
0.0
8410.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
12933.2
Support Posture Assigned: Discard
*********************************
E-28
BATTERY
INPUT DATA
**********Quantity
MTRR
Trng hrs
1 UC(lot)
0.3 MTTR
0 Repair parts 5
80 lot
2.0 Duty cycle
0 Tech doc pp
100 MTBF
1.0 S+TE
0 QSA
24
0
3
******************* SUPPORT POLICY SUMMARIES ****************
Contractor Military Local
Depot Depot Repair Discard
LIFE CYCLE COST
INITIAL COSTS:
Production
Training
Spares
S+TE
Tech. Doc.
X4030330.0
**TOTAL 5402.5
130887.0
5482.5
116801.0
3771.7
342672.0
2249.0
0.0
3153.5
0.0
0.0
2249.0
0.0
3153.5
80.0
0.0
2249.0
0.0
. 1442.7
80.0
0.0
2249.0
0.0
54839.4
0.0
0.0
57088.4
OPERATION AND SUPPORT COSTS:
Wage
Training
Spares
Repair
Transportation
S+TE
Tech. Doc.
**TOTAL
12249.6
0.0
2733.3
X4009950.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
120818.0
0.0
2733.3
0.0
1804.5
49.2
0.0
110247.0
0.0
2733.3
0.0
0.0
49.2
0.0
12249.6
0.0
273334.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
24024930.0 125405.0 113029.0 285584.0
Support Posture Assigned: Discard
*********************************
E-29
